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Abstract 
 
This Ph.D. thesis, titled Essays in Labor Markets – Gender, Fertility and Education, analyzes different 
economic problems within the field of labor economics. It consists of three independent research 
papers that can be read separately. Although the topic in each chapter is different, they have 
common ground in the empirical methods applied. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis, Does Early Childbearing Matter? New Approach Using Danish Register 
Data, studies how women’s timing of fertility affects their long-term labor market outcomes. This 
paper is currently resubmitted to the academic journal Labour Economics. 
Work interruptions related to childbearing are expected to affect mothers’ wages directly 
through changes in the formation of human capital. This effect is proposed as being 
exceptionally strong for early childbearing women who are about to start their working careers. 
This study investigates whether the poor long-term labor market outcomes experienced by 
women who first gave birth before turning 25 reflect previously existing disadvantages or are a 
consequence of the timing of childbearing. The purpose is also to observe whether a new 
combination of the best identification practices of earlier studies serves as a better estimation 
method. This is done by applying a within-family estimator while treating miscarriages as an 
exogenous variation, thereby mitigating family and individual heterogeneity, which might have 
biased earlier results based on either of the two identification strategies alone. It is found that 
early childbearing has no long-term effects on women’s earnings. There is a significant yearly 
earnings gap in the early 20s, which disappears by the age of 28, after which the trajectories are 
symmetric for the early and non-early childbearing mothers. I argue that a combination of the 
within-family method and the use of miscarriages as an exogenous variation serves as a better 
method for estimating the causal effect of early childbearing on women’s earnings. 
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In the second chapter of this thesis, The Family Earnings Gap Revisited: A Household or a Labor 
Market Problem?, I study the gender inequality in the child penalty in earnings. In this paper, I take 
on a new approach to analyze this puzzle. I exploit the intra household difference in gender 
composition between heterosexual and lesbian couples. There are multiple advantages in 
evaluating the child penalty in same-sex couples compared to heterosexual couples. First, the 
partners in same-sex relations will, by default, face the same kind of labor market treatment i.e., 
gender based advantages and disadvantages. Second, the comparative advantages and division of 
labor within the households are non-gender specific. First, I show that the child penalty on 
aggregate is lower in lesbian households relative to heterosexual households, even after 
controlling for education, timing of parenthood, and area of residence. Second, looking at the 
individual parents’ child penalty and comparing heterosexual women to the lesbian partner with 
less bargaining power shows that the child penalty is not due to intra household bargaining 
position. Lesbians with low bargaining power experience relatively low child penalty compared to 
the heterosexual mothers. The analysis also reveals that this difference in child penalty does not 
come from changes in labor market participation, but primarily from wage rates and the higher 
tendency for heterosexual women to take on part-time rather than full-time positions. Third, I 
show that the intra household earnings gap increases significantly due to parenthood in 
heterosexual households while it does not in lesbians households. 
All together, these results indicate that the observed gender inequality in child penalty is 
not a universal gender entity. The child penalty for mothers is much dependent on the partner 
and household organization and less dependent on labor market attitudes against mothers per se 
– although discrimination cannot be rejected and is still most certainly a significant problem. The 
results show that the child penalty can be lowered by sharing the household production with a 
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partner that is more engaged in childrearing and that this household organization most likely does 
not lower the overall household earnings, but rather the opposite. 
 
The third chapter, CEO Education and Corporate Environmental Footprint, is forthcoming in Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management and is written together Mario D. Amore, Morten 
Bennedsen and Birthe Larsen. In this paper we analyze the effect of CEO education on 
environmental decision-making. Estimating a wide array of regressions on a panel dataset of 
Danish firms from 1996 to 2012, we deliver the following findings. First, we find a positive 
association between CEO education and the firms’ energy efficiency: better educated CEOs use 
significantly less energy inputs (electricity and gas) per employee. Second, we seek to establish the 
causal direction of our findings by using CEO hospitalization events, which generate temporary 
and arguably exogenous separations between CEOs and their firms without changing the 
matching between the two. Third, we estimate the effects of long education in different fields 
showing a positive association between electricity efficiency and a CEO’s advanced education in 
business-related fields. Fourth, using a comprehensive survey on individual values and 
preferences, we show that highly educated CEOs exhibit stronger personal concerns for climate 
change. They are also significantly more likely to own environment-friendly vehicles, such as fuel-
efficient cars and electric cars. Taken together, our findings suggest that education shapes 
managerial styles giving rise to greater sustainability in corporate actions. 
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Resumé (Danish) 
 
I denne Ph.D.-afhandling, Essays in Labor Market, Fertility and Education, undersøges der en række 
økonomiske problemstillinger inden for det brede felt af arbejdsmarkedsøkonomi. Afhandlingen 
består af tre uafhængige forskningsprojekter og kapitlerne kan derfor læses uafhængigt af 
hinanden. Omend emnerne for hvert af de tre kapitler er forskellige, har de alle et fælles grundlag 
i den empiriske metode. 
 
Det første kapitel, Does Early Childbearing Matter? New Approach Using Danish Register Data, der i 
øjeblikket er genindsendt til 2. runde peer-review i tidskriftet Labour Economics, belyser hvorfor 
kvinder, der føder før de fylder 25, har en lavere livstidsindkomst end andre kvinder. Spørgsmålet 
er, om det skyldes fødselstidspunktet eller om det snarere kan tilskrives kvindernes ufordelagtige 
udgangspunkt, der er uafhængig af tidspunktet, de vælger at få børn på. Det kan umiddelbart 
være svært at dekonstruere indkomsteffekten, da de indkomstbetydende faktorer er 
sammenfaldende for hvornår kvinder vælger at få børn. Formålet med studiet er todelt: i) at 
estimere den sande effekt af fødselsalderen for danske kvinders indkomstudvikling på kort og 
langt sigt og ii) at afprøve de to mest anvendte estimationsmetoder og se om en ny kombination 
af disse producerer bedre og mere middelrette estimater. Dette gøres ved at anvende et 
søskendestudie og samtidig bruge ufrivillige aborter som eksogen variation for tidspunktet for 
kvindernes første fødsel. På den måde kontrolleres der for en række uobserverbare 
heterogeniteter, der kan påvirke sammenhængen mellem fødselsalderen og indkomster.  Studiet 
viser, at kvinders fødselsalder ingen betydning har på deres indkomstudvikling på lang sigt. På 
kort sigt er der en lille indkomstnedgang for de unge mødre, som dog forsvinder, når kvinderne 
er i slut 20’erne.   
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I det andet kapitel, The Family Earnings Gap Revisited: A Household or a Labor Market Problem?, 
undersøges kønsuligheden i karriereomkostningerne ved at få børn.  I dette kapitel anvendes en 
ny metode til at belyse dette omdiskuterede problem. Det bliver gjort ved at udnytte forskellen i 
kønssammensætningen for partnere i heteroseksuelle og lesbiske parforhold. Af data- og 
sammenligningsmæssige årsager analyseres der forældreskab, der forekommer igennem 
adoptioner. Denne metode har en række hensigtsmæssige egenskaber, i) er den komparative 
fordel og arbejdsdelingen i husholdningen ikke kønsbestemt i homoseksuelle parrelationer. ii) 
homoseksuelle forældre udsættes for samme form for kønsbaseret behandling på 
arbejdsmarkedet, dvs. de vil opleve samme kønsbaserede fordele og ulemper i gennemsnit. 
Studiet viser, at indkomstomkostningerne ved at få børn er lavere for lesbiske husstande end for 
heteroseksuelle hustande. Dernæst undersøges omkostningerne på individniveau ved at 
sammenligne heteroseksuelle kvinder med lesbiske kvinder. For at danne et sammenligneligt 
grundlag sammenholdes kvinder, der har samme relative styrkeposition i forhold til human og 
økonomisk kapital forældrene imellem inden for parforholdet. Jeg viser, at lesbiske mødre 
oplever en lavere omkostning ved at få børn end heteroseksuelle kvinder og at dette er gældende 
uanset hvilken styrkeposition kvinderne har. Analysen viser også, at indkomstforskellene ikke 
skabes pga. forskelle i arbejdsmarkedsdeltagelsen, men primært er båret af at de lesbiske kvinder 
har en højere lønstigning og arbejder flere timer efter de bliver forældre. Til sidst vises der, at 
løndifferencen imellem forældrene indenfor hustandende stiger for heteroseksuelle par men ikke 
for lesbiske par, når de bliver forældre.  
 
Det tredje kapitel, CEO Education and Corporate Environmental Footprint, er udarbejdet sammen med 
Mario D. Amore, Morten Bennedsen og Birthe Larsen, og er accepteret til publicering i tidskriftet 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. I dette kapitel undersøger vi, hvordan direktørers 
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uddannelse påvirker deres klimabeslutninger, både inden og uden for virksomhedsregi. Til 
analysen anvendes der unik energidata for danske virksomheder løbende fra 1996 til 2012, der 
sammenholdes med mikrodata for virksomhedernes regnskaber og direktørernes 
personkarakteristika. Vi finder en stærk positiv sammenhæng mellem direktørernes 
uddannelsesniveau og virksomhedernes energi-effektivitet. Vi prøver dernæst at identificere de 
kausale forhold, ved at anvende eksogene sundhedsstød til direktøren. Der vises, at når en 
direktør med høj uddannelse bliver indlagt på et sygehus og dermed er fraværende fra 
virksomhedsdriften, falder virksomhedens energieffektivitet markant. Det samme gør sig dog 
ikke gældende for direktører med lavere uddannelsesniveauer. Ydermere fremgår det, at 
uddannelsesniveauet er korreleret med større klimabevidsthed, hvor højtuddannede direktører 
udviser en større bekymring for klimaændringerne – en bekymring der omsættes til handling, 
også i privatlivet, hvor de på gennemsnittet vælger mere miljøvenlige biler. De samlede resultater 
indikerer, at mere uddannelse er med til at skabe lederevner, der kan forbedre virksomhedernes 
bæredygtighed. 
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Introduction 
 
This Ph.D. thesis is composed of three chapters. It should be noted that while all three chapters 
are independent research papers and can be read as such, they all address topics within the broad 
field of Labor Economics. The first chapter analyzes whether long-term labor market outcomes 
experienced by women who gave birth at an early age reflect previously existing disadvantages or 
are a consequence of the timing of the childbearing.1 The second chapter analyzes whether the 
child penalty in earnings experienced primarily by women is a universal gender entity or due to 
the partner’s characteristics or gender. The third and last chapter, analyzes the effect of CEO 
education on environmental decision-making.2 While the first two chapters are within the field of 
household economics and analyze the labor market’s outcomes for individuals around 
childbirths, the last chapter lies within the intersection of educational, environmental and 
management economics. Although the chapters are not entirely within the same branch of 
economics they all address highly relevant societal questions. Gender equality, the influence 
family formation has on careers and climate saving causations are debated more than ever and are 
matters all societies need to address.  
 
Traditionally, arguments in economics dealt with the broad questions. Is free trade better 
than mercantilism? Is capitalism a better system than communism? Why do the economies of 
some countries grow so much faster than others? Later economists have turned to address 
questions that are narrower but still very important. The first economists were philosophers and 
political thinkers as much as they were economists. Today many of us see ourselves more like 
engineers designing bridges and dams. Like engineers with cranes, calipers and slide rulers, we use 
our own tools – logical theoretical models, mathematics and econometrics – to solve specific 
                                                     
1 This chapter is currently resubmitted to the academic journal Labour Economics 
2 This chapter is forthcoming in the academic journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
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problems. It is no wonder that many great economists who helped turn economic principles into 
powerful tools for designing the real-world economy started off in natural sciences or as 
engineers. 
 
Economists have a specific way of thinking about societal problems. The British economist 
Lionel Robbins (1898-1984) once defined economics as the study of scarce resources (Robins, 
2007). Where there are scarcities, there are costs, since they force us to choose between resources 
and how to allocate them. One of the most important scarcities is time, which is omnipresent in 
most economic studies. This choice set is asymmetric, since we often deselect multiple things 
every time we select only one. The choice set seems to grow with the technological progress, 
providing ever more possibilities. This together with the “fear of missing out” (FOMO) - which 
has coined the Millennium Generation - and the illusion of unique rights to abundancy – which 
has manifested a righteous belief that we can have everything at once - are increasing the 
complexity and pressure of choosing. Every choice is dear. The pressure of choice is affecting us 
all and when faced with unrealistic beliefs and without training choosing can be stressful. In 
economics, this cost of not obtaining everything else is called Opportunity Cost, which simply sums 
up all the forgone utility you could have obtained if you had chosen otherwise. Rationally, we 
should calculate whether the utility of our choice is higher than for all other possible choices. The 
opportunity is often gone before we are done calculating and then what is left is only the cost of 
calculating. No wonder economist live their lives obsessing about lost opportunities. There are so 
many of them. On the other hand, this is also what brings food to the tables of economists. If 
there was no opportunity cost to study, there would be no need for our skills. “Luckily” for new 
aspiring economists the opportunities seem endless and so does our job.  
The span of resources analyzed often stretches far beyond pecuniary items. It covers all 
sorts of valuables such as be the bricks used to build a kindergarten, the books in a library or the 
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drugs needed to cure diseases. Or as in this thesis the cost of parenthood on labor market 
outcomes and human capital gains on green decision making. Gary Becker (1930-2014), the 
groundbreaking Chicago-economist, is one of the reasons that economics does not only deal with 
industries, firms, prices and profit. He broke down the division between the “economic” and the 
“social” - or as some might argue, he economized the social. The philosophy of the Chicago 
School of Economic was that markets and prices are the basis of how society works. Becker took 
this further than most. Firms calculate costs and benefits to earn the biggest profit, but Becker 
reasoned that the same calculations are made on a household level (Becker, 1992). 
Although controversial at the beginning, Becker laid the foundation most of the present 
time labor/household economists base their work on today, where economists are getting used to 
analyze topics as the marriage “markets”, child “penalties” and household “production”. Even 
the wording of core social decisions have been economized. A crucial input to household 
production is time, which is the omnipotent scarce resource for humanity. Children are time-
intensive “goods”. Few choices will have a higher demand on your time. The cost of having 
children is for Becker similar to the cost of leisure; the income you give up by not working. This 
means that every second you read a book you also forgo income, the same intuition can be used 
when you spend time with your loved ones. There are some fixed costs of getting children such 
as the cost of food, housing, clothing etc., but more importantly are the non-fixed opportunity 
costs. These can vary for many reasons. Example given, the higher wages the higher is the cost of 
children, since you forgo more income. On the other hand, it is important to account for the 
benefits. Just as reading can be beneficial for your cultural and human capital, children can serve 
as an income and caretaking insurance in the long run.3 
 
                                                     
3 In this case, long run is being pre-death. I am specifying this so not to discourage any Keynesian readers.  
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In this thesis, I study three economic problems, all of which address the opportunity costs in 
different situations. All the studies are empirically based. The key to all three chapters is to find 
the counterfactual. Just observing and reporting the outputs for each group will not provide any 
meaningful identification of the problems. Using the term counterfactual might lead the reader to 
think about great “what-if” books, where the author presents an alternative existence that could 
have been reality if some detrimental historical situation had turned out differently.4 In some 
ways, the job of an empirical economist mirrors the one of the “what-if” novelist. In other ways, 
it does not. The most important difference is that the counterfactual used in research must be 
grounded in theory and data, and not only serve as an interesting thought experiment, which 
sometimes makes the job and the results less fun and dramatic. 
Empirical research is most valuable when it uses data to answer specific causal questions, as 
if in a randomized clinical trial. Ideal experiments are often hypothetical, but even hypothetical 
experiments are worth considering and are useful when formulating a realistic research question. 
A good starting point is to imagine how to study the research question with no financial 
constraints or ethical boundaries. If you cannot formulate or design an experiment that can 
provide the answers in a world where all is allowed, the chances that any empirical research can 
provide meaningful insights are slim. Thinking about the ideal experiment also helps pinpoint the 
identifying causation of the problem in hand and to identify which mechanisms you would want 
to vary and which to be constant. 
In the absence of a real experiment, it is common to look for the second best, which often 
can be found using well-controlled comparisons and/or natural quasi-experiments. Common to 
all of my studies is that real clinical trials are infeasible. Although intriguing, it is neither possible 
nor ethical to randomly assign individuals to have children or not, nor to assign the CEOs to 
firms. I then had to search for quasi-natural experiments unfolding in the real society.  
                                                     
4 E.g., The Plot Against America – Philip Roth, The Man in the High Castle – Philip K. Dick, and The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union – Michael Cabon. 
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Of course, some quasi-natural experimental research designs are more convincing than 
others, but the econometric methods used in my studies are almost always fairly simple. The 
belief is that estimators in common use almost always have a simple interpretation that is not 
heavily model-dependent. Good econometrics cannot save a shaky research agenda, but the 
promiscuous use of fancy econometric techniques can sometimes bring down a good one. 
This approach puts a high demand on the quality of data, its availability and level of detail. 
We live in a data-centric era that presumes Big Data to be the solution to all our problems. Data 
science skills are demanded everywhere, from social media companies to public policy 
administrations. But data is profoundly dumb in itself. Big Data can tell us “everything” about 
correlations among endless variables. The fetish of obtaining countless observations in order to 
find these hidden correlations has diluted the commonsense and often serves as a veil of 
ignorance more than being unveiling. In economics 101, I learned to chant “correlation is not 
causation” and with good reason. The chant increases the awareness to separate the two effects, 
but does not give the tools to do so. Although it does not take an economics degree to know that 
the rooster’s crow does not cause the sun to rise or that playing basketball does not increase your 
height, formal training in administering data together with social theory surely helps in solving 
societal problems of higher complexity. The chant has followed me every step through my 
research, where I have tried to combine the power of data with solid economic theory, in order 
to avoid spurious correlations, reverse causalities or formulating theories with no place in the 
observed world. 
All three studies exploit the highly detailed and powerful data available on the Danish 
population. The possibility to identify each individual and to match information from several 
registers and surveys over long periods is a luxury many economists only dream of. This data, or 
what people today might call Big Data, provides excellent ground to seek the causes of the 
economic problems addressed in this thesis. 
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Having a huge population can be exploited in two ways. One is to apply general models on 
the full population to exploit all the statistical power while controlling for a wide range of 
confounding variables. This is effective for analyzing overall trends, heterogeneity effects, and 
localizing a high proportion of the variance of the effect in question. Although powerful, it 
sometimes overlooks the details forming the causal relation between two effects. The other way 
to exploit the data is to carefully select subsamples that might work as a quasi-natural experiment. 
Each strategy has its advantages. I have chosen the latter. Common for all three chapters is the 
strong selection criteria applied to address each research question. I have focused on finding 
equivalent treatment and control groups, where they are as identical in the main metrics as 
possible. This allows me to isolate the effect of interest and analyze how it affects the treated and 
controlled population differently. This tedious selection process comes at a cost. The final sample 
sizes are significantly reduced after imposing the inclusion criteria, leaving me with less statistical 
power, which otherwise could have been used to do further heterogeneity tests. The goal of this 
thesis is to study economic problems using novel empirical identification strategies, which can be 
re-applied on other, greater or later data. The contribution should therefore be twofold, one is 
the results and knowlegde obtained on Danish data, the other is the methodological precedence. 
 
In chapter 2, I try to compare how parenthood affects the labor market outcomes of men 
and women differently. Comparing men and women is interesting in many ways. We hold a 
strong identification in our gender, which is internalized through a vast socialization process. We 
are divided and categorized as either he or she from an early age, often long before our bodies are 
aware of this distinction. As in many other aspects, we identify much of our economic outcomes 
to be affected by the gender we are given (or in some cases, the gender we take). A thorough 
discussion of this enveloping socialization process is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
therefore only briefly discussed in the chapters. 
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“The woman is both Eve and Virgin Mary. She is an idol, a servant, the origin of Life, the power of darkness; she is the 
elementary silence of Truth, she is artifice, gossip and lies; she is the healer and the sorceress, she is man’s prey, she is his 
ruin, she is everything he is not and wants, his negation and his raison d’être. She is the Other, she is Evil through which 
Good can exists.”  
- Simone de Beauvoir (Les Temp modernes’ 1948)  
This quote by de Beauvoir encapsulates some of the ways we think about gender. First, it 
pinpoints that when comparing genders, it is often from a masculine viewpoint. Women is “the 
other” while Men is the first, the main, and most of all the default gender. All comparisons made 
are therefore embedded in this power relation, where women are compared to men and not vice 
versa. This was the case in 1948, but remains so in many aspects to this day. Especially in 
questions of labor and household economics, where one of the major objectives is to identify 
why women do not work as much as men, take different educations than men, work in different 
sectors than men, followed by the overall question of why women earn less than men. These 
analyzes are often conducted without noticing that men’s situations is set as the bar, indicating 
that the man’s way of living is the preferable. In my view, identical earnings between men and 
women is not the goal in itself, since every woman and every man, or for that matter every 
person has unique preferences, and the average of that is merely a measure of anybody’s. 
Preferences changes in time and culture, which makes a universal goal rather meaningless. The 
question about gender equality often masks other meritocratic determinants for how to conduct 
our lives. Thus, the true goal of equality for anybody of any gender is to be able to live their lives 
based on their merits. The foremost job of gender economics must be to unmask what is causing 
the gender differences in possibilities rather than in outcomes.  
Second, de Beauvoir’s quote also states that much is demanded of the women. A women 
has to be many things at once in order to fulfill her feminine role. She has to be Eve and Virgin 
Mary. To be “both” rather than “either” also influences the woman’s role as a mother. In chapter 
2, I address the trade-off between working and staying at home to take care of the children. In 
Denmark, we call women who work so hard outside the home that they barely have time for 
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their children for Ravnemødre (“raven mothers”). It is meant as an insult. The opposite is a 
Hønemor (“hen mother”), who dotes on her children as a hen dotes on her eggs. This is hardly 
complimentary, either. In chapter 2, I address the issue of when to have children. For financial 
reasons, women are told that they are supposed to finish their studies and be well established in 
the labor market before having children. For biological considerations, women are told not to 
wait until they are too old, since fertility drops significant with age. These “kind” suggestions 
provide a narrow window for when the women are supposed to feel confident in having children.   
Whatever mothers do, it seems, they are expected to feel guilty about it. It is not my job to decide 
or judge how mothers should live their lives, but merely to map what determines their course of 
lives. This is the first step in localizing the societal obstacles that hinder women to live the lives 
they want.  
Third, de Beauvoir articulates the philosophical problem of even comparing the genders. 
This comparison is more than just an economic exercise and demands strong methodological 
considerations, for how to compare outcomes of genders on the basis of exactly the gender? 
Without taking further epistemological considerations, it might end up in a vicious tautological 
circle. All attempts at explanation depend, whether explicitly or implicitly, on drawing parallels 
between the thing to be explained and some other thing that we believe we already understand. 
But the fundamental problem in explaining the experience of gender is that there is nothing 
remotely like it to compare it with. It is itself so imbedded in all of our experiences. We can never 
try to be the other – or if we try by changing sex, we can never not have tried to be both, which 
also separates us from the pure binary experience of biological uniqueness in experience. 
Phenomenologically it is unique. There is an irresistible temptation for an analytical process to 
move from uniqueness to its assumed non-existence, since the reality of the unique would have 
to be captured by concepts that apply to nothing else. Thus comparing men and women is only 
possible to the extent that we shall never assume the separate genders to become the other. We 
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can turn to literature and the arts for inspiration where there is a long history of describing a 
counterfactual world where men are perceived as women or vice versa. Rosalind fooled 
everybody by her disguise as Ganymede in Shakespeare’s As You Like It. Similar transformations 
have been made in other stories in order for the woman to gain the privileges of the man (e.g., 
Dorothea in Don Quixote and Éowyn in Lord of the Rings) and in legendary stories of war 
heroines (e.g., Jeanne d’Arc and Hua Mulan). This phenomenon also extends to real life where 
female authors have taken a male alter ego, where Karen Blixen became Isak Dinesen, Mary Ann 
Evans became George Elliot and Charlotte Brontë became Currer Bell. Fictitious or not, 
common to all these example is that the women dipped their toes in the pool reserved for the 
men, only for once again to return to their own pool. The water may have been mixed but the 
pools still have their assigned gender.  
In economics, we analyze the gender on a higher stratum, meaning that we do not 
necessarily need to understand the depth of the socialization process involved. We often see the 
genders as zeroes and ones, rather than socialized ideographic identities. This comes at a cost, but 
enables us to evaluate the difference between the genders on an aggregate level. This is a 
powerful tool and economics is thus important to identify key gender differences in the societies. 
Our results should aim at drawing broad conclusions and highlight unfairness based on 
systematic and nonsensical differences between the genders. In order to do that we ought to 
forget about the ideographic destinies while conducting our studies, since these would inhibit any 
form for macro-level social theory or general empirical results. However, it is important that we 
recall the idea of individualism again, when our results are done and our conclusions are to be 
made. Alfred Marshall, one of the founding fathers of economics, described the economic 
doctrine as “not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth” 
(Hodgson, 2005).  
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In Chapter 1 and 2, I show that women bear a high labor market cost of having children, 
while men do not. This is in line with the long strand of research documenting gender inequality 
in child penalty. In this light, it may seem like a mystery why any woman would like to have 
children. Although economists tend to focus on materialized outcomes, it is indeed important to 
mention the non-quantifiable benefits of having children. Bertrand (2013) finds that the biggest 
premium to life satisfaction is associated with having a family and that it is much higher than the 
premium of having a career. Furthermore, working too much and having spent too little time 
with their family is often one of the biggest regrets among the elderly (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 
2002). Thus, one might ask why we evaluate the child penalty as a penalty and not as a life 
satisfaction premium. Is there a general glorification of the career way of living in the western 
world and do we obsess too much about our work-life? Maybe it is possible for women to have 
both career and family, as men have been able to. This raises the question whether a family can 
master two career-orientated spouses at once. Maybe we are too embedded in the Beckerian 
terminology or maybe we economist tend to neglect what is not easily quantified? Whereas 
income is graspable, concepts of satisfaction, contentment and love are not. One question is, if 
any society or individual can survive even the smartest subordination to the efficiency of love. 
The other question is, whether we can survive without it. 
 
The French economist Thomas Piketty is afraid that economics has isolated itself and that 
it should never have sought to divorce itself from the other social sciences (Piketty, 2014). He 
claims that social sciences collectively know too little to waste time on foolish disciplinary 
squabbles. If we are to progress in our understanding, we must take a pragmatic approach and 
avail ourselves of the methods of historians, sociologists, and political scientists as well.  
The philosophers of ancient Greece, at the very early stage of what can be categorized as 
economics, were concerned with life’s most fundamental questions, questions that we still 
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struggle with to this day. What does it take to live well in a human society? What do people need 
to be happy and fulfilled? What makes them truly thrive? That is where economics started and, 
after all it is where it must begin from again.  
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Work interruptions related to childbearing are expected to affect mothers’ wages 
directly through changes in the formation of human capital. This effect is proposed 
as being exceptionally strong for early childbearing women who are about to start 
their working careers. This study investigates whether the poor long-term labor 
market outcomes experienced by women who first gave birth before turning 25 
reflect previously existing disadvantages or are a consequence of the timing of 
childbearing. The purpose is also to observe whether a new combination of the best 
identification practices of earlier studies serves as a better estimation method. This is 
done by applying a within-family estimator while treating miscarriages as exogenous 
variation, thereby mitigating family and individual heterogeneity, which might have 
biased earlier results based on either of the two identification strategies alone. It is 
found that early childbearing has no long-term effects on women’s earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
Estimating the causal effect of early childbearing on women’s labor market outcomes is a long-
standing challenge for researchers. Early childbearing is often perceived as both a social and an 
economic problem, creating challenges for both society and the mother in question. There is a 
widespread belief that early childbearing is negatively correlated with women’s educational 
attainment, employment prospects, and lifetime earnings. I investigate whether the long-term 
socioeconomic problems experienced by women who give birth before age 25 reflect already-
existing disadvantages or are a consequence of the timing of childbearing. In contrast to common 
belief, I find no evidence that early childbearing has long-term negative effects on women’s 
earnings. 
To do this, I analyze the full population of Danish mothers in the years from 1980 to 2014. 
The advantages of the data are threefold. First, the data are register-based, which makes it 
possible to observe the entire population of Danish mothers to obtain a very large panel. Second, 
the data include a large number of demographic, educational, income, labor market, and health 
variables, which makes it possible to control for a large set of important confounding factors. 
The detailed health registers provide an especially strong advantage to the identification strategy 
outlined below by distinguishing terminated pregnancies into miscarriages and induced abortions. 
Third, the administration of the registers’ historical information is highly reliable. 
These features make it possible to analyze the impact of early childbearing in a novel way 
by combining two strong identification strategies, each of them designed to identify causal effects 
of early childbearing on adult labor market outcomes in different ways. Some previous studies 
used a within-family estimator to account for family heterogeneity (Geronimus & Korenman, 
1992). Others treated miscarriages as an exogenous variation on women’s childbirth timing (Hotz 
et al., 1997). This paper constructs three samples to compare and implement both strategies and 
evaluate whether a combination of the two provides better estimates. 
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The first sample consists of pairs of early and non-early childbearing sisters. The second 
consists of early childbearing women and non-early childbearing women who were also pregnant 
early but were forced to delay their first childbirth due to a miscarriage. These samples are 
constructed to replicate earlier studies and examine whether the same results can be obtained 
with Danish women. The results for both suggest that early childbearing has a significant negative 
effect on earnings and educational attainment. 
The third sample is a combination of the first two. It consists of early childbearing women 
and their non-early childbearing sisters who also were pregnant early but delayed their first 
childbirth due to miscarriage. The negative effects of early childbearing on earnings disappear and 
the effect on education diminishes substantially when a within-family estimator is applied using 
sisters who miscarried at an early age. 
These results show the advantages of this novel combination of identification strategies, 
which eliminates the potential biases each strategy faces when applied on its own. Even though 
sisters share backgrounds, adolescence, and genes, there may remain some unobserved 
heterogeneity between early childbearing women and their non-early childbearing sisters, as birth 
timing is highly endogenous to individual features. On the other hand, even though miscarriages 
are highly random and delay childbirth, they are not entirely unbiased to biological and social 
features. I incorporate a highly detailed health variable to address the biological bias. Aschraft et 
al. (2013) showed that socially disadvantaged women have a higher risk of miscarrying even after 
controlling for health, which suggests that studies using miscarriages for exogenous variation 
without further controls for family heterogeneities may also biased. 
A combination of the two identification strategies addresses these biases. The use of a 
within-family estimator assures the validity of treating miscarriages as exogenous variation by 
addressing the heterogeneity in social and family backgrounds between the miscarrying and non-
miscarrying women. Together with controlling for the possible negative correlations between 
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health and miscarriages, this produces a better causal estimate of the effect of early childbearing 
on adult labor market outcomes.   
The main result of this study is that early childbearing has no persistent effect on women’s 
earnings, which suggests that the inferior earnings of early childbearing women are not due to 
having children young but to pre-existing disadvantages in ability and social factors. This paper 
thus makes two contributions. The first is methodological: showing that a combination of earlier 
practices is a better estimation method. The second is the result for Danish women: that early 
childbearing does not need to have long-term effects in a country with strong public welfare 
institutions. 
In this study, early childbearing is defined as giving birth to a child before turning 25.5 
However, the results are robust to different threshold ages and specifications.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short literature review. Section 3 
summarizes the institutional settings. Section 4 outlines the data used in the study. Section 5 
explains the econometric strategy. Section 6 presents the results and robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
   
2. Literature Review 
Academics face a great challenge in identifying the effects of fertility on labor market outcomes,  
because career and family planning can rarely be separated and often influence one another. This 
simultaneity problem is difficult to resolve and casts doubt on the reliability of earlier results 
based on cross-sectional evidence or individual fixed effects methods. 
Leung et al. (2016) showed that Danish women who delay childbirth have higher earnings. 
This is either due to (i) the child penalty, in which childbirth causes significant disruptions to 
education and career, leading to lower human capital accumulation and reduced wages; or 
                                                     
5 This benchmark age of early childbearing is discussed thoroughly in Section 4. 
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(ii) selection, in which early childbearing women are inherently different from later childbearing 
women and would not have performed as well in the labor market whenever they gave birth.  
Childbirths have in general been found to be costly for women. Just as the “gender gap” 
describes the discrepancy between male and female wages, the “family gap” refers to the 
discrepancy between mothers’ and non-mothers’ earnings. Becker’s household production theory 
(1965) claims that the opportunity cost of working increases after having a child, and as a result 
effort and productivity in the workplace decrease. The family gap has been confirmed repeatedly 
in empirical studies. Goldin (2014) and Blau and Kahn (2017), among others, found large wage 
loses associated with motherhood in the U.S.A.6 The same has been found in Germany (Adda et 
al., 2017; Schönberg & Ludsteck, 2014; Ejrnæs & Kunze, 2013), France (Wilner, 2016; Coudin et 
al., 2018), Canada (Phipps et al., 2001), and even the relatively gender-equal Scandinavian 
countries (Light & Ureta, 1995; Simonsen & Skipper, 2006; Angelov et al., 2016; and Kleven et 
al., 2018). Although the gap has narrowed, it is still significant in most countries (Kleven & 
Landais, 2017). 
The timing of childbearing may have several direct and indirect effects. An early drop in 
human capital investment—whether a result of interruptions to education or to work—has been 
shown to have long-term negative effects in the labor market (Gerster et al., 2014). This results in 
a self-reinforcing spiral of lower employment and slower human capital build-up, resulting in an 
inferior career path (Mincer & Ofek, 1982; Baum, 2002). People who miss or disrupt good 
opportunities early in their careers can be locked into poor career paths (Mroz & Savage, 2006; 
Bell & Blanchflower, 2011).  
Alternatively, the timing of first childbirth can be seen as an indicator of women’s endowed 
human capital. By reversing the causality, we can see the timing of first childbirth as an economic 
marker of women’s labor productivity and preferences regarding working careers. For example, 
                                                     
6 Others findings on the family gap in the U.S. include Gronau (1974), Bronars & Groggar (1994), Angrist & Evans 
(1998), and Goldin (2014). 
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the price of their time is lower than that of highly productive women, which Gronau (1974) 
dubbed the “shadow-price” of early childbearing. 
The empirical literature contains ambiguous results on whether the child penalty is bigger 
for early childbearing women. Depending on the statistical approach and the age that defines early 
childbearing, the estimated effects range from big to almost zero. There is a vast range of 
empirical studies on teenage motherhood. The earliest cross-sectional studies found large 
negative effects of teenage childbearing (e.g., Card & Wise, 1978). A stream of sister studies 
found reduced but still significant negative effects on labor and educational outcomes 
(Geronimus & Korenman, 1992; Hoffman et al., 1993, on US data; and Holmlund, 2005, on 
Swedish data). Hotz et al. (1997 and 2005) were the first to use miscarriages as an instrument to 
study the effects of delaying age at first birth. They found negative short-term effects of teenage 
childbearing but insignificant or small positive long-term effects for some outcome variables 
using U.S. data. Other studies using miscarriages as an instrument for birth timing have tended to 
estimate modest effects of teenage childbearing on women’s subsequent education and earnings 
(Ashcraft et al., 2013; Fletcher & Wolfe, 2009; and Ermisch, 2003, and Goodman et al., 2004, on 
English surveys). Other identification strategies have been used to elicit the causal effect of 
childbirth timing: Ribar (1994) used age at menarche and found nonexistent or adverse effects of 
teenage childbearing on high school completion, whereas Klepinger et al. (1999) found significant 
reduction in years of education and subsequent earnings, both of them using the same strategy on 
U.S. data. Using propensity-score matching with different weights has also been popular, often 
showing negative effects of teenage childbearing (Diaz & Fiel, 2016; Chevalier & Vittanen, 2003). 
Levine and Painter (2003) used within-school propensity-score matching and found that a large 
part of the disadvantage teenage mothers face in high school completion is due to previously 
existing disadvantages, not to the childbirth itself. 
Delaying motherhood can be beneficial in adolescence but also later in life. A smaller set of 
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studies have analyzed the effects of delayed motherhood among older women. Hofferth (1984) 
used cross-sectional methods on U.S. data and found positive results of delay. Albrecht et al. 
(1999) and Taniguchi (1999) found similar results by applying longitudinal methods to Swedish 
and U.S. data, respectively. Miller’s (2011) study was the most recent to exploit miscarriages as 
exogenous variation and found that delayed motherhood led to substantial increases in earnings 
for American women. Other creative identification strategies have been used in this literature: 
Cristia (2008) used variation in pregnancy outcomes due to fertility treatment and found 
increased employment for American women who delayed due to unsuccessful fertility treatment. 
Mølland (2016) used abortion availability to study fertility delay in Norway and found a positive 
effect of delay on educational attainment. Wilde et al. (2010) criticized the instruments used in 
earlier studies, questioning both measurement errors and the validity of the exogeneity when 
using time-varying instruments; they instead used events occurring in early age and the 
characteristics of parents, but still found positive effects of delayed childbirth. Fitzenberger et al. 
(2013) also questioned the non-dynamic approach of earlier studies and used an explicit dynamic-
treatment approach on German data. Arguing that non-treated individuals today may be treated 
in the near future and incorporating these dynamics into their study, they found significant 
evidence of lost employment due to becoming a mother. The effect was particularly pronounced 
for the medium-skilled. Herr (2016) also addressed the heterogeneity in the effect by skill set, 
comparing women with the same educational levels who differed in having a child before or after 
entering the labor market. Herr (2016) argued that estimates based on age understate the return 
on delayed motherhood for women who are still childless at labor market entry. Diaz and Fiel 
(2016) claimed that the consequences of early motherhood are heterogeneous and vary greatly by 
socioeconomic background.7 
Ambiguous predictions can be drawn from these alternative theories and findings. Some 
                                                     
7 Other studies have suggested that the responsibilities of motherhood could even serve as a positive turning point in 
the lives of troubled youth (Brubaker & Wright, 2006; Edin & Kefalas, 2005). 
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offer reasons to believe that early childbearing mothers can encounter substantial short- and 
long-term difficulties in the labor market, while others claim that the observed child penalty is 
due to selection rather than the timing of first childbirth. 
 
3. Institutional Settings 
Denmark has a strong welfare state of the Scandinavian model, which combines considerable 
redistribution through high taxes with generous family policies intended to support the female 
labor supply, among other inequality-depleting objectives. Public childcare is universal and 
heavily subsidized from around 6 to 12 months after birth. Universal job-protected and paid 
maternal leave is provided until the child reaches the age at which public childcare is available. 
Mothers who have a child during their studies are also supported, both with extended time to 
complete their degrees and by receiving double the universal government student stipend for a 
year.8 In addition, all parents who live with their children are eligible for supplementary child 
support from their local municipalities. The support starts when the child is born and ends when 
the child turns 18.9 Although parents are not fully compensated for the direct costs of raising a 
child, these fees are non-trivial, especially for the lowest earners. The opportunity costs of early 
motherhood in a Scandinavian welfare state model are thus expected to be low relative to 
countries whose institutional settings provide fewer social benefits and higher returns on human 
capital investments. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the previous section, studies in a Scandinavian 
context have still found non-trivial educational and labor market penalties for early childbearing 
women (e.g. Leung, 2016; Holmlund, 2005; Albrecht et al., 1999; and Mølland, 2016). It is 
therefore an ongoing puzzle whether the effect of early childbearing on labor market outcomes is 
                                                     
8 All students enrolled in tertiary educations get a monthly fee transferred from the public system. In 2018 this fee 
was DKK 6,018 a month.  
9 The fee in 2018 is around DKK 4,500 a month when the child is an infant and declines through adolescence, 
ending around 1,000 a month when the child is a teenager. Furthermore, if either parent is eligible for social welfare, 
parents living with the child about half the time receive extra child supplements. The rules and fees have changed 
several times, but the basic principles have remained the same. 
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caused by the timing of childbearing or selection, even in the Scandinavian countries.  
 
4. Data 
I use the Danish administrative register data, covering the full population of Danish mothers in 
the years from 1980 to 2014. These data are provided by Statistics Denmark and include many 
different registers. I use registers with annual information on socioeconomic variables (e.g., age, 
gender, education), income (yearly income, earnings, and a crude measure of wage rates), 
employment status (e.g., employed, self-employed, unemployed), and family identifiers. The 
parents in the sample are connected with their children through family links and personal 
identification numbers.10 
For the final population, I can observe each individual’s family situation, number and 
gender of children, age, and marital status. I exclude individuals whose datasets are incomplete in 
any of these metrics. All monetary values are converted in real terms to year-2014 price levels 
using the Danish Consumer Price Index, obtained from Danish National Accounts. 
Central to this study are the special health data provided by the Danish National Patient 
Register, which holds records of every individual patient’s contacts with Danish Secondary 
Health Care from 1977. The data include detailed descriptions of all contacts with the health 
services, including diagnoses.11 In this study, all pregnancies are investigated and categorized as 
either completed or aborted. The ability to distinguish between intentionally and unintentionally 
terminated pregnancies (abortions and miscarriages, respectively) is essential to this study. 
Unspecified diagnoses are excluded.  
I construct three samples. The first consists of sister pairs of early and non-early 
childbearing sisters; early childbearing is defined as giving birth before turning 25. The second 
                                                     
10 The data are anonymized for privacy by Statistics Denmark. The family links and variables are pulled from the 
FABE register up until 1986 and from the BEF register thereafter. 
11 All diagnoses are reported in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) system. The use of the Danish 
National Patient Register serves as a non-subjective measure of the women’s health levels, as opposed to surveys. 
25 
 
consists of women who gave birth before turning 25 and women who did not but who were 
pregnant before turning 25, suffered a miscarriage, and were forced to postpone their first 
childbirth until after 25. Women in the last group who had induced abortions after their 
miscarriage but before turning 25 are excluded from the second sample, thereby removing 
women who clearly wished to postpone motherhood. The third sample is a combination of the 
first two. It consists of women who gave birth before turning 25 and their non-early childbearing 
sisters, who were pregnant before turning 25, but suffered a miscarriage and, were forced to 
postpone their first childbirth until after 25. Sisters who had induced abortions after their 
miscarriage but before turning 25 are also excluded from sample 3. For comparability, I select 
only women who do become mothers before turning 40.12 In some families, more than two 
sisters meet the inclusion criteria. 
For some families more than two sisters meet the inclusion criteria. This leaves me with 
34,784 families in sample 1 (S1), with 36,093 early childbearing mothers and 37,042 non-early 
childbearing mothers. For sample 2 (S2), in which I do not restrict the mothers to being sisters 
but do require the non-early childbearing mothers to have had an early miscarriage, there are 
123,825 early childbearing mothers and 4,880 non-early childbearing mothers. After the very 
stringent inclusion criteria of sample 3 (S3) are imposed, the sample size diminishes to 938 
families, with 1,076 early childbearing mothers and 938 non-early childbearing mothers. Despite 
these strict inclusion criteria, the final samples are large in comparison with other studies on early 
childbearing that use within-family models or estimation methods treating miscarriages as 
exogenous variation.13  
Defining young mothers 
I define first-time mothers aged 24 or younger as early childbearing in this study. In general, 
                                                     
12 This also include women who adopt. Adoptions account for less than 1% of the total fertility. 
13 Geronimus & Korenman (1992) used three different panel data sets, containing, respectively, 129, 182, and 223 
sister pairs. Hotz et al. (2005) had 1,042 women with early pregnancies, but only 72 of these ended in miscarriage. 
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Danish women have children relatively late in life, with first-time mothers being older than 29 on 
average. The U.K. and U.S. have the highest proportions of teenage mothers among Western 
countries, and Denmark has one of the lowest. In 1995, the teen birth rate in Denmark was 
0.83%, while it was 2.84% and 5.44% in England/Wales and the U.S. respectively (Sedgh et al. 
2014). In the mid-1990s, the proportion of Danish women giving birth to their first child before 
turning 25 was lower than the proportion of American women giving birth to their first child 
before turning 20 (National Vital Service).  
Having children while studying can be extremely demanding and may lead to lower 
educational attainment and lower adult wages. Danes finish school at a relatively high age; 
whereas the majority of British women graduating from their tertiary education are in their early 
twenties, most Danish women are in their late twenties.14  
Previous studies using Scandinavian data have also defined early childbearing as having a 
child before the age of 25 (Jacobsen, 2010; Duus, 2007; Jørgensen et al., 2013; Leung et al., 2016, 
on Danish data; and Olausson et al., 2011, on Swedish data). Lastly, Danish public policy often 
uses 25 as the upper threshold for being a young mother.15   
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the age at first childbirth for the relevant cohorts in 
Denmark. Twenty-three percent of Danish mothers are early childbearing mothers, defined as 
giving birth before turning 25. 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 The relatively high graduation age could be a consequence of different societal and cultural influences. Education 
is free of charge in Denmark, and all students are financially supported by the government with a monthly stipend of 
about DKK 6,000. It is also normal to take a gap year after high school and to work while taking tertiary education. 
Together, these factors relieve the financial pressure of rushing through studies. See Table A1 and A2 in the 
appendix for details on graduation ages in Denmark as compared to the U.K. 
15 So does the major private aid organization for Danish mothers, Mothers Aid. See for example the Annual Report 
2013 of Mothers Aid (in Danish, Mødrehjælpen). 
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Figure 1 - Age at First Childbirth for Women Born in 1967 
 
Note. The graph shows the distribution of age at first birth for women in the 1967-cohort. 1967 is the average year of 
birth for the women of this study. 
Main Variables  
The three main outcome variables in this study are (i) yearly earnings, (ii) adult earnings, and (iii) 
educational attainment. Yearly earnings consists of all labor earnings in a given year.16 Adult 
earnings is aggregated labor earnings from age 25 to 40, the longest I could follow the individual 
mothers in the data. Educational attainment is the length of education in years, from entering 
elementary school to finishing the highest-ranked education program.17 It can take years for 
women’s work lives to balance after childbirth, which is why I use measures capturing both 
dynamic and cumulative labor earnings. Most studies have focused on the penalties to yearly 
earnings at a certain age, and a few have looked at cumulative earnings penalties over time.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the main variables and variables for educational level, 
wage rate, labor participation, year of birth, average number of diagnoses in adolescence, and 
parental educational level. The time-invariant variables are shown at age 40. The wage rate is the 
                                                     
16 The yearly earnings are pulled from the IND (income) register from Statistics Denmark. The variable used is 
LOENMV, which consists of all labor income, fringe benefits, other tax-free income, employee bonuses, and 
realizations of stock options (https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/personindkomst/loenmv). 
17 The ranking is as follows: primary and lower-secondary school (9–10 years of schooling mandatory for all Danes), 
high school (upper secondary school, which is optional and takes 3 years), vocational education (an alternative to 
high school with a typical duration of 3 years), short academy profession post-high school programs (with a 
maximum duration of 2 years). Undergraduate degree programs are 3- to 3.5-year post–high school professional, 
bachelor, and undergraduate programs (academic bachelor’s programs). Master’s and PhD programs are university 
graduate programs; a master’s degree takes 2 years (on top of the 3 years for the undergraduate degree), and a PhD 
requires an additional 3 years. The education levels and lengths are pulled from Statistics Denmark’s Educational 
Register (UDDA), and the variables used to create educational length are HFPRIA and HFAUUD.  
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hourly wage estimated by Statistics Denmark.18 Labor participation is a dummy taking the value 1 
if the woman had any labor earnings in a given year and 0 otherwise. The table shows that the 
mothers of sample 1 are in general better off with regard to the measures of labor earnings and 
education, followed by the mothers in sample 2, and the mothers in sample 3 are worst off. 
There are significant within-sample differences between the early and non-early childbearing 
mothers in samples 1 and 2, with the early childbearing sister being worse off in every variable. 
This within-sample difference disappears in sample 3 for most variables. One of the exceptions is 
the educational level and length, where the non-early childbearing sisters are doing better, 
although the differences are smaller than in sample 1 and 2. The non-early childbearing sisters 
have 0.72, 0.78, and 0.38 years longer education on average than the early childbearing mothers in 
Sample 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
The other significant difference between sisters in sample 3 is in the health variable, which 
is the women’s average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence (ages 12–18). All diagnoses 
relating to pregnancy, birth, and fertility treatment are excluded in order not to bias the variable 
with pregnancy-related health problems. The mean value of this health variable across the 
samples is shown in Table 1. In general, there are no extreme differences among sisters, but 
unsurprisingly the non-early childbearing mothers in sample 2 and 3 have the most diagnoses. 
Lastly, the table also shows that the mothers in sample 3 come from the least educated 
backgrounds, with their parents having lower educational attainment than those of the mothers in 
sample 2 or in sample 1, which has the best-educated parents. The big difference between the 
early and non-early childbearing mothers in sample 2 indicates that it is important to control for 
family background, either by including parental education in the regressions or differencing it out 
                                                     
18 Although wage rate is an appealing measure of productivity, the wage rate provided by Statistics Denmark is only 
estimated on the basis of several metrics, and is not a directly observed hourly wage. The variable is TIMELON, 
pulled from the IDA register up to 2007 and from the LONN register from then on. I only include the observables 
indicated as high quality or marked as highly reliable (TLONKVAL < 40). Only a subset of about 70% have usable 
hourly wage estimates after cleansing and quality-proving the variable, which is why this is not used as a main 
variable in this study. 
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in a family fixed effect model. 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics by Sample and Childbearing Timing 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
 1NEC 1EC Diff (1)-(2) 2NEC 2EC Diff (5)-(6) 3NEC 3EC Diff (9)-(10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(Adult earnings) 14.80 14.59 0.21*** 14.67 14.54 0.12*** 14.50 14.46 0.04 
 (0.82) (1.02)  (0.97) (1.08)  (1.08) (1.10)  
Education Length 13.12 12.39 0.72*** 13.01 12.25 0.76*** 12.37 11.99 0.38*** 
 (2.13) (2.18)  (2.23) (2.17)  (2.24) (2.27)  
Primary and Secondary 
Education 0.20 0.29  -0.09*** 0.22 0.32  -0.10*** 0.28 0.36  -0.08*** 
 (0.40) (0.45)  (0.41) (0.47)  (0.45) (0.48)  
Vocational Education 0.45 0.48  -0.03*** 0.45 0.48  -0.03*** 0.48 0.44 0.03 
 (0.50) (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50)  
Tertiary Education 0.35 0.23 0.12*** 0.33 0.21 0.12*** 0.25 0.20 0.05** 
 (0.48) (0.42)  (0.47) (0.41)  (0.43) (0.40)  
Yearly Earnings 269,761.6 249,410.0 20,351.6*** 261,192.2 242,132.8 19,059.4*** 234,725.3 229,975.1 4,750.2 
 (155,496.3) (153,075.1)  (161,809.8) (151,677.4)  (157,00.0) (168,454.3)  
Wage Rate (#) 186.39 172.82 13.58*** 184.48 172.79 11.68*** 171.07 167.39 3.68 
 (62.44) (55.27)  (63.56) (54.93)  (56.75) (49.90)  
Labor Participation 0.90 0.87 0.02*** 0.87 0.86 0.01** 0.85 0.85 0.00 
 (0.30) (0.33)  (0.34) (0.35)  (0.36) (0.36)  
Age at first Birth 28.92 22.02 6.91** 27.42 21.91 5.51*** 27.17 21.55 5.62*** 
 (3.65) (1.82)  (3.23) (1.85)  (2.94) (1.95)  
Birth Year 1967.74 1966.77 0.97*** 1967.53 1967.15 0.38*** 1967.05 1966.59 0.46*** 
 (4.48) (4.42)  (4.64) (4.73)  (4.40) (4.43)  
Diagnoses 0.25 0.26  -0.005*** 0.30 0.27 0.03*** 0.31 0.27 0.04** 
 (0.48) (0.51)  (0.54) (0.53)  (0.52) (0.54)  
Mother's Education   10.08 9.39 0.69***    
    (3.16) (2.90)     
Father's Education (##) 10.56 10.48 0.07*** 11.01 10.39 0.61*** 10.03 9.98 0.05 
 (3.34) (3.32)   (3.40) (3.28)   (3.27) (3.24)   
Observations 37,042 36,093   4,880 123,825   938 1,076   
Note. 1EC and 1NEC are the early and non-early childbearing sisters in sample 1. 2EC and 2NEC are the early and non-early childbearing 
mothers in sample 2. 3EC and 3NEC are the early and non-early childbearing sisters in sample 3. Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural 
logarithm of the labor earnings from ages 25 to 40. Education Length is the years of the education from entering elementary school to 
finishing the highest ranked education. Primary and Secondary Education is a dummy indicating if the highest obtained education is either 
elementary or high school. Vocational Education is a dummy indicating if the highest obtained education is vocational training. Tertiary 
Education is a dummy indicating if the highest obtained education is any tertiary education, such as short cycle, medium cycle, bachelor, 
master or doctoral degrees. These three categories are mutually exclusive. Yearly Earnings consists of all labor earnings at age 40. Wage Rate is 
the hourly wage at age 40. (#) The observation numbers for this variable is lower since wage rates are only recorded for a subsample of the 
working population: 27,543; 25,919; 3,504; 86,449; 636; and 731 observations for 1NEC, 1EC, 2NEC, 2EC, 3NEC, and 3EC, respectively. 
Labor Participation is a dummy taking the value 1 if the women have any labor earnings in the given year. Diagnoses is the average number of 
diagnoses per year excluding all pregnancy related diagnoses. Mother’s and Father’s Education is the educational length of the sample women’s 
parents – the small differences in the fathers’ education length between the sisters in sample 1 and 3 are due to the few sisters with different 
fathers. (##) The observation number for the father’s education is also lower since some of the fathers’ education length are not available: 
34,271; 33074; 842; and 968 observations for 1NEC, 1EC, 3NEC and 3EC. There are none-missing for S2, since it is a control variable 
used in the regressions on this sample are women with missing information on their father’s education excluded. Monetary values are 
translated into year-2014 DKK using the Consumer Price Index from the Danish National Accounts. 1DKK≈0.13€. T-test for the 
difference in means between the early and non-early childbearing within the sample are shown at significant levels: p*<0.10, **0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
My goal is to estimate the causal effect of early childbearing on women’s labor market outcome 
and educational attainment against the alternative of waiting. The first step in identifying this 
effect is to control for observable factors associated with both alternatives. One approach is to 
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estimate the parameters in the following equation: 
(1)   , 
where yijt is the outcome variable of interest for individual i in family j at time t, whether it is the 
natural logarithm of adult earnings, yearly earnings, or educational length. EC is a dummy 
indicating early childbearing. γ is the coefficient of interest, estimating the effect of early 
childbearing. X is a vector of observable family- and individual-variant variables, such as the 
woman’s age, number of diagnoses, and birth order. Fj is a vector of observable family-invariant 
variables: immigration status and parental education level. Year is a year dummy included to 
absorb time effects common to all women. Let δ be the individual unobservable heterogeneity 
and α be the unobserved family heterogeneity, which is the same for all members of the same 
family – for example, parental involvement and social background.19 Cross-sectional models 
produce biased estimates if EC is correlated with the error term ε, as a result of omitted variables 
or reverse causality. Women may have differing priorities for family and career that lead some of 
them to both invest less effort in work and begin childbearing sooner. Further bias arises if 
women’s fertility timing is responsive to actual or anticipated career outcomes. If women with 
higher earnings potential postpone motherhood in order to reduce the financial penalty, the 
cross-sectional estimates will overestimate the benefits of postponing childbearing.  
For my first approach, I follow Geronimus and Korenman (1992) and apply a within-
family estimator to remove any family heterogeneity. This method compares sisters, one of 
whom is early childbearing and the other not. By taking the family averages, (2), and then 
subtracting it from the individual levels, (3), both the observed, F, and unobserved, α, family 
characteristics are removed from the model, (4). The idea is that after the heterogeneity that 
comes from the women’s social background is removed, the remaining differences between the 
                                                     
19 Some studies have proposed that parental involvement actually differs between their children. Hence, the parents 
are more involved in their first born than in the rest of their children. This phenomenon will be discussed in details 
later. 
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sisters’ outcomes should be due to the difference in their age at first childbirth. The equations 
below show the within-family transformation of the family fixed effects estimator: 
(2)   
(3)   
(4)   
The family fixed effects model requires strict exogeneity within each family to be unbiased, 
which implies that early childbearing should be random among sisters, conditionally on X. 
Individual heterogeneities between the sisters certainly still exist and may be correlated both with 
likelihood of early childbearing and with labor market outcomes. This problem can be partially 
resolved by controlling for pre-childbearing observables. Unobserved individual heterogeneities 
between the sisters, such as abilities and priorities for family and career, may still bias the 
estimator if no further measures are taken. 
For my second approach, I follow Hotz et al. (1997) and exploit miscarriages as exogenous 
variation in timing of childbearing. There should not be any pre-pregnancy life-planning 
differences between the miscarrying and the non-miscarrying women, because all of them were 
pregnant with no evident intention of terminating the pregnancy. This addresses the selection 
problems between the early and non-early childbearing women. 
Although miscarriages are perceived as highly random, three concerns must be raised: (i) 
Miscarriages may adversely affect the women psychologically. This could lead to later labor 
market effects if the miscarrying women suffer from longer spells of depression. Regan (2001) 
found that severe psychological effects of miscarrying predominantly affect women who 
experience recurrent miscarriages, which he estimates to be less than 1% of women. It is 
therefore doubtful that this effect will bias the results. (ii) Women with poor health and risky 
behavior during pregnancy may be more likely to miscarry. Both of these factors are also 
correlated with women’s labor market outcomes. Individuals with health problems generally 
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perform worse in the labor market (Smith, 2009). This makes it difficult to separate differences in 
labor market performance due to miscarriage from those due to poor health. Although I cannot 
observe the pregnant women’s behavior, medical evidence does not support a strong impact of 
behavioral factors on risk of miscarriage (Merck, 1999).20 To address the health concern, I apply a 
control variable that captures the systematic health differences between the sisters, explained in 
detail in section 3. (iii) Ashcraft et al. (2013) and Fletcher and Wolfe (2009) found that even if 
miscarriages are biologically random, they are not socially random. Women from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds have a higher probability of miscarrying even after health differences 
are controlled for. 
Finally, I combine the two approaches and estimate the effect of early childbearing on 
women’s adult earnings, yearly earnings and educational attainment by applying a within-family 
estimator and using sisters who postponed childbearing due to miscarriage.21 This strategy has the 
advantages of both strategies and also exhibits significant synergistic effects when the two are 
applied together. While miscarriages serve as an exogenous variation in timing of childbearing, 
addressing most of the selection issues, the within-family estimator addresses the bias due to 
family and social heterogeneities, which might affect both childbearing timing and the social bias 
in miscarriages. Lastly, I use controls for the sisters’ health and birth orders to address possible 
biases due to biological heterogeneities in miscarriages and intra-family biases, respectively.22 
To implement the three identification strategies, I construct three samples, described in 
detail in section 3. I apply the standard family fixed-effects model on sample 1, with additional 
controls for health, birth order, and year dummies. On sample 2, I apply an OLS regression in 
which members of the control group were all pregnant before age 25 but miscarried and thus 
postponed childbearing until after turning 25, while also controlling for health, birth order, and 
                                                     
20 Chatenoud et al. (1998), George et al. (2006), and Venners et al. (2004) found mixed results on the impact of 
smoking on pregnancy losses. 
21 This strategy is an extension of my previous work presented in my Master Thesis (Rosenbaum, 2014). 
22 Some literature find evidence for birth order effects on economic outcomes, see Berhman & Taubman (1986), 
Ejrnæs & Portner (2004), Black (2005), Sulloway (1996), Price (2008) and Ladner (1971). 
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year dummies. For this sample, I also control for the observed time-invariant family variables 
such as parental education level and being immigrants.23 On sample 3, I apply the family fixed 
effects model, conditioning it so that the control sister was pregnant before 25 but miscarried and 
thus postponed childbearing until after turning 25, while also controlling for health, birth order, 
and year dummies.  
Visual Evidence 
To evaluate the common trend assumption and the strength of treating miscarriages as 
exogenous variation, I reorganize the panel as an event study to show the exact timing of the 
labor market divergence between early and non-early childbearing mothers. I define the event t0 
as the age at first birth for the early childbearing mother and as the age at miscarriage for the 
non-early childbearing mother.24 Since the non-early childbearing sisters in sample 1 do not have 
a natural event benchmark, the early childbearing sister’s age at first birth is defined as the event, 
t0, for all sisters in the family. I follow the women from t0-5 to t0+16.  
The panels in figure 2 show a high degree of common trend up until t0-1 for the early and 
non-early childbearing women in sample 2 and 3, indicating similar labor, educational, and marital 
trajectories. The figure shows that there are bigger pre-event differences within sample 1, where 
fewer non-early childbearing sisters are married and more are undertaking an education. Panel A 
shows that the trajectories in yearly earnings are similar before the event but diverge at that time: 
the early childbearing mother falls behind just after the event for all samples. The gap between 
the early childbearing and non-early childbearing mothers then persists through the time series 
for sample 1 and 2, but it narrows and almost disappears for sample 3. The trajectories are similar 
for labor participation, shown in Panel C. 
The trends are in fact also similar when looking at panel C, where the ratio of women who 
                                                     
23 Immigrant is defined as a dummy equal to 1 if the mother is a first- or second-generation immigrant. 
24 If the non-early childbearing woman had multiple miscarriages, I use the last one before age 25 as the event. 
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are either married or in cohabiting relationships is depicted. The pre-event gap in married women 
is much larger in sample 1 compared to sample 2 and 3. Lastly, panel D shows the ratio of 
women under education, defined as not having completed their highest educational attainment. 
This panel shows similar trends for all women and does not indicate any drastic change in 
pursuing education due to having or expecting to have a child.25 One small difference remains, 
the panel shows that the non-early childbearing women in sample 1 are pursuing education for a 
bit longer than the rest of the women. Altogether, this is in line with the prediction that there 
would be less pre-pregnancy differences between the miscarrying and the non-miscarrying 
women, because all of them were pregnant with no evident intention of terminating the 
pregnancy. This suggests that treating miscarriage as exogenous variation addresses the possible 
pre-birth heterogeneities between the mothers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
25 This may be due to Danish institutional settings, where education is free and students are subsidized with a 
monthly transfer from the government of around DKK 6,000 while undertaking any tertiary education. The 
consequences of the specific Danish institutional settings will be discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 2 – Time Trends, Crude Means by Sample and Early Childbearing 
          Panel A. Yearly Earnings              Panel B. Labor Participation 
 
 
                            Panel C. Marriage           Panel D. Under Education 
  
Note. The figures show the crude means around the event from t-5 to t+16 of the early and non-early childbearing women in Yearly 
Earnings (panel A), Labor Participation (panel B), Marital Status (panel C), and being in Education (panel D). The event is defined as the 
age of first birth for the early childbearing mother and as the age of the miscarriage for the non-early childbearing mother. For Sample 1 
the early childbearing sister’s age at first birth is defined as the event for all sisters in the family. Labor Participation is a dummy taking the 
value 1 if the women have any labor earnings in the given year. Marriage is defined as either marriage by law or being in a cohabiting 
relationship. Under Education is defined as not having completed their highest educational attainment. Monetary values are translated into 
year-2014 DKK using the Consumer Price Index from the Danish National Accounts. 1DKK≈0.13€. 
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Amenability to Generalization: Global or Local Treatment Effect? 
Ideally, the sample selection process of this study provides a universe in which the only 
systematic difference between the sisters is the timing of their first births. This is done by 
imposing strict inclusion criteria and thus focusing on the few specific women who are very 
much alike. Murphy (2005) argued that the number of early pregnancies in a family is correlated 
with poor socioeconomic status, indicating that the estimates obtained on the basis of the 
samples might be interpreted as a local treatment effect that does not account for the entire 
population of early childbearing mothers. On the other hand, the majority of early childbearing 
mothers come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds in the first place, which suggests 
that this study is relevant for most of the cases.  
 
6. Results 
The main outcome variables of this study are yearly earnings, the natural logarithm of adult 
earnings, and educational attainment. As shown in the summary statistics and in the time-trends 
panels of figure 2, there are significant differences in earnings and educational attainments within 
and across the samples. For sample 3, the within sister differences are smaller and the gap in 
yearly earnings diminishes over time. Table 2 shows the results on adult earnings and educational 
length at age 40 for the women from all three samples. In these regressions, I only include non-
early childbearing related controls to get the total effect of early childbearing on the outcome 
variables. That is controlling for health and birth order, while also controlling for parental 
education and immigration status when applying the non-sister sample 2.  For sample 1, the 
family fixed effects results show that early childbearing before age 25 lowers the women’s adult 
earnings from age 25 to 40 significantly, by 18.4%, in comparison to their non-early childbearing 
sisters. This implies that early childbearing imposes a substantial earnings penalty even after 
family heterogeneities are controlled for. The results also show that early childbearing is 
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associated with lower educational attainment by 0.62 years. For sample 2, the estimated cost of 
early childbearing is reduced to 9% for adult earnings and to 0,59 years for educational length.26 
However, the results from sample 3 show that early childbearing does not have any 
significant impact on adult earnings, with a point estimate close to zero. It also produces a 
reduced though still significant estimate of 0.29 years for the penalty of early childbearing on the 
education length. 
This shows that there is a big difference between applying the two methods separately and 
together to estimate the early childbearing effect. The combined method addresses the 
unobserved individual and social heterogeneities better, which may indicate bias in the results of 
the first two methods. The standard family fixed effects model and the use of miscarriages as 
exogenous variation alone may overestimate the negative consequences of early childbearing.  
The coefficients for Diagnoses are negative, large, and significant for the regression outputs 
of all three samples, which shows the size of the effect of health on earnings and educational 
attainment. Together with the fact that health is (weakly) negatively correlated with the non-early 
childbearing mothers of samples 2 and 3, this indicates that omitting health controls can lead to 
bias in estimates when miscarriages are used for exogenous variation. The negative effect of early 
childbearing decreases a little when the health variable is excluded, but the difference is 
insignificant.27 Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions.28 
                                                     
26 In untabulated regressions, I include controls correlated with the timing of early childbearing, such as the women’s 
educational level, total number of children and marital status at age 40. The estimates of the early childbearing 
coefficient is then a measure of the partial effect of early childbearing on adult earnings and educational level. The 
partial effect is significant lower, but remains negative at 7% and 5% on adult earnings for sample 1 and 2, 
respectively. The estimates for educational length stay intact at 7.5 months and 7 months negatively for sample 1 and 
2, respectively. For sample 3, the partial effect of early childbearing on adult earnings are now positive but 
insignificant at 1%, while it is negative and significant at 2 months of education. These regressions should be 
interpreted with caution, since the post-birth controls are highly endogenous to the early childbearing variable.  
27 Even though I control for the women’s health, concerns remain about how to specify the health variable 
optimally. A good control variable must capture the important health differences between the sisters, i.e. the factors 
that are highly correlated with labor market outcomes. The health variable is the yearly average number of non-
pregnancy-related diagnoses. Some diagnoses might be more relevant than others however. Although this variable 
weighs all diagnoses evenly, it does capture the most important variations. Serious illnesses such as cancer are often 
complex and involve several diagnoses, which is captured in the health variable. 
28 Applying a threshold age for early childbearing has advantages, but it does not exploit all the variations in the data. 
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Table 2 - Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult Earnings) Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Early Childbearing 
(EC) -0.1838*** -0.6173*** -0.0904*** -0.5862*** -0.0160 -0.2887*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.044) (0.088) 
Diagnoses -0.0957*** -0.1351*** -0.1771*** -0.2268*** -0.1936*** -0.1983* 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.057) (0.112) 
Birth order 0.0074 0.1775*** -0.0315*** 0.0159 0.0530 0.2101 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.013) (0.071) (0.139) 
Father's Education  0.0190*** 0.0861*** 
  
   (0.001) (0.002) 
  
Mother's Education  0.0286*** 0.1504*** 
  
   (0.001) (0.002) 
  
Immigrant   -0.4533*** -0.8228*** 
  
     (0.030) (0.058)     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Obs. 73,135 73,135 128,705 128,705 2,014 2,014 
Group Obs. 32,588 32,588   934 934 
R^2 0.022 0.050 0.029 0.091 0.024 0.025 
Note. Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) are estimated using a family fixed effect model. Column (3) and (4) are estimated using a cross 
sectional OLS. EC is a dummy indicating early childbearing. Education is the length of the women’s total education measured in years, 
Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural logarithm of the adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a dummy indicating whether the sister is 
the oldest, Diagnoses is the average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Father's and Mother's education is the education length 
of the women's parents measured in years. Immigrant is a dummy indicating being a first or second-generation immigrant.  Significant 
levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. err. in the parenthesis, clustered at sister level.  
These results show the effect of early childbearing on the level effect at 40. It is interesting 
to evaluate the trajectories in yearly earnings between the early and non-early childbearing women 
from age 20 to 40. Figure 3 depicts the point estimates and confidence intervals at the 95%-level 
of the effect of early childbearing on yearly earnings, obtained using the same identification 
strategies as the one for table 2. It shows significant negative effects starting in the early 20s 
(around first childbirth) for all samples. This effect diminishes with age but remains significantly 
negative throughout the women’s late 20s and 30s for samples 1 and 2. While the early 
childbearing mothers of sample 2 are catching up faster than those in sample 1, the yearly 
earnings penalty is statistically significant, at around DKK 12,000 and 15,000 at age 40, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The use of a continuous age for the first childbirth variable instead of a dichotomous variable therefore provides a 
valuable robustness check. New sampling criteria are needed for this approach for both sister samples, however. 
Sister sample 1 now consists of all sisters with different ages at first childbirth. Sample 3 now consist of mothers 
(non-sisters and sisters respectively) among whom the control sister had a miscarriage at the same age as the 
treatment mother bore her first child. The control sister was therefore pregnant at the same age as the early 
childbearing mother but miscarried and therefore postponed motherhood. A comparison of ages at first childbirth 
will estimate the linear effect of age at first childbirth and therefore assume linearity in the effect of yearly delay. The 
implications remain the same when the linear functional form of age at first birth is used. For point estimates see 
Table A7 in the appendix.  
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respectively. However, the estimated effect of early childbearing for sample 3 is only significantly 
negative until the sisters turn 28, suggesting that the earnings penalty is short-lived. The point 
estimates are very close to zero from the age 28 on, indicating no difference in long-term 
earnings trajectories due to the timing of first childbirth. 
Figure 3 - The Point Estimates of Early Childbearing on Yearly Earnings (DKK) 
 
Note. The figure shows the point estimates of early childbearing on yearly earnings in Danish Kroner (DKK). Legend. S1 is the 
point estimates based on the family fixed effect model for sample 1, S2 is the point estimates based on the OLS for sample 2, S3 
is the point estimates based on the family fixed effect model for sample 3. For S1 and S3, untabulated controls for health, birth 
order and year dummies are applied. For S2, untabulated controls for health, birth order, parental education, immigration status 
and year dummies are applied. The upper and lower bound for the point estimates indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
Monetary values are translated into year-2014 DKK using the Consumer Price Index from the Danish National Accounts. 
1DKK≈0.13€. 
The earnings differences can come primarily from two margins: labor participation and 
wage rate. It is thus interesting to decompose the effects and observe what is causing the earnings 
trajectories. Figure 4 shows the point estimates of early childbearing for the three samples on 
labor participation and wage rates at the ages 20 to 40. The pattern from figure 3 is intact: There 
are significant negative effects on labor participation in the early 20s for all samples, and these 
diminishes with age but remains significant and negative throughout the late 20s and 30s for 
samples 1 and 2. At age 40, the effect is small but statistically significant and negative, at around 2 
percentage points and 4% lower wage rates.29 The estimated effects for sample 3 are very close to 
                                                     
29 The reverse effect of early childbearing on wage rate in the start 20s might be due the difference in the ratio of 
students and age of full time labor market participants. You might expect higher hourly wage rates for non-students 
or those who have worked more years. 
Age 
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zero from age 28, indicating no difference in labor participation or wage-rate trajectory due to the 
timing of first childbirth.  
Figure 4 - Point estimates of early childbearing on labor market participation and wages 
                       Panel A. Labor Market Participation                               Panel B. Log(Wage Rate)   
     
Note. Panel A shows the point estimates of early childbearing on labor market participation, which is a dummy taking the value 1 
if the woman has any labor earnings in the given year, and 0 if she has zero. Panel B shows the point estimates of early 
childbearing on the natural logarithm of the hourly wages. Legend. S1 is the point estimates based on the family fixed effect model 
for sample 1, S2 is the point estimates based on the OLS for sample 2, S3 is the point estimates based on the family fixed effect 
model for sample 3. For S1 and S3, untabulated controls for health, birth order and year dummies are applied. For S2, 
untabulated controls for health, birth order, parental education, immigration status and year dummies are applied. 
Overall, the results suggest that the prevailing differences in earnings found in samples 1 
and 2 are not caused by early childbearing but probably by unobserved individual heterogeneities 
between the sisters and unobserved social and family heterogeneities across women. After 
individual and family heterogeneities are controlled for in sample 3, the effect of early 
childbearing largely disappears. The results show that there is a short-term negative shock but no 
long-term difference in labor participation or wage rates for sample 3, and the differences in 
yearly earnings observed in samples 1 and 2 are due to diverging trajectories in both labor 
participation and wage rates. 
Robustness Tests 
I construct three different tests that address the robustness of the presented results. These tests 
evaluate several possible factors on the estimated effects. (i) I test whether the results are 
sensitive to the chosen age-threshold for early childbearing. I am able to lower the threshold to 
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age 21 while still obtaining a fair amount of observations for sample 3. (ii) Throughout the study, 
women with shared mother were defined as sisters - meaning that some of the sisters do not 
share the same father. The mother is often perceived as the anchor of the family, which is why 
having the same mother often entails shared adolescence. The assumption that sister studies 
remove family heterogeneity depend primarily on cultural similarity, but also to some degree on 
genetic similarity. I therefore exclude the few sister pairs with different fathers to test if they 
influence the results.30 (iii) There are some sisters that give birth at very different ages in a few of 
the families. Siblings whose ages at first birth are widely spread could potentially differ along 
other unobserved dimensions too. In order to test the importance of these cases, I run two 
regressions excluding the sisters with more than 9 and 4 years of differences in age at first birth.  
The original results are robust to all the tests. The point estimates of early childbearing for the 
different tests are shown in the Appendix Tables A3-A6. 
7. Conclusion 
Early childbearing women earn less than the average Danish woman. The question is whether 
this is due to the early childbearing or to confounding factors in the women’s backgrounds, 
abilities, and pre-motherhood situations. The purpose of this study is twofold: (i) to estimate the 
true effect of early childbearing on Danish women’s earnings and educational attainment, and (ii) 
to test the two best practices used in earlier studies and whether a combination of them produces 
better and less biased estimates. This is feasible due to the unparalleled detail of the fertility and 
labor market data for the universe of Danish women. 
Both the within-family method without the use of miscarrying sisters and the cross-
sectional method using miscarriages as exogenous variation on the non-sister sample lead to 
estimates that early childbearing has a large and significant negative effect on women’s earnings 
and educational attainment. But the effect on earnings disappears when the model is applied 
                                                     
30 The share of sister pairs with the same father: SS1: 85.44% and SS2: 84.97%. 
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together with the use of control sisters who were pregnant before 25 but miscarried and 
postponed childbearing until after age 25; and the effect on education declines substantially, 
though it remains significant and negative. There is a significant yearly earnings gap in the start 
20s, which disappears at the age of 28, where after the trajectories are symmetric for the early and 
non-early childbearing mothers. 
This result indicates that some unobserved individual heterogeneity remains when only a 
family fixed effects model is applied, and that some unobserved social and family heterogeneity 
remains when only miscarriages are used as exogenous variation. It also indicates that both of 
these heterogeneities can be removed when miscarrying sisters are used as controls. The 
combination of these two approaches is effective for addressing the risk that social bias in 
miscarriages. 
These results are obtained for Danish women and might be influenced by the specific 
Danish institutions, which provide relatively generous public welfare schemes. Nonetheless, they 
show that in a welfare society of the Scandinavian model, early childbearing does not necessarily 
impose long-term labor-market penalties on mothers, suggesting that institutions can be designed 
to alleviate penalties due to early childbearing. 
I argue that a combination of the within-family method and the use of miscarriages as an 
exogenous variation serves as a better method for estimating the causal effect of early 
childbearing on women’s earnings and educational attainment.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 - Age Distribution of Graduating First Stage of Tertiary Education in 1998 (Females) 
  24 or younger 25-29 30-34 35-39 40 or older 
Denmark (%) 18 51 15 7 8 
United Kingdom (%) 66 10 7 7 11 
Source: Eurostat 
Table A2 - Average Age at Entering Different Tertiary Education in 1998 (Whole Danish Population) 
  Short Medium B.Sc. M.Sc. PhD 
Average age 26.2 26.8 23.4 27.7 31.1 
 Source: The Danish Ministry of Education (2000), Short is short cycle tertiary degrees of 1 to 2 years of length, Medium, is medium cycle tertiary 
degrees of 2.5 to 3.5 years of length. B.Sc. is bachelor degrees of 3 years of length. M.Sc. is master degrees of 5 years of length. PhD is doctoral 
degrees adding 3 years to the 5 years of a master degree. 
 
Table A3 - Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 – Early Childbearing <23 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Early Childbearing 
(EC) -0.2311*** -0.7430*** -0.2589*** -0.7469*** -0.0001 -0.2667** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.007) (0.014) (0.084) (0.122) 
Individual Obs. 30,126 30,126 90,982 90,982 909 909 
Group Obs. 13,674 13,674 
  
424 424 
R^2 0.033 0.076 0.043 0.120 0.020 0.061 
Note. Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) are estimated using a family fixed effect model. Column (3) and (4) are estimated using a cross 
sectional OLS. EC is a dummy indicating early childbearing. Education is the length of the women’s total education measured in years. 
Further untabulated controls are:  Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural logarithm of the adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a 
dummy indicating whether the sister is the oldest, Diagnoses is the average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Father's and 
Mother's education is the education length of the women's parents measured in years. Immigrant is a dummy indicating being a first or 
second-generation immigrant.  Significant levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. err. in the parenthesis, clustered at sister level.  
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Table A4 - Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 – Early Childbearing <22 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education Log(Adult Earnings) Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Early Childbearing 
(EC) -0.0419*** -0.7893*** -0.1536*** -0.5829*** 0.0460 0.1152 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.045) (0.074) (0.075) 
Individual Obs. 22,853 22,853 33,865 33,865 909 909 
Group Obs. 10,311 10,311     424 424 
R^2 0.131 0.082 0.158 0.086 0.181 0.213 
Note. Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) are estimated using a family fixed effect model. Column (3) and (4) are estimated using a cross 
sectional OLS. EC is a dummy indicating early childbearing. Education is the length of the women’s total education measured in years. 
Further untabulated controls are: Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural logarithm of the adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a 
dummy indicating whether the sister is the oldest, Diagnoses is the average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Father's and 
Mother's education is the education length of the women's parents measured in years. Immigrant is a dummy indicating being a first or 
second-generation immigrant.  Significant levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. err. in the parenthesis, clustered at sister level.  
 
Table A5 – Effect of Early Childbearing on Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 – Restricting the 
Intra-Sister Difference in Age of First Birth 
 Sample 1 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
Log(Adult 
Earnings) 
Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
 Max age at first birth difference 
 <10 years <5 years <10 years <5 years 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
EC -0.1483*** -0.5253*** -0.0852*** -0.3043*** -0.0061 -0.2690*** 0.0089 -0.1329 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.024) (0.049) (0.093) (0.069) (0.143) 
Individual 
Obs. 53,925 53,925 20,044 20,044 1,655 1,655 718 718 
Group 
Observations 24,421 24,421 9,417 9,417 773 773 0.074 0.060 
R^2 0.024 0.050 0.017 0.024 0.039 0.029 0.017 0.024 
Note. The coefficients are estimated using a family fixed effect model. EC is a dummy indicating early childbearing. Education is the 
length of the women’s total education measured in years. Further untabulated controls are: Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural logarithm 
of the adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a dummy indicating whether the sister is the oldest, Diagnoses is the average number 
of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Significant levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. err. in the parenthesis, clustered at sister 
level.  
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Table A6 – Effect of Early Childbearing on Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 – Restricting the 
Sisters to Share Fathers 
 Sample 1 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult Earnings) Education Log(Adult Earnings) Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Early Childbearing (EC) -0.1695*** -0.5866*** -0.0135 -0.3190*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.050) (0.099) 
Individual Observations 62,355 62,355 1,624 1,624 
Group Observations 28,604 28,604 786 786 
R^2 0.027 0.056 0.038 0.031 
Note. The coefficients are estimated using a family fixed effect model. EC is a dummy indicating early childbearing. Education is 
the length of the women’s total education measured in years. Further untabulated controls are:  Log(Adult Earnings) is the natural 
logarithm of adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a dummy indicating whether the sister is the oldest, Diagnoses is the 
average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Significant levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. err. in the 
parenthesis, clustered at sister level.  
 
Table A7 – Effect of Age at First Birth on Adult Earnings Income and Educational Length at Age 40 
 Sample 1 Sample 3 
 Log(Adult Earnings) Education Log(Adult Earnings) Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Age at First Birth 0.0250*** 0.0250*** -0.0060 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) 
Individual Observations 73,135 73,135 375 375 
Group Observations 32,588 32,588 165 165 
R^2 0.033 0.033 0.132 0.086 
Note. The coefficients are estimated using a family fixed effect model. Age at First Birth  is the age of the women’s first child birth. 
Education is the length of the women’s total education measured in years. Further untabulated controls are:  Log(Adult Earnings) is 
the natural logarithm of the adult earnings from 25 to 40., Birth Order is a dummy indicating whether the sister is the oldest, 
Diagnoses is the average number of diagnoses per year in adolescence. Significant levels: 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Robust std. 
err. in the parenthesis, clustered at sister level.  
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Abstract 
Using Danish administrative data from 1995-2014, I compare income and wage 
trajectories of women to those of their partner before and after becoming parents. I 
then compare within- and across-couple gaps for women in opposite and same-sex 
households. Since same-sex couples by definition do not experience sex-specific 
comparative advantages at work or at home, the changes in intra household earnings 
due to parenthood must be based on other factors than the intra household gender 
differences. Comparing the dynamics upon adopting a child in opposite and same-sex 
couples will identify to what extent the gender compared to non-gendered factors 
determine the observed gender inequality in the child penalty. Contrary to opposite-
sex households and heterosexual mothers, for same-sex households, I find only a 
small child penalty for lesbians and no significant within household differences in 
earnings trajectories due to parenthood, no matter the mothers’ intra household 
bargaining power. 
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1. Introduction 
The gender gap is a continuous topic in the economics literature. Despite considerable 
convergence over the last century, gender inequality in incomes and wage rates continue to be 
significant across all countries. Looking at most western countries the convergence has slowed 
down or has even seemed to stop. USA and Denmark, each other’s polar with regard to social 
security and public welfare, have plateaued at a gender gap around 15-20%. So the riddle yet to 
be solved is; what causes this resilient and seemingly universal gap between men and women’s 
earnings?  
One thing that has not changed proportionally over time is the unequal impact parenthood 
has on men and women. Kleven et al. (2018) suggests that the gender gap is small pre-
parenthood whereas women experience a significant child penalty, while men do not.31  Other 
studies have also stressed the significance of parenthood and claim that this is one of the last 
resistant and consistent biases leading to gender wage gaps.  
In this paper, I take on a new approach to analyze this puzzle. I exploit the intra household 
difference in gender composition between heterosexual and lesbian couples.32 The empirical analysis 
is based on universal administrative Danish Registers, which allows me to track all pairs of 
parents and their income and salaries from 1995 to 2009. There are multiple advantages in 
evaluating the child penalty in same-sex couples compared to opposite-sex couples. First, the 
comparative advantages and division of labor within the households are non-gender specific. 
Second, the partners in same-sex relations will, by default, face the same kind of labor market 
treatment i.e., gender based advantages and disadvantages. Overall, there will be no difference in 
                                                     
31 Little or negligible effects are found for men’s earnings due to fatherhood (Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood, 2010; 
Wilner, 2016). If there is an effect, it is usually found to be small but in fact positive (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; 
Boeckmann & Budig, 2013; Killewald, 2013; Kunze, 2015)).  
32 I will use the wording Lesbian for females in same-sex couples and Heterosexual for men and women in opposite-
sex couples throughout the paper. These specific wordings are used to ease the reading and to specify which kind of 
same and opposite-sex constellation is referred to. Strictly speaking, it is only assumed that the females in the same-
sex couples are lesbians and that the individuals in the opposite-sex couples are heterosexual, since I cannot observe 
their sexual preferences directly. 
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outcomes within the lesbian households due to gender. I exploit this to make three analyses that 
shed light on the nature of the existing gender inequality in the child penalty. 
First, I compare the aggregate household child penalty in earnings between heterosexual 
and lesbian households. I find that the child penalty is lower in lesbian households relative to 
heterosexual households, even after controlling for education, timing of parenthood, and area of 
residence. This is so, in spite of the fact that women traditionally face higher child penalties. 
Second, I compare the individual parents’ child penalty between heterosexual women and the 
lesbian partner with less bargaining power (defined by factors usually associated with intra 
household decision power, such as age, income and education). Lesbians with low bargaining 
power experience relatively low child penalty compared to heterosexual mothers and do not 
experience higher child penalty than their high bargaining power partner. Third, I evaluate the 
dynamics in the intra household earnings gap due to parenthood. I find that the intra household 
earnings gap increases significantly due to parenthood in heterosexual households but not in 
lesbian households. 
In this paper, I look at parenthood by adoption. Looking at adoptions makes it possible to 
identify same-sex parents, which is otherwise not quantitatively possible in Denmark. Although 
impossible, it would have been interesting to study non-adoption fertility as well, but comparing 
adopting lesbians with adopting heterosexuals has a clear-cut statistical advantage. By looking 
only at adoptions, gender comparative advantages in childrearing associated with pregnancies, 
nursing etc. are eliminated. Thus, the parents are freer to organize the childcare according to 
factors other than their physical and biological characters.  
This is, to my knowledge, the first paper using panel data to estimate the effect of 
household gender composition on the child penalty and this novel sheds new light on the 
ongoing discussion on the gender inequality in child penalty and earnings. All together, the results 
indicate that the observed gender inequality in child penalty is not a universal gender entity, but 
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rather due to the gender of the partner and/or the partner’s involvement in childrearing and 
household production. If it is a universal gender penalty, penalties should be higher in lesbian 
households with two mothers compared to households with only one. I show that the bargaining 
power in lesbian households has little to do with the child penalty, where it seems that 
childrearing chores are shared rather evenly between partners of different ages, education and 
incomes. These results are also interesting from the more traditional economic perspective, where 
theories on gender differences in comparative advantages of childrearing and household 
production together with gains from division of labor and specialization are cornerstones in 
household economics theory. The positive effect on household earnings due to more egalitarian 
and non-specialized allocation of labor between partners within the household goes against the 
traditional view on how to optimize household outcomes post-parenthood.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the vast literature. Section 3 outlines 
the theory behind using same-sex household for the identification strategy. Section 4 explains the 
institutional settings. Section 5 describes the data and shows some summary statistics. Section 5 
shows some graphical evidences. Section 7 explains the empirical strategy and shows the results. 
Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Parenthood Gap 
Looking at the historical development, big differences in the gender gap can be observed across 
countries with different public policies. Many equality measures have been implemented, as well 
as a cultural revolution where women entering the labor market demand equal pay. One thing 
that has not changed proportionally over time is the unequal impact parenthood has on men and 
women. Kleven et al. (2018) suggest that the gender gap is small pre-parenthood but increases in 
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parenthood since women have a significant child penalty, while men have not.33 Other studies 
applying different identification strategies on data from various countries, have also stressed the 
significance of parenthood and claims that this is one of the last resistant and consistent biases 
leading to gender wage gaps. 
Much of the wage gap can be explained by fewer hours worked and weaker continuity in 
labor force participation by mothers leading to lower productivity (Mulligan & Rubinstein, 2008; 
Wilner, 2016; Adda et al., 2017; Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Gallen, 2018) especially for middle-age 
workers where gender wage gaps are the biggest (Goldin & Katz, 2016; Blau & Kahn, 2017). 
Coudin et al. (2018), Goldin (2014) & Bertrand et al. (2010) suggest that work hours and 
disruptions in labor force participation dramatically lower wages due to a "job-flexibility penalty" 
or labor intensity where imperfect substitution between workers can lead to a convex hours-
earnings relationship.34 Focusing on high-skilled Swedish workers, Albrecht et al. (2017) show 
that the career paths of men and women diverge at the time of the birth of their ﬁrst child: 
mothers tend to work less, in a diﬀerent type of ﬁrms, and becomes less mobile. 
Mothers are often perceived to be discriminated against at the labor market, more than 
women are in general (Altonji & Blank, 1999; Wennerås et al., 2010; Blau & Kahn, 2017).35 
                                                     
33 Card et al. (2015) suggest similar trends and show that the effect from pre-child human capital investments has 
fallen implying that in the past women used to pay the career penalty of children upfront, where they now seem to 
invest in education and career at similar level as men. 
34 Some have argued that the gender difference in age at first birth can account for some of the gender gap. Men are 
usually older than women when having children. Many studies find that postponing is positively correlated with 
labor market outcomes (Card & Wise, 1978; Hofferth, 1984; Geronimus & Korenman, 1992; Hoffman et al., 1993; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1995; Holmlund, 2005; Leung et al., 2016). These two factors put together indicates that the 
gender difference in age at first birth may account for some of the general gender gap in child penalty. On the other 
hand, later studies trying to identify the causal effect of age at first birth on careers find no or little evidence that 
timing matters (Hotz et al., 2005; Rosenbaum, 2018). Looking at the high earning end, however, the picture seems 
to differ. Having the first baby at an early age improves the chances of promotions into CEO positions (Smith et 
al., 2013).  
35 Discrimination can take on many forms, where some studies find it on the entry level through hiring biases 
(Goldin & Rouse, 2000; Bjerk, 2005) other document it in promotion processes, finding a significant glass ceiling 
for women hindering them from reaching top level jobs (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2003; Matsa & 
Miller, 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Gobillon et al., 2015; Folke & Rickne, 2016). Searsons (2018) find asymmetric 
responses to the quality of male and female surgeons. 
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Employers are afraid of lower productivity or effort of mothers but not of fathers, which is 
primarily due to change in household division of labor when entering parenthood. 
These results indicate that it is difficult for women to both have a family and excel in their 
career, which on the contrary men seems able to do. This raises the question whether a family 
can master two career-orientated spouses at once.36  
 
2.2 Households Organization 
Households form an entity, where it is possible to increase the total household welfare with 
specialization and division of labor. This different time allocation within the household becomes 
even more pronounced when the couples enter parenthood, where time presumably becomes an 
even more scarce resource. 
As proposed in the seminal work of Becker (1965) and (1985), partners’ allocation of time 
is determined by comparative advantages. His model of household division of labor has been the 
workhorse model in the literature. Assuming decreasing returns to scale and comparative 
advantage, both spouses may participate in the labor force, where their contributions to 
household income and to household production are determined by their relative productivity in 
those two activities.37 Such advantages result from previous investments in human capital, i.e., 
educational attainment, labor market experience and potential acquisition of any specific 
household skills. Hence, these differences in efficiencies should in principle not be determined by 
                                                     
36 In the light of these results, it is a puzzle why women would want children. Although economists tend to focus 
on pecuniary outcomes, it is indeed important to mention the non-pecuniary benefits of having children. Bertrand 
(2013) finds that the biggest premium to life satisfaction is associated with having a family and that it is much higher 
than the premium of having a career. Thus, one might ask why we evaluate the child penalty as a penalty and not as 
a life satisfaction premium. Is there a general glorification of the career way of living in the western world and do 
these societies obsesses too much about the work-life? Keeping in mind that most jobs are not necessarily fulfilling 
and giving, but hard and non-enjoyable work. Maybe it is possible for women to have both career and family, as 
men have been able to. This raises the question whether a family can master two career-orientated spouses at once. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the key element to the gender gap question is non-normative. We economists should not 
dictate whether individuals should do either career or households, but we should give the opportunity for everyone 
to choose to pursue either or both. Liberating this choice is what gender equality is about in the 21st century, rather 
than forcing everybody to spend less time at home and more time at work. 
37 In the special case of increasing returns to labor, it is optimal for only one spouse to work, leading to full 
specification and division of market labor to housework. 
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the gender, which makes these types of household economic models gender neutral. Some will 
argue that a person’s later experiences are in part consequences of parents’ gender specific 
investment behavior, of intrinsic differences between the sexes (e.g. pregnancy and nursing), and 
the discounted value of future labor income, where women still face glass ceilings as 
foreshadowed.38 As a result, it is often perceived that women have the comparative advantage in 
household labor, while the man in income creating labor.39 40  
These models predict bad news for women; even if women choose to continue their career 
while being main responsible for childcare and other housework, it will lead to significant wage 
penalties (Becker, 1985). Childcare and housework are effort demanding compared to leisure, and 
thus women lifting the burden of these would have less energy for the market job than their 
men.41 This can reduce the hourly earnings of mothers, affect their job type and occupation, and 
predictably lower their investment in human capital, even when they work the same number of 
market hours as fathers. Becker (1985) suggests that the housework responsibilities of mothers 
may account for much of the gender difference in earnings. These theories might lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies. If households perceive that women would earn less in the long run, it would 
lead to a gender segregated division of time allocation when optimizing the household budget, 
                                                     
38 For career women trying to climb the ladder, but who have not reached top positions yet, the overall effect of 
children is that the more children, the lower probability of promotion (Smith et al., 2013).  
39 Be aware that this assumption does not contradict that women may have the absolute advantage in either or both 
hemispheres. 
40 These Beckerian household models, consider the household, as a whole, and therefore the decisions among the 
engaged becomes elementary unitary; in particular, this household is characterized by a unique utility function that is 
maximized under a budget constraint. Chiappori (1992) offers an alternative to this, called the “collective” 
household model that essentially consists in deepening the individualistic foundations of consumer theory by 
claiming that the members of the household should be considered independently rather than altogether as 
maximizing agents. This allows incorporating the notion that Agents are "egoistic" in the sense that their utility 
depends only on their own consumption and labor supply. This theoretical background offers insight to why, the 
household allocation is not always efficient, but rather Pareto efficient, since the equilibrium is now decided on the 
basis of two separate individuals optimizing separate utility functions. This is in fact sometimes present, where you 
see examples on household who does not pool income. 
41 It is reasonable to question this simple categorization of time into job market and non-job market use. More 
precisely whether housework, such as cleaning and grocery shopping can be clustered together with time spend with 
your own children. Since the later can be assumed to be pleasurable - for the most part. However, the categorization 
somewhat makes sense when dividing non-job market time into bounded, inescapable and inflexible activities 
(including both cleaning and child caring) and unbounded independent and flexible egocentric activities (such as 
pure leisure). 
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which would lead to significant gender earnings gap. This is in fact the case, even though there 
has been a large convergence between men and women in time used at both the labor market and 
housework. Aguiar & Hurst (2007) find that women’s general non-market hours have decreased 
while men’s have increased over time. They find that both men and women are using more time 
with their children, but the women’s increase is significantly larger than the men’s.42 This 
indicates a decreased specialization in non-child related housework, but an increased 
specialization in childrearing.  
Women working equal market hours as their spouse still tend to do significantly more work 
at the household (Aguiar & Hurst, 2007), even in households with career orientated women 
(Folke & Rickne, 2016) and women endowed with high intelligence and unusually high IQs 
(Gensowski, 2018). Daly & Groes (2017) find that it is almost exclusively the mothers that take 
the children to medical services in Denmark. As these services are mainly performed during 
regular working hours this provides one mechanism, by which absenteeism increases as a 
consequence of motherhood.43  
Although Scandinavian countries have more progressive views on women’s labor market 
participation than other western countries, the general gender views are still rather traditional. 
Data from the International Social Survey Program shows that having children is detrimental for 
the Danes’ view on women’s labor market participation. Whereas almost all survey participants 
believe that women should work full time pre-motherhood, only around 18% hold that view for 
                                                     
42 Evidence from the American Time Use Survey indicates the same household behavior in USA. American 
mothers spend on average three times the amount of time at interacting with the children’s schools than American 
fathers, double the amount on taking physical care of the children, and spend an average 6.2 minutes a day doing 
homework with their children, while men spend less than four minutes on average. 
43 On the other hand, the effect from pre-child human capital investments has fallen (Card et al., 2015), implying 
that in the past women used to pay the career penalty of parenthood upfront, where they now seem to invest in 
education and career at similar level as men (VIVE, 2018; Bettinger & Long, 2005; Brenøe, 2018). This pre-
parenthood convergence between the genders has, among others, lead to un- or less-penalized salaries up until 
parenthood (Goldin, 2014; Kleven, et al. 2018). 
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women having pre-school children. Interestingly this survey sample consists of both men and 
women, where there is little difference in the beliefs between the genders.44  
The fact that these observed attitudes are symmetric across genders indicates that it is a 
household decision to position the father on the labor market while easing the income burden of 
the mother. In consequence, women may choose less demanding jobs, leading to a lower lifetime 
income and promotion glass ceilings.  
Bertrand et al. (2015) find a big discontinuity in incomes within the couples where few 
women exceed having 50% of the household income. This inequality does not diminish over 
time, but rather seems to increase in marriage tenure.45 The discontinuity among the newlyweds 
implies that gender identity affects who marries whom, while the fact that the discontinuity grows 
with marriage tenure suggests that identity considerations also influence the evolution of relative 
income within a couple and/or the likelihood of divorce. This is in line with the theories of 
Goffman (1956) and Akerlof (2000) on gender identity formation where the behavioral 
prescription for one's gender affirms one's self image, or identity, as a "man" or as a "woman" 
and violating the prescriptions evokes anxiety and discomfort in oneself and in others. Gender 
identity, then, changes the "payoffs" from different actions. This can lead to either strong self-
selection processes or outright discrimination.46 Angelov et al. (2016) find that the comparative 
advantages in terms of earnings potential determine how the monetary costs of parenthood are 
shared between the parents. Consistent with this effect they also find smaller lifetime gender gap 
in child penalty when the educational attainment of the women is closer to the husband, 
indicating that the match type is crucial for the magnitude of the gender gap in incomes and 
                                                     
44 Other surveys of household opinion on gender labor market participation find similar results. The Economist and 
YouGov, a pollster, conducted a large survey of America, Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Scandinavian 
countries in 2017, finding that most believe that the mother should make the change in her career in order for the 
household to work. 
45 Similar results are found by Wilde et al. (2010) and Adda (2015).  
46 Chiappori et al. (2002) also find, both theoretically and empirically, that changes in the sex ratio and in the divorce 
laws index have sizable impacts on gender time allocation and income transfers within the households. Both factors 
influencing the spouses outside option and hence changing the inside bargaining power between the spouses. 
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wages. Hence, one effect is being in a partnership and another effect comes from the choice of 
partner.  
Even in the twenty-first century, men tend to avoid female partners who exhibit 
professional ambition, such as high levels of education or working in highly competitive markets 
(Brown & Lewis, 2004; Fishman et al., 2006; Greitemeyer, 2007; Hitsch et al., 2010). It is 
relatively unlikely that a woman will earn more than her husband, and when she does, she tend to 
lie about it (Murray-Close & Heggenes, 2018), maybe because it leads to lower marital satisfaction 
and higher divorce rates (Bertrand, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2015; Folke & Rickne, 2016). It 
increases the likelihood of divorce when women are promoted, but not so when men are 
promoted (Folke & Rickne, 2016). Moreover, the workplace is still the most common place to 
find a partner (Rosenfeld et al., 2015). Due to these factors, it is more understandable why single 
women might try to improve their marriage options by “acting wife” (Bursztyn et al., 2017).47 On 
the other hand, women value their partner’s intelligence and education, even when these exceed 
their own (Fishman et al., 2006; Lee, 2016). 
 
3. Same-Sex Households  
There seem to be no consensus whether the motherhood penalty stems from labor market or 
household decision mechanisms. One possible way of splitting these effects is by taking the 
gender out of the equation. In this study, this is done by looking at same-sex couples entering 
parenthood. 
There are multiple advantages of evaluating the child penalty in same-sex couples. First, the 
comparative advantages and division of labor within the household are non-gender specific. In 
other words, it is not the gender or gender differences that determine the time allocation to 
                                                     
47 Bursztyn et al. (2017) consider the self-selective identity process through studying the marriage market, finding 
that single women shy away from actions that could improve their careers to avoid signaling undesirable traits in the 
marriage market. They show that MBA single females perform worse when males are in the room, compared to an 
equal setting devoid of potential future spouses. 
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household and labor production, since there is no endowed gender bias in comparative 
advantages, bargaining abilities or willingness to compete or any of the other gender specific skills 
suggested in the literature.48 Second, the partners in same-sex relations will, by default, face the 
same kind of gender discrimination on the labor market. This gender normalization between the 
partners going into parenthood allows me to analyze; 1. whether there is any child penalty for 
parents in same-sex households, 2. if so, how it is divided among these parents, due to other 
factors than gender differences. It is possible to suggest a causal interpretation of the observed 
child penalty for women by conducting a careful comparison holding everything else equal but 
the gender composition of the couples. I can observe whether the child penalty is gender specific, 
specific for the opposite-sex stereotypical household organization or driven by meritocratic 
factors, such as abilities and earnings potential.  
Put differently, same-sex couples offer an interesting comparison to opposite-sex couples 
in the household time allocation choices.  Nobody has - to my knowledge - made an event study 
on micro level data comparing the child penalty across same- and opposite-sex parents before. In 
doing this, I can shed new light on why the child penalty is prevalent for mothers and not fathers.  
My default assumption is that homosexuals do not differ systematically from heterosexuals 
in key elements such as labor market preferences and child rearing. Black et al. (2008) suggests 
that family formations in the gay and lesbian community differs only modestly from the general 
population as a whole.  
The literature on same-sex household generally finds what they call a “lesbian premium” 
and a “gay penalty” (Sabia et al., 2017). This in fact, is bound to happen by default due to the 
                                                     
48 The literature has suggested negative consequences of women’s poor bargaining skills, unwillingness to compete 
and risk aversion. Papers on bargaining skills; Raiffa, 1982; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Babcock & Laschever 2003; 
Small et al., 2007; Greig, 2008; Hall & Krueger, 2012; Leibbrandt & List, 2015; Card et al., 2015. Papers on 
willingness to compete; Bertrand et al., 2010, Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Flory et al., 2014; Buser et al., 2014; 
Markussen et al., 2014; and Reuben et al., 2015. Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Charness et al., 
2011; Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012; Charness & Gneezy, 2012, Datta Gupta et al., 2013; Niederle et al., 2013, Dreber 
et al., 2014; Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Flory et al., 2014. Papers on risk aversion; Eckel & Grossmann, 2008, Falk 
and Hermle, 2018; Censowski, 2018. 
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gender of the lesbian and gay’s spouses. According to the existing household literature, when 
lesbians (gays) share the household burden with  a woman (man) who in general takes greater 
(less) household responsibilities, it liberates (occupies) time and effort to focus on the market job 
and therefore increases (decreases) productivity and earnings. While there seems to be persistent 
evidence for the “gay penalty”, lesbian partners and heterosexual couples have similar household 
incomes, implying that the average female income must be higher in the lesbian couple. Empirical 
studies find that cohabiting lesbians and gay men exhibit intra-household inequalities in earnings, 
hours worked in paid labor, and the likelihood of working full-time suggesting that there is a 
primary worker and secondary worker even in same-sex household (Giddings et al., 2014; Jepsen 
& Jepsen, 2015; Antecol et al., 2008). Martell & Roncolato (2016) find evidence of different time-
use patterns for lesbians, but they conclude that these are driven by characteristics other than 
sexual orientation. Same-sex couples may have gendered living arrangements (Biblarz & Savci, 
2010), but a “natural” starting point and traditional social norms do not exist to guide the initial 
household arrangement (Bauer, 2016).  
Oreffice (2011) studied the impact of bargaining power on the labor supply in same-sex 
households and find that the older and the wealthier partner has the most bargaining power. She 
showed that partners in same-sex couples respond to shifts in bargaining power by changing their 
respective labor supply. Antecol & Steinberger (2013) studied the labor supply gap of married 
women in different-sex couples and women in partnered lesbian couples. They found that 
primary earners in lesbian couples allocate more time to the labor market than secondary earners, 
who still provide more labor than women in opposite-sex couples. Even though the literature is 
expanding, most research still suffers from severe lack of power and causal interpretation due to 
low number of observations and weak identification strategies.  
There are good reasons to maintain that – at least along many important dimensions – 
homosexuals are not fundamentally and inherently different from their heterosexual counterparts 
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(Black et al., 2007). It is furthermore reasonable to believe that same-sex households also exhibit 
division of labor, but do so on other metrics than the spouses’ gender.  
 
4. Institutional settings 
Denmark has a strong welfare state of the Scandinavian model, which combines considerable 
redistributions through high taxes and generous family policies intended to support female labor 
supply among other inequality depleting objectives. Together with relatively egalitarian gender 
views this means that Denmark has one of the highest female labor force participation rates in 
the world, currently around 80%, and almost no remaining gender gap in participation rates.49 
Public childcare is universal and heavily subsidized from around 6-12 months after birth. 
Until the child reaches the age where public childcare becomes available, there is job-protected 
and paid parental leave. Mothers are entitled to 4 weeks of pregnancy leave – taken before the 
birth, 2 weeks of mandatory post birth leave, and optional 12 weeks of fully compensated leave, 
which has to be taken somewhat in continuation of the above. Fathers have 2 weeks fully 
compensated leave, often taken from the day of the birth. Lastly, the parents are together entitled 
to 64 weeks of parental leave divided between the parents as wished. The long parental leave is 
well compensated by the government, usually together with the employer.50 In total mothers and 
fathers can take a maximum of about 19 and 16 months of parental leave respectively. Adopting 
parents are entitled to exactly the same amount of parental leave. The only practical difference is 
that none of the leave is earmarked to any gender, leaving a greater flexibility in the household 
organization. 
Adopting children is not a trivial objective. It often takes some planning and information 
gathering to follow through an adoption process. Eligibility for adopting is dependent on several 
                                                     
49 Female labor force participation is around 70% in the United States, 73% in United Kingdom, 74% in Germany 
and 68% in France.  
50 Most employees have generous agreements due to strong labor union traditions in Denmark. Those who are not 
in a union usually also have the same benefits, since the labor agreements often are universal for each field of work. 
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condition. In Denmark, the adopting parents must: Have lived with the adopting partner for at 
least 2.5 years, be in “reasonable” health, have a home which can accommodate a child, financial 
stability, no criminal record that compromises the caretaking of a child, and be under 43 years old 
at the adoption application date. This is to ensure a safe and stable environment for the adoptees. 
Although these restriction can be met by most Danish households, they exclude the poorest, who 
therefore will not be present in the final sample of this study.  
 
5. Data and summary statistic 
I use the Danish administrative register data, which is a panel dataset covering 100% of the 
population in the years 1994 to 2014. The data is provided by Statistics Denmark and includes 
many different registers. I use registers with annual information on demographic variables (e.g., 
age, gender, education etc.), income information (yearly income, earnings and a crude measure of 
wealth), employment status (e.g., employed, self-employed, unemployed), and family identifiers of 
the population. The parents in the sample are linked with their children through family links and 
personal identification numbers.51 
The inclusion criteria are as follows: (i) I focus on parents who are married or cohabitating; 
(ii) I focus on parents ages 25 to 60. At this age, women have realized most of their pre-
employment human capital investments. The reason to exclude single parents follows a 
comparability principle. That is, the predictive probabilities of having a child and the earnings of 
within married/cohabitating individuals substantially differ from those of singles. I focus on 
labor income because I only have a rough measure for hours worked in the register data, hence a 
wage variable will be a rough approximation at best. The labor income of the population is 
converted in real terms to the year 2015 price level using the Danish Consumer Price Index 
obtained from Danish National Accounts.  
                                                     
51 Anonymized for data privacy considerations by Statistics Denmark 
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In this paper, I look at parenthood by adoption. First, looking at adoptions makes it 
possible to identify same-sex parents, which is otherwise not quantitatively possible in Denmark. 
I can observe the gender of the adopting parents directly and define the household as same-sex if 
the adopting parents are of same gender. Compared to the otherwise mostly used survey 
measures where sexuality is self-reported, this measure is presumably unbiased.52 It has been 
possible to assemble a sufficient number of lesbian parents. Although it would serve as an 
interesting comparison, there are unfortunately not enough adoptions by male same-sex couples 
to conduct any meaningful statistical analysis.53 Furthermore, it was not possible to assemble 
enough same-sex couples where one mother gave birth. This may be for three reasons. First, 
there are few incidences of this kind. Second, they are difficult to observe since the non-
childbearing mothers may not be registered as parents. Third, IVF-treatment is a fairly recently 
accepted fertility method for single and lesbian women.54 Thus, the same sex couples in this study 
consist of two women having children together and therefore the comparison of the child penalty 
will be between heterosexual and lesbian couples. To homogenize the treatment and control 
group, I restrict the households to consist of parents who do not have any children prior to 
adopting.55  
It would have been very interesting looking at both childbearing and adopting same-sex 
couples, where both situation can shed light over different aspects of the gender inequality in 
child penalties. The choice of which mother is chosen to be pregnant and afterwards the relative 
penalty between the childbearing and non-childbearing mothers within the household would 
                                                     
52 In general, it is very difficult to retrieve data of reasonable reliability and of significant power on homosexual 
individuals (Schönpflug et al., 2018). 
53 It was only legalized in 2011 for gay couples to adopt in Denmark. Although legal today, it is de-facto very 
difficult for gay couples. E.g., many countries will not let their adoptees be adopted by gay men.  
54 I find that more observations of these kinds in the more recent years, but there are still few. I also tried to look at 
mothers with a child who has no other parent identified. Of them, I tried to find those mothers who lived with 
another women, and therefore assuming a lesbian parenthood relation. Even by these metrics, it was not possible to 
assemble any significant amount of observations. 
55 I am in the process to get data where I can take use of broader family and fertility types as comparison groups in 
order to both observe the particularity of adoptions and the increase my population. 
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both have been interesting to investigate. On the other hand, looking at adoptions has some 
clear-cut advantages. First, looking only at adoptions eliminates the potential gender bias coming 
from pregnancy and nursing. When adopting there are no biological changes to the mother that 
either consume effort which otherwise could be put into the job or prevents her from 
participating in the labor market. When there is no pregnancy, there is no obvious gender 
comparative advantage in childrearing. This factor is important in this setting, since without 
pregnancy there is no physical component that can separate the two mothers in the lesbian 
couple. The physical care of the infant is therefore not bound to any one of the women. Thus, 
they are freer to organize the childcare according to factors other than physical and biological 
characters. Second, adoption differs in many other ways from traditional childbirth. The timing 
for the decision of entering parenthood is different when adopting than in traditional pregnancy 
settings. Adopting parents have often been forced to postpone parenthood due to fertility 
problems, which is why adopting parents often are older when entering parenthood.56    
Figure 1 shows the development in adoptions in Denmark over time. The figure shows 
how lesbian couples have gained a higher proportion of the overall adoptions in Denmark over 
the years from 1999 to 2009. The figure also shows substantial year-to-year variation in the 
overall number of adoptions, fluctuating between 300 and 600 adoptions a year. Not all 
adoptions are used in this study. I only use adoptions, where there is no prior relation between 
the adopting parents and the adoptees and when the adoptees are no older than 2 years old at the 
time of adoption. This ensures that the reason for adopting is not to help relatives and that 
adopting is somewhat relatable to having biological children.  
The final panel for this study covers the parents three years prior to five year after their 
first adoption. This limited time-period is covered due to data limitations. 2009 is at present time 
                                                     
56 Adopting parents are often older since they have often have tried traditional fertility for a period without success 
before engaging in the adoption process. Some have argued that the child rearing is different for adoptees and 
traditional babies. On the one hand, it might be an advantage getting a child that has passed the first very 
demanding months. On the other hand, it can be troublesome getting a child who has have a relative unstable first 
period of life.  
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the last year where the gender of the adopting parents is observable from the ADOP-register and 
as figure 1 shows 2009 is also the year where most same-sex couples adopted. The last year of 
earnings information is 2014, which is 5 years of post-adopting observations when using the last 
cohort of adoptions from 2009.57 The final balanced panel covers 4,610 individual adopting 
parents, consisting of 1,761 different-sex households and 544 same-sex households.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the adopting parents in heterosexual and lesbian 
households. The first column shows the men in opposite-sex couples, the second column the 
women in opposite -sex couples, the third column the women in same-sex couples, whereas the 
fourth and fifth column show the pre-adoption first income and second income women in the 
same-sex couples respectively. This is defined as having the highest labor income in the 
household in the year before the first adoption and is shown in order to see whether there are 
significant differences or division of labor within same-sex households. Different metrics on this 
is applied later in the paper. The statistics show that heterosexual men are the oldest at first 
adoption, followed by heterosexual women, the first income lesbian and lastly the second income 
lesbian. The overall difference in age at first adoption between heterosexual men at 37.95 and 
second income lesbians at 33.45 is 4.41 years. There are no noteworthy sample differences in 
ratio of immigrants (around 4 per cent) and number of adoptions (around 1.3-1.4 per couple).58 
The lesbian women are in general marginally better educated than the heterosexual women, who 
again are marginally better educated than the heterosexual men are. None of the differences in 
length of education is statistically significant.59 Lastly, a higher proportion of lesbian mothers live 
in the capital region (52 %) than heterosexuals (42 %) at the time of adoption. Lesbians tend to 
live in urban areas, often due to higher tolerance for non-traditional sexual orientations and due 
to larger marriage-markets. Both the lesbian and heterosexual adopting parents have a higher 
                                                     
57 In the process of being updated to 2016. 
58 The demographic variables as well as the family links are pulled from the FABE and the BEF registers. The 
variables used to create educational length are HFPRIA and HFAUUD and are pulled from the UDDA registers. 
The adoption information are found in the ADOP register. All registers are from Statistics Denmark. 
59 For type of education across the parents, see appendix figure A1. 
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tendency to live in the capital region than the general population of Danish parents where only 
32 % live in the capital region. This might be due to cultural and traditional differences across 
residents of urban and non-urban areas. Lastly is shown, the statistics for labor market 
experience. It shows quite a big difference across the groups. Where the men have the most 
experience and the lesbian women have the lowest experience and salary. In general, this shows 
that there are no large sample differences in the statistics, although controlling for age at first 
adoption, region of residence, experience, and year of adoptions could alleviate possible age and 
idiosyncratic time variation biases.  
Figure 1 – Number of annual adoptions  
Shows the number of adoption in Denmark from 1999 to 2009. The total adoptions (black curve), the adoptions by heterosexual 
couples (light grey) and by lesbian couples (dark grey). 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics  
Shows a number of summary statistic by household type gender and role. Where column (1) men from the adopting heterosexual 
households, (2) women from the adopting heterosexual households, (3) all women from the adopting lesbian households, (4) FI: 
First Income, partners with the highest pre-adoption intra household income from the adopting lesbian households, (5) SI: 
Second Income, partners with the lowest pre-adoption intra household income from the adopting lesbian households. Age at first 
adoption is the parents’ age when adopting their first child. Years of education is the mandatory time needed from elementary 
school to complete the highest taken education. Immigrant is a dummy indicating 1 if the person is either a first generation or 
second generation immigrant. Gender of first adopted child is a dummy indicating 1 if the gender of the first adopted child in the 
household is male and 0 if female. Number of adoptions is the number of total children adopted in 2009. Labor Experience is the 
number of years at the labor market one year prior to the first adoption. Salary is the labor income one year prior to the first 
adoption. The mean are shown with the standard deviation in the parenthesis for each variable and parent.    
  Heterosexual   Lesbian 
 
Men Women  All FI SI 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Age at first adoption 37.95 36.92  34.07 34.59 33.54 
 
(4.26) (4.26)  (5.21) (5.03) (5.34) 
Years of education 14.09 14.17  14.28 14.6 13.97 
 
(2.30) (2.12)  (2.26) (2.22) (2.26) 
Immigrants 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.03 0.05 
 
(0.18) (0.17)  (0.20) (0.17) (0.22) 
Sex of first adopted child 0.49  0.52 
 (boy=1) (0.50)  (0.50) 
Number of adoptions 1.40 1.40  1.32 1.32 1.31 
 (0.54) (0.54)  (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 17.08 15.98  12.66 13.29 12.03 
 (6.41) (6.25)  (6.07) (6.02) (6.05) 
Observations 1761 1761   1088 544 544 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Area of residence 
Shows the area in Denmark of the households’ residence. The distribution is calculated on the basis of one observation per 
household per year. 
  Heterosexual Lesbians 
Capital 42.3 52.4 
Zealand 10.4 7.4 
Southern  14.0 10.9 
Mid-Jutland 23.3 21.3 
Northern Jutland 10.0 8.0 
  100 100 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
6. Graphical Evidence 
Before turning to the formal analysis, I provide some initial graphical evidence examining the raw 
salary and income trajectories across the different household and parental types over time. 
Figures 2 Panel A. and B. show the crude mean of yearly salary and income around the first 
adoption - salary being the labor earnings, income being the sum of labor earnings, public 
transfers and capital gains.60 First, the figures show a level difference between the different types 
of parent. Men are the highest earners across all the years, followed by the first income lesbian 
partner, the heterosexual women and lastly the second income lesbian partner. Second, the 
patterns reveal that before the first adoption the salary and income trajectory of the parents 
across type are the same, suggesting no gender or household type specific trend over time. Third, 
there are large gender differences immediately after the first adoption. Whereas men’s earnings 
seem to be only marginally or not affected by adoptions, the heterosexual and the first income 
lesbian women experience a large drop in salaries immediately after the first adoption and a 
stagnation of earnings afterwards. The second income lesbian women do not seem to be affected 
as much. The difference in the salary and income trajectories follows naturally from the 
organization of the Danish welfare state, where salary losses are highly compensated in general 
and almost entirely compensated when it is due to parental leave. The immediate drop in salaries 
indicates that there is a substantial short-term child penalty whereas the flatter salary and income 
trajectories post-parenthood indicate a persistent long-term child penalty. The level difference 
between the groups can be due to many reasons, but due to the event study design, the significant 
difference in age at first adoption is important. Lesbian women are in general younger in the 
event year, meaning they are earlier in their careers where the salaries are lower. This possible 
violation of common trend will be discussed and addressed in the next section.  Panel C. shows 
                                                     
60 The yearly earnings are pulled from the IND (income) register from Statistics Denmark. The variable used to 
construct the salary variable is LOENMV, which consists of all labor income, fringe benefits, other tax-free income, 
employee bonuses, and realizations of stock options. The variable used to construct the income variable is 
PERINDKIALT, which consists of all income from labor, transfers, property and other unspecified contributions. 
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the labor market participation rate defined as having any salary in the given year, and Panel D. 
show the percentage of these who are only part time employees, defined as working less than 30 
hours a week.61 Following the patterns of income and salary, there is a small decrease in 
participation across all women when entering parenthood, while men’s participation seem 
uninfluenced by parenthood. On the other hand, Panel D. shows that everybody decreases their 
working hours in the year of adoption and settles on working hour levels a little below that of the 
pre-parenthood level. Figure 2 Panel E. shows the number of days on parental leave for the 
parents across the different household types.62 It shows that heterosexual women spend the most 
time on parental leave with around 200 days in the year of adoption. This amount is shared 
evenly between the two mothers in same-sex relationships, where both the first and second 
income partner takes around 100 days each in the year of adoption. Lastly, the heterosexual men 
take only a minor part of the overall parental leave, with around 30 days in the year of adoption. 
This illustrates an important difference between men and women, but also between heterosexual 
and same-sex couples. The women are still the primary caretakers in heterosexual households, 
even in adoption situations, where sexual comparative advantage is less evident (no pregnancy or 
nursing). On the contrary, same-sex couples split the caretaking equally on average, no matter the 
pre-parenthood income power, education or age. This is on average across the households, 
meaning that there still can be specialization and variation in the parental leave taken within the 
household. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
61 The working hours are not directly observable, but it is possible to construct an approximate measure of the 
individuals working hours based on their tax bills. There is a special lump-sum fee mandatory for all people with 
labor income. This lump-sum fee depends solely on the working hours and not the income. There are three levels 
of fees for three intervals of working hours for which an estimate of the individual working hours can be 
approximated. These variables are constructed on the basis of ATPXX from the IDA register.   
62 The days on parental leave is based on the variable SAGSART from the SGDP register. 
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Figure 2 – Individual yearly salary pre and post adoption 
Panel A. shows the crude mean individual yearly salary across households. Panel B. Shows the crude mean individual yearly 
income. Panel C. shows the labor market participation. Panel D. show the ratio of part-time to full-time positions. Panel E. shows 
the crude mean of parental leave taken. All variables are depicted across the different gender and income types in each year from 
Event-3 to Event+5. Event=0 in the year of the households first adoption. Hetero Men is the mean for the adopting men in 
heterosexual households, Hetero Women is the mean for the adopting women in heterosexual households, Lesbian FI is the 
mean of the adopting women in same-sex households with the highest intra-household pre-adoption income, Lesbian SI is the 
mean of the adopting women in same-sex households with the lowest intra-household pre-adoption income. All Lesbian is the 
mean of all adopting women in same-sex households. 
                      
                    Panel A.      Panel B. 
                
               Panel C.      Panel D. 
          
       
              Panel E. 
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7. Econometric Strategy and Results 
The goal of this paper is to study the gender bias in child penalty - often denoted the family gap, 
motherhood penalty or mommy track. Thus, the idea is not to test the existence of the child 
penalty, but rather to investigate how the gender itself influences the observed differences in 
earnings between fathers and mothers. The gender’s influence on child penalty relies on multiple 
factors. Women may face hostile labor markets but may also suffer from their partner’s lack of 
engagement in the household production. Having a male partner may lead to gender stereotypical 
household organization, which may force women to detract themselves from the labor market, to 
a higher degree than they desire. 
Hence, the comparison I need is not childless women, but rather women facing different 
family situation. More specifically women in a gender invariant relationship entering parenthood, 
i.e., lesbian couples having children. If the mother does not differ from her partner in gender, 
then the observed effect of having a child cannot be due to the within household gender 
differences. Nor can it be due to gender heterogeneity in post parenthood discrimination in the 
labor market.  
I apply a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) event study design using heterosexual couples as 
the treatment group and lesbian couples as the control group. The adoption of the household’s 
first child is the event in this setting. This design is suited to analyze the household, individual 
and intra household dynamics in economic outcomes when having children. Other studies have 
applied similar approaches looking only at heterosexual childbearing families mainly using men 
and women with delayed childbirth or couples who never had children as controls (Kleven et al., 
2018; Angelov et al., 2016). This entails a strong assumption about common trend on observables 
between parents and non-parents, stating that fertility planning is somewhat exogenous. In this 
study, no such assumption is needed since I compare parents with same family situations on both 
sides, who also face the same economic and labor market situation.  
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The reason why the DiD approach comes in handy is that there is a pre-parental level 
difference in the total household earnings between the heterosexual and lesbian households. As 
long as the common trend assumption is not violated, the properties of DiD method ensures that 
the difference between the two family types observed over time is due to the difference in how 
they cope with having their first child. Figure 3 shows similar pre-parenthood trends for parents 
across gender and family type, which supports the common trend assumption. Since both 
heterosexual and lesbian parents face the same Danish labor market and institutional settings 
there is furthermore little reason to believe that the common trend assumption is violated.63 
The heterosexual and lesbian women differ significantly at one central variable to the salary 
formation, namely the age at first adoption, shown in Table 1. The lesbian mothers are in general 
younger at the time of adoption, which also leads to the difference in labor market experiences. 
This might be the reason why there are level differences in the salaries in the event study graphs 
of Figure 2. Level differences are not violating any conditions needed for DiD to be unbiased as 
long as the trends between the groups are common. Furthermore, including controls for these 
two variables in the DiD-regressions should address the bias concerns, if the impact of age and 
experience at first adoption on child penalty is linear in time. However, the impact of work-
interruptions - such as having children - on the earnings trajectories may vary depending on the 
career timing.64 I address the possible problem with non-linearity in the unbalanced variables 
between treatment and control group in the robustness check section 7.4.65 
                                                     
63 Furthermore, the two types of couple share the fertility situations. As seen in the summary statistics, all the 
parents are relatively old when entering parenthood. This is probably due to that adoptions are not parents’ first 
choice of method to have children, both for heterosexual and lesbian couples who most likely have tried other 
fertility processes before engaging in the adoption system. 
64 There is a big literature on the birth timing effect on labor market outcomes. No real consensus is present. Some 
studies find no causal effect of birth timing, while others find significant positive effects of waiting. The results also 
varies between fathers and mothers. For further discussion on fertility timing and labor market outcomes see 
Rosenbaum (2019); Herr (2016); and Fitzenberger (2013). 
65 If it is worse to have children earlier than later, a linear control for age and experience at first adoption will 
overestimate the child penalty for lesbian mothers, since they adopt earlier. The results show that lesbian mothers 
have lower child penalty than heterosexual mothers, thus this result will at must be a conservative one. 
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Now let LEs be a dummy for lesbian couples and dt be a time-dummy that switches on for 
observations obtained after entering parenthood (i.e., adopting). Then  
(1)  , 
where Y is the total household earnings in family, j, at household sex composition, s. α is the 
intercept, and ε is the error term, assuming that . Each term represents an 
interesting conditional mean for interpretation:  
·  
·  
·  
·  
 
Where HE and LE indicate heterosexual and lesbian households respectively and Pre and Post 
indicates if the measurement time is pre or post parenthood. α is the baseline heterosexual total 
household earnings before event i.e., pre parenthood. γ is the pre-parenthood differences 
between the heterosexual and lesbian couples. λ is the effect of entering parenthood for the 
heterosexual couples. β is the causal effect of interest, which in this particular setting measures 
how much of the gender specific child penalty stems from intra-household gender composition. 
Consider the following model: 
(2)   , 
Where Xjst is a vector of household type and time-invariant covariates, such as the households’ 
education level, age at first adoption and labor market experience. R is regional dummies and C is 
year dummies. These controls are included to address potential biases arising from either 
differences in observables or violation of the common trend assumption. These are important 
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controls due to significant differences between heterosexual and same-sex households in the age-
at-first-adoption and pre-adopting labor market experiences.  
The empirical analysis consists of three parts, each studying a different aspect of the child 
penalty across gender and household type. First, an investigation of the difference between 
lesbian and heterosexual child penalty in the aggregated household earnings. Second, the child 
penalty for the individual parents across gender and type is studied. Third, an analysis of the 
dynamics in the intra-household earnings gap pre and post the household’s first adoption. 
 
7.1 Household Earnings 
If the child penalty is gender specific to women due to gender comparative advantages in 
childrearing or labor market discrimination against mothers – as described in the introduction – 
then lesbian households must experience a higher accumulated child penalty. On the other hand, 
if the child penalty is due to other factors, such as gender stereotypic organization of the 
household time allocation, then it is not obvious that lesbian households will experience a bigger 
child penalty than the heterosexual households on aggregate. As shown in the data section, the 
accumulated days of parental leave taken around adoptions are somewhat similar for heterosexual 
and lesbian households. Despite this similarity in aggregated days of leave, the allocation between 
the partners is rather different where women take almost all the leave in heterosexual households 
the lesbian women share it equally. I therefore apply a DiD model on the household income pre 
and post the first adoption between heterosexual and lesbian households in the setup of equation 
(2). Now Y is the logarithm of household earnings, LE is a dummy equal one for the lesbian 
household, d is a dummy indicating parenthood. I control for parental age at the time of 
adoption, household education level, region of residence and include time-dummies. The 
coefficient for the dummy, LE, captures the overall level difference in the earnings between the 
heterosexual and lesbian households. The coefficient for the parenthood dummy, d, is the overall 
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household child penalty across both types of households. The coefficient for the interaction 
term, LE*d, is the difference in the relative child penalty between heterosexual and lesbian 
households. j, is the household index and t = 0, 1, …, 5 denotes the year relative to the couple’s 
first adoption. Figure 3 depicts the coefficients for the relative child penalty between heterosexual 
and lesbian households, while table 3 shows the full regression outputs on the yearly salary from 
Event+0 to Event+5. The regressions are run for both the aggregated household income and 
salary. It is shown that the child penalty in household earnings is higher for heterosexual couples 
than for lesbian couples. Lesbian households experience a 12-18% salary premium in the child 
penalty compared to heterosexual households, meaning that lesbian households have a 
substantially lower child penalty than heterosexual households. This indicates that the child 
penalty is not bound to the gender of the parents but is rather due to the gender heterogeneity 
within the households, where lesbian couples’ way of organizing households post parenthood 
seems more efficient for the income formation.66 This is also interesting for the discrimination 
argument and questions the earlier results indicating that the labor market discriminates against 
mothers per se.67 In general, this result goes against that mothers should experience higher child 
penalty due their gender one way or the other. If higher child penalty is idiosyncratic to being a 
mother, then lesbian households, which have two mothers, should experience a higher overall 
child penalty than heterosexual one-mother households. These results are also interesting seen 
through traditional economic perspective, where theories on gender differences in comparative 
advantages of childrearing and household production together with gains from division of labor 
and specialization are cornerstones in household economics theory. The positive effect on 
household earnings due to non-specialization of partners within the household goes against the 
traditional view on how to optimize household outcomes post-parenthood. While this is still only 
                                                     
66 It would be interesting to show whether this income premium come on expense to child development and 
performance. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this study, since I am not able to follow the households for 
sufficient number of years at this stage. However, this question will be of interest in future follow up studies. 
67 Surely, labor market discrimination can still exist even through these results. Although, the size is questionable 
due to these outcomes. 
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indicative, it is certain that a large part of women’s child penalty is decided in the household and 
not at the labor market.68 
The other coefficients in the regressions show that lesbian households experience lower 
income levels in general and both household type’s earnings is lowered in the first 2-3 years of 
parenthood, whereafter it is restored and afterwards increased. Having a higher household level 
of education and living in the capital region of Denmark are - not surprisingly - correlated with 
higher earnings. This study is only able to present the short-term effect – following parents five 
years after getting their first child. It would be interesting to do a follow up study in the future, 
and follow the parents for a longer period, to observe whether these preliminary results also 
reflect the long-term outcomes and to measure how the difference in the household organization 
affect the children’s development and wellbeing. 
The income variable captures everything from labor earnings, public transfers and capital 
gains. Although income primarily consists of labor earnings, it is not a clean measure of 
productivity or labor market outcomes, which is why the yearly salary is used as well. Again, I 
take the logarithm of the earnings measures to get a percentage approximation of the relative size 
of child penalty. Whereas there are no households with zero income, some households have 
single years without labor earnings, for which they are excluded from the sample.69 The results on 
log yearly salaries are similar to the ones on the log incomes, which underlines that the lesbian 
households are able to lower the labor earnings penalty due to parenthood. This indicates that it 
is possible for women to maintain careers even in the wake of having children, especially in the 
absence of a patriarch.  
                                                     
68 The other leg of the specialization gains is how the children fares. Unfortunately, I cannot follow the households 
for more than five years after adoptions and none useable variables on wellbeing and skills are available for children 
less than five years. However, there is little reason to believe that the child wellbeing should differ significantly in 
the lesbian and heterosexual households. Browne (2007) and Golombok (2015) finds evidence for greater child 
wellbeing raised in lesbian households. 
69 In practice, less than 1 % of the total sample of the households have zero labor earnings within a year. It is almost 
impossible to have a zero income for a household in Denmark, where almost everybody is compensated by the 
social security if not able to generate income themselves. Furthermore, the presence of labor earnings is even more 
unlikely in this sample, who all have been through adoption procedures demanding economic stability.  
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Figure 3 – Difference-in-Difference coefficient for child penalty in earnings between Lesbian Household to Heterosexual Households  
The figures show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for lesbian household to 
heterosexual households. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of yearly income, shown in Panel A. and the 
natural logarithm of yearly salary, shown in Panel B. The main explanatory variable in both regressions is LE*d, which is the 
relative child penalty for lesbian households to heterosexual households due to parenthood. Additional and non-depicted 
independent variables used in both regressions are as described in Table 1. An indicator variable of having adopted, an 
indicator of household type of parental gender composition. Additional controls are used for household educational attainment 
(measured as the collective years of education), age at first adoption, labor market experience (measured as the collective years 
of labor market experience in the year before adopting), dummy indicating if the mother is adopting in the measurement year, a 
categorical variable of area of residence, and year dummies. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. Robust 
standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The dots are the point estimates, whereas the lines indicates the confidence 
intervals on 99 % level. 
     Panel A. Income          Panel B. Salary 
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Table 3 – Difference-in-Difference coefficient for child penalty in earnings between Lesbian Household to Heterosexual Households  
The table shows the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for lesbian household to heterosexual 
households. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in both regressions is 
Parenthood*LE, which is the relative child penalty for lesbian households to heterosexual households due to parenthood. 
Additional independent variables used in the regressions are an indicator variable of Parenthood estimating the general salary effect 
of becoming parents on household level and an indicator of household type, Lesbian, estimating the general salary differences 
between same-sex and different-sex households.Additional controls are used for household educational attainment (Household 
Education, measured as the collective years of education), age at first adoption, Adoption year is a dummy indicating if the household 
is adopting in the measurement year, Experience is the household aggregated year of labor market experience in the year before 
adopting, and non-depicted dummies for area of residence  and years. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. 
Robust standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Variating observation numbers are due to few zero salaries that are dropped due to the log-transformation. 
  Event+0 Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parenthood -0.0829*** -0.0699*** 0.0177 -0.0085 0.0143 0.0373 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) 
Lesbian -0.3031*** -0.3205*** -0.3264*** -0.3336*** -0.3318*** -0.3374*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) 
Parenthood*Lesbian -0.0012 0.1041** 0.1373*** 0.1604*** 0.1378*** 0.1716*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) 
Adoption Year - -0.1152 -0.0652** -0.0825** -0.0890* -0.0934 
 
- (0.075) (0.031) (0.036) (0.050) (0.079) 
Household Education 0.0476*** 0.0469*** 0.0468*** 0.0499*** 0.0534*** 0.0494*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age at adoption -0.0083*** -0.0108*** -0.0107*** -0.0116*** -0.0118*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0151*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,186 4,263 4,223 4,173 4,133 4,083 
R-squared 0.225 0.203 0.213 0.191 0.201 0.205 
 
 
7.2 Individual Parent Earnings 
Having shown that lesbian households’ earnings do not suffer as much due to parenthood as 
heterosexuals’, it is interesting to decompose the effect between the parents within the 
household. In this section, I compare the heterosexual mothers to the lesbian mothers. It is not 
evident how heterosexual women should be compared to the lesbian mothers. In the absence of 
a man, the lesbian couples may form household roles based on factors other than the gender. 
The lack of women’s bargaining power within the household is described repeatedly in the 
bargaining literature (as described in the introduction), but other factors than gender have also 
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been proposed to influence the bargaining power, such as relative age, education and income.70 I 
therefore make several comparison groups based on these bargaining factors. First, I make a 
straightforward comparison of all heterosexual women to all lesbian women, expecting greater 
penalty for the heterosexual women almost by default. Second, I account for bargaining power 
through selection of five different comparison groups. I compare heterosexual women to the 
lesbian partner (i) with the lowest pre parenthood earnings, (ii) with the lowest education, (iii) 
who is youngest, (iv) with the least pre parenthood labor market experience, and (v) who is taking 
the majority of the parental leave. Comparison group (v) is highly endogenous, since deciding 
who to take the majority of the parental leave is negatively correlated with the relative earnings 
potential within the household. Keeping this in mind, the comparison group still offers some 
insights in the cost of being the primary caretaker within the household. I apply the same DiD 
design over the same years as the one used on household levels described above.  
I find that heterosexual mothers experience higher child penalties in salaries than lesbian 
mothers in general. I furthermore find that heterosexual mothers experience higher child 
penalties even when compared to the lesbian mothers with the weaker bargaining position. This 
is true when comparing heterosexual mothers to the lesbian mothers who in their relationship 
either are the second income bearer pre-adoption, holds the least education, is the youngest, has 
the least labor experience or is taking the majority of the parental leave. The results holds for 
both total income (untabulated) and salary penalties, shown in figure 4.71 The results are not 
surprising since the heterosexual male does not suffer significantly from fatherhood together with 
the fact that the heterosexual households do worse than lesbian households on aggregate. This 
                                                     
70 Unfortunately, I do not have any wealth measure, which otherwise are widely used as an explanation for 
bargaining power. 
71 The full regression output is reported in table A2 in the Appendix. In further untabulated figures, I restrict the 
comparisons further by only including the heterosexual mothers with the least bargaining power within the 
household (i.e., lowest pre-parenthood income, lowest education, youngest and taking the most parental leave). As 
most heterosexual mothers have the lower bargaining power measured by these metrics within their households, the 
results are similar to the ones shown in figure 4. The results are also robust to excluding any parent who is 
undertaking an education within the measurement years. 
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mean that the heterosexual mothers must account for the large child penalty observed in 
heterosexual households. 
Figure 4 – Difference-in-Difference coefficients for child penalty in earnings between Heterosexual Women to Lesbian Women  
The figures show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for heterosexual women to 
lesbian women. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in is LE*d, 
which is the relative child penalty for lesbian households to heterosexual households due to parenthood. Additional and 
untabulated independent variables used in the regressions are; an indicator variable of motherhood. An indicator variable of 
household gender composition type. Controls for educational attainment, age at first adoption, labor experience, a dummy 
indicating adoption within the year, a categorical variable of area of residence, and year dummies. The categories All 
compares all heterosexual women to all lesbian women. Low Earning compares heterosexual to lesbian women who holds the 
second income within the household. Youngest compares heterosexual to lesbian women who are the youngest within the 
household. Low Educated compares heterosexual to lesbian women who have the lowest educational attainment within the 
household. Most Leave compares heterosexual to lesbian women who takes the most maternity leave within the household. 
Least Experience compares the heterosexual to lesbian women who have the least labor market experience within the 
household at the time of adoption. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. The dots are the point estimates, 
whereas the lines indicates the confidence intervals on 99 % level. 
 
These differences in child penalty across heterosexual and lesbian women can come from 
three margins: labor participation, hours worked and wage rates. It is thus interesting to 
decompose effects and observe what is causing this division in child penalty for women in 
heterosexual- and lesbian households. Figure 5 shows two DiD outcomes between mothers in 
heterosexual households compared to mothers in lesbian households.72 The same DiD regression 
model is applied, but now the outcome variables are a dummy for labor market participation 
within the year (1, indicating participation, 0, indicating no participation) depicted in Panel A., 
and a dummy for having a part-time position (1, indicating part-time, 0, indicating full-time) 
depicted in Panel B. Only women having labor market participation within the year are included 
in the results shown in Panel B. Panel A. shows that the difference in earning between the lesbian 
                                                     
72 The full regression output is reported in table A3 in the Appendix 
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and the heterosexual mothers found above does not come from changes in labor market 
participation. Except some indication of differences in the first year after adopting, there are no 
differences between heterosexual and lesbian mothers. This is true when comparing all 
heterosexual mothers both to all lesbian mothers and to lesbian mothers with low intra 
household bargaining power. On the other hand, Panel B. show that among the women 
participating, more heterosexual women moves from a full-time to a part-time position than 
lesbian women do when entering motherhood. This is true when comparing heterosexual 
mothers to both all lesbian mothers and the lesbian mothers with low intra household bargaining 
power. Overall, this indicates that motherhood does not affect the heterosexual and the lesbian 
mothers’ labor market participation differently, but more heterosexual mothers lower their 
working hours compared to lesbian mothers after entering motherhood.   
 
Figure 5 – DiD coefficients for the child penalty in labor market participation and working hours between Heterosexual Women to 
Lesbian Women  
The figures show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty in labor participation and full-time 
positions for heterosexual women to lesbian women. In Panel A. the dependent variable is a dummy indicating one for an 
individual participating in the labor market within a year. In Panel B. the dependent variable is a dummy indicating one for labor 
market participants holding a part-time position. Both panels show the results across the different samples of mothers based on 
bargaining power (explained in section 6.2 and Figure 4). The main explanatory variable in is LE*d, which is the relative child 
penalty for lesbian households to heterosexual households due to parenthood. Additional and untabulated independent variables 
used in the regressions are; an indicator variable of motherhood. An indicator variable of household gender composition type. 
Controls for educational attainment, age at first adoption, labor experience, a dummy indicating adoption within the year, a 
categorical variable of area of residence, and year dummies. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. The dots are the 
point estimates, whereas the lines indicates the confidence intervals on 99 % level. 
 
Panel A.                                         Panel B. 
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7.3 Intra Household Earnings Gap 
The obvious follow up question then is how becoming parents influences the intra household 
earnings gap. To estimate the intra household earnings gap due to parenthood, I apply the 
following DiD specification: 
(3)  
where t = −1, 0, …,5 denotes the year relative to adoption, the calendar year is indexed by c = 
1994 ,…, 2014, Yjct is the within-couple difference in income or salary, j is the couple index, 
 is the within-couple difference in income or salary one year prior to adoption, X(t=-1) is 
vector containing within-couple differences in age and pre-child years of education for couple j 
one year prior to adoption. 1[ . ] = 1 if the expression within parentheses is true and 0 otherwise. 
 is the calendar year control for idiosyncratic time trends or shocks, which is important since 
there is variation in the calendar year of first adoption. εjct is the error term.   
The parameters of interest αm for m=  0, 1, …, 5, identify the effects of parenthood on the 
intra household earnings gap at the year of adoption and up to 5 years after, relative to the pre-
adoption gap. Thus, the parameters identify the approximate change in the intra household 
percentage earnings gap compared to the pre-adoption gap for each year after the adoption year.   
The dependent variables are the absolute salary and the log(salary) differences between the 
partners. For the heterosexual households it is the man’s salary subtracted by the woman’s. For 
the lesbian households it is the salary of the woman with the highest pre-parenthood income 
subtracted by the salary of the woman with the lowest pre-parenthood income. Figure 6 shows 
that the intra-household salary difference increases relatively more in heterosexual households 
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compared to lesbian households when entering parenthood.73 Meaning that parenthood affects 
the partners more unequally in heterosexual households than in lesbian households. 
 
Figure 6 – Difference-in-Difference coefficient for intra-household earnings gap entering parenthood between Heterosexual and Lesbian 
households 
The figure shows the Difference-in-Difference regression estimate of relative development in the intra-household salary gap in 
parenthood for different-sex and same-sex households. The dependent variable is the intra household difference in absolute salary 
(Panel A.) and log salary (Panel B.) between the partners. For the different-sex households it is the man’s salary subtracted by the 
woman’s. For the same-sex households it is the salary of the women with the highest pre-parenthood income subtracted by the 
women with the lowest pre-parenthood income.  The main explanatory variable in the regressions is LE*d, which is the relative 
effect of parenthood for the lesbian households to the heterosexual households. Additional (untabulated) independent variables 
used in regressions are an indicator variable of parenthood estimating the general effect of becoming a parent, and an indicator of 
household type estimating the general intra-household differences in salary between different-sex and same-sex households. 
Controls for the intra household differences one year prior to the first adoption in the parents’ educational attainment (measured 
as the collective years of education), age at first adoption (i.e., becoming parent) and salary as well as a categorical variable of area 
of residence are used. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. The absolute estimates are in DKK (1DKK is approximately 
0.157 USD). The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. The dots are the point estimates, whereas the lines indicates the 
confidence intervals on 99 % level. 
 
               Panel A.    Panel B. 
 
 
 
7.4 Robustness tests 
The common trend assumption is central in obtaining unbiased estimates when applying a DiD 
model. One major concern that may violate this assumption is the significant differences in age 
and labor experiences at first adoption between the opposite and same-sex households. The 
impact of having children may vary significantly across ages and career stages.74 The estimated 
effect of the child penalty for lesbians might be overestimated if postponing parenthood is good 
for labor market outcomes, since they adopt earlier in life compared heterosexual women on 
average. 
                                                     
73 The full regression output is reported in table A4 in the Appendix 
74 There is a big literature on this which have not reach any consensus. For further discussion on fertility timing and 
labor market outcomes see Rosenbaum (2019), Herr (2016), Fitzenberger (2012). 
DKK 
 
Log 
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So far, I have addressed the potential bias in sample differences by including linear controls 
for age and experience at the time of adoption in the regressions. The question is whether these 
are linear in time and thus whether a linear control for these is sufficient. The common support 
i.e., the overlap, between the treatment and control group is large, even though the sample means 
are unequal. This allows me to apply Inverse Probability Weights, IWP, which addresses the 
concern of biases due to systematic difference in timing of first adoption. I do this for the 
mothers estimating the individual level child penalty. First, I estimate the propensity score, , of 
being a lesbian women, LE=1, on observables covariates, X, using a logit model. Lesbian women, 
LE=1, get the weights , while heterosexual women, LE=0 get the weights 
. Notice that  depend on X, so w depends on X and LE. Weighting the sample 
serves as a method to compare the most relevant of the control observations to the treated in 
order to elicit the true effect of being treated. In this case, the causal difference in child penalty 
between lesbian and heterosexual women.  
I test different specifications of the matching function. In the most specified model, the 
propensity score is derived from the age, labor market experience, and educational level in the 
year at first adoption. After obtaining the IPW on the basis of propensity scores, I apply them 
together with the DiD model from the main analysis. I do not include the controls used to derive 
the propensity scores in the DiD models, since it would lead to over-control problems.75 
These tests are only more precise than the unweighted normal DiD with linear controls, if 
we assume that age and experience at first adoptions are not linear to the child penalty and that 
there are sufficient amount of control observations without common support in the treatment 
group. The results show that the point estimates are robust to these new specifications, but the 
standard errors increased pushing some of the new estimates to be only borderline significant, 
                                                     
75 For further details on Propensity Scores for Matching methods using observables to account for systematic 
differences between treatment and control see Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985). For further details on the Inverse 
Probability Weighting method see (Robin et al., 1994). 
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even though the point estimates do not change significantly. The results can be seen in Figure A6 
in the appendix. 
Who is taking the parental leave is highly endogenous, since it is negatively correlated with 
the relative earnings potential within the household. Although endogenous, Hald (2018) suggests 
that the intra household variation affects the division of labor and therefore is a strong 
determiner for the intra household gender wage gap.76 Earlier I tested the child penalty between 
the mothers of opposite and same-sex households with the restriction of them taking the most 
leave within the household. I found that child penalty for the caretaking lesbian mothers are 
lower than for the caretaking heterosexual mothers. I now expand on this model and insert a 
continuous variable counting the days of parental leave around the first adoption to evaluate the 
relative intra household caretaking as well as the absolute effect of parental leave days on the 
child penalty. As seen in Figure 2 – Panel E, the number of days it takes to be the parent with the 
most leave is on average lower in same-sex than in opposite-sex household. The coefficient for 
days of leave is negative and statistical significant throughout the full period, but the child penalty 
remains lower for the lesbian women. This indicate that parental leave has both a direct and an 
indirect effect. The direct being that the negative effect increases in number of days away from 
the labor market, while the indirect comes from being the one taking most of the parental leave 
within the household and thus indicating that the individual is the primary caretaker in other 
aspects as well.  
Following the hypothesis that whom you have children with and how much they 
participate in the household production is important for your own labor market outcomes, I 
conduct an additional test which includes the number of days of parental leave (or share of the 
household total parental leave) the partner takes in the regressions estimating the primary 
                                                     
76 Olafsson & Steingimsdottir (2019) find that parents who are entitled to paternity leave are less likely to separate 
using a reform in Iceland that offered one month of parental leave earmarked to fathers with a child born on or 
after January 2001. 
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caretaker’s earning trajectories. The result that the child penalty is lower for the lesbian women is 
robust to including these controls. The outputs also show that the higher share taken by the 
partner the lower the penalty for the primary caretaker no matter household gender composition. 
The results can be seen in Figure and Table A5 and A6 in the appendix. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The gender gap in earnings is an intensely debated topic in most western countries. Even though 
the western world has experienced a significant convergence in earnings between the genders, a 
significant and persistent gap still exists. In this paper, I take on a new approach to analyze this 
puzzle. I exploit the intra household difference in gender composition between heterosexual and 
lesbian couples. There are multiple advantages in evaluating the child penalty in same-sex couples 
compared to heterosexual couples. First, the comparative advantages and division of labor within 
the households are non-gender specific. Second, the partners in same-sex relations will, by 
default, face the same kind of labor market treatment i.e., gender based advantages and 
disadvantages.  
The first and relatively non-central result from this study is that the pattern of gender 
inequality in child penalty persists in heterosexual couples that adopt. Even though adopting 
eliminates the potential gender bias that results from pregnancy and nursing and thus lowers the 
gender comparative advantage in childrearing, there remains a large child penalty for mothers. As 
in traditional childbirth households, there is no child penalty for fathers.  
I then turn to present three main results on the household organizations impact on the 
child penalty. First, I show that the child penalty on aggregate is lower in lesbian households 
relative to heterosexual households, even after controlling for education, timing of parenthood, 
and area of residence. Second, looking at the individual parents’ child penalty and comparing 
heterosexual women to the lesbian partner with less bargaining power shows that the child 
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penalty is lower for lesbian women independently of the intra household bargaining position.. 
The analysis also reveals that this difference in child penalty does not come from changes in labor 
market participation, but primarily from wage rates and the higher tendency for heterosexual 
women to take on part-time rather than full-time positions. I also test whether these results 
depends on the heterogeneous organization of parental leave between the two types of 
household. After controlling for days of parental leave taken and the share of parental leave taken 
by the partner, I still find that lesbian women have lower child penalties than heterosexual 
women.  Third, I show that the intra household earnings gap increases significantly due to 
parenthood in heterosexual households while it does not in lesbians households. 
All together, these results indicate that the observed gender inequality in child penalty is 
not a universal gender entity. I show that the bargaining power in lesbian households has little to 
do with the child penalty, where it seems that childrearing chores are shared rather evenly across 
partners of different ages, education and incomes. These results are also interesting from the 
more traditional economic perspective, where theories on gender differences in comparative 
advantages of childrearing and household production together with gains from division of labor 
and specialization are cornerstones in household economics theory. The positive effect on 
household earnings due to more egalitarian and non-specialized allocation of labor between 
partners within the household goes against the traditional view on how to optimize household 
outcomes post parenthood.  
The presented results are all short-term effects, since I am not able to follow the 
households for longer than five years after their first adoption. This prohibits investigations of 
the children’s development and performance across the household types either, since few 
measures are made for children younger than 5. One follow up question of interest is whether the 
lower child penalties compromise the children’s outcomes.  
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Whether equally shared household production is overall better or not is not for this study 
to decide. These results show that the child penalty for mothers is much dependent on the 
partner and household organization and less dependent on labor market attitudes against mothers 
per se – although discrimination cannot be rejected and is still most certainly a significant 
problem. The results show that the child penalty can be lowered by sharing the household 
production with a partner that is more engaged in childrearing and that this household 
organization most likely does not lower the overall household earnings, but rather the opposite. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1 – Educational attainments  
Show distribution of highest obtained educational level across household type, gender and income type. School is elementary 
school of 10 years from the age 5 to 15. High School is additional 3 years of schooling which, is also qualifying for further 
academic studies. Vocational is all vocational education of 2-4 years often taken instead of high school. Short Further is all short 
post high school training of 1-1.5 years in a specific trait. Undergrad consist of all academic bachelors and professional bachelors. 
Grad consist of all master and PhD educations. 
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Table A2 – Difference-in-Difference coefficients for child penalty in earnings between Heterosexual Women to Lesbian Women  
The tables show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for heterosexual women to lesbian 
women. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in the regressions is 
Parenthood*Lesbian, which is the relative child penalty for heterosexual mothers to lesbian mothers due to parenthood. Additional 
independent variables used in the regressions are an indicator variable of motherhood estimating the general effect of becoming 
a mother on the salary, and an indicator of household type estimating the general earnings difference between heterosexual and 
lesbian women. Controls for educational attainment (measured as the collective years of education), age at first adoption 
(becoming parents) and a categorical variable of area of residence are used. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. Panel 
A. compares heterosexual women to all lesbian women. Panel B. compares all heterosexual women to the lesbian with the 
second income within the household. Panel C. compares all heterosexual women to the lesbian who is the youngest within the 
household. Panel D. compares all heterosexual women to the lesbian with the lowest educational attainment within the 
household. Panel E. compares all heterosexual women to the lesbian who takes the most maternity leave within the household. 
The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Variating observation numbers are due to few zero salaries that are dropped due to the log-transformation. 
 
Panel A. Heterosexual mothers and all lesbian mothers 
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2524*** -0.1129*** -0.1936*** -0.1946*** -0.2076*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) 
Lesbian -0.1845*** -0.1859*** -0.1882*** -0.1910*** -0.1893*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.2778*** 0.2410*** 0.2946*** 0.2811*** 0.2896*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) 
Adoption Year -0.1031 -0.0828* -0.0928** -0.0499 -0.0176 
 (0.096) (0.044) (0.047) (0.062) (0.098) 
Age at adoption -0.0022 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0059** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0679*** 0.0736*** 0.0750*** 0.0768*** 0.0751*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0226*** 0.0224*** 0.0223*** 0.0250*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,795 4,729 4,664 4,579 4,503 
R-squared 0.089 0.097 0.095 0.110 0.104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Panel B. Within household second income heterosexual mothers and lesbian mothers 
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2591*** -0.1211*** -0.2183*** -0.2184*** -0.2248*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) 
Lesbian -0.4478*** -0.4400*** -0.4413*** -0.4439*** -0.4456*** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.3748*** 0.3875*** 0.4580*** 0.4235*** 0.4537*** 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) 
Adoption Year 0.0633 -0.0667 -0.0944* -0.0766 0.0768 
 (0.115) (0.048) (0.050) (0.068) (0.121) 
Age at adoption -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0063** -0.0077** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0687*** 0.0741*** 0.0763*** 0.0765*** 0.0752*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0221*** 0.0223*** 0.0232*** 0.0252*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,020 3,987 3,943 3,887 3,835 
R-squared 0.107 0.111 0.115 0.124 0.116 
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Panel C. Within household youngest heterosexual mothers and lesbian mothers  
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2566*** -0.1118*** -0.2106*** -0.2033*** -0.2006*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) 
Lesbian -0.3054*** -0.2981*** -0.2999*** -0.3002*** -0.3038*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.3286*** 0.3262*** 0.3693*** 0.3553*** 0.3971*** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) 
Adoption Year -0.0424 -0.0804* -0.0513 -0.0764 0.0243 
 (0.114) (0.048) (0.051) (0.069) (0.125) 
Age at adoption -0.0036 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0053* -0.0057* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0706*** 0.0772*** 0.0800*** 0.0819*** 0.0773*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0212*** 0.0223*** 0.0229*** 0.0253*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,033 3,994 3,949 3,896 3,840 
R-squared 0.098 0.104 0.107 0.120 0.108 
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Panel D. Within household lowest educated heterosexual mothers and lesbian mothers  
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2579*** -0.1176*** -0.2139*** -0.2157*** -0.2062*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) 
Lesbian -0.1380** -0.1197** -0.1203** -0.1246** -0.1283** 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.1529** 0.1473** 0.2253*** 0.1734*** 0.2067*** 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.069) 
Adoption Year 0.0435 -0.0500 -0.0607 -0.0888 0.0322 
 (0.119) (0.048) (0.051) (0.067) (0.127) 
Age at adoption -0.0073** -0.0055* -0.0033 -0.0066** -0.0078*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0675*** 0.0759*** 0.0757*** 0.0750*** 0.0746*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0238*** 0.0237*** 0.0236*** 0.0253*** 0.0241*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,863 3,833 3,786 3,729 3,682 
R-squared 0.101 0.104 0.106 0.118 0.103 
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Panel E. Most parental leave taking heterosexual mothers and lesbian mothers  
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2466*** -0.0967*** -0.2010*** -0.1975*** -0.1925*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) 
Lesbian -0.1309** -0.1219** -0.1252** -0.1258** -0.1213** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.1782*** 0.1348** 0.1751** 0.1794*** 0.1600** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.064) (0.068) 
Adoption Year -0.1374 -0.1093** -0.0342 -0.1063 -0.0639 
 (0.112) (0.048) (0.052) (0.068) (0.127) 
Age at adoption -0.0059* -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0060** -0.0065** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0733*** 0.0818*** 0.0800*** 0.0815*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0213*** 0.0221*** 0.0224*** 0.0250*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,906 3,876 3,823 3,763 3,718 
R-squared 0.099 0.103 0.102 0.122 0.109 
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Panel F. Within household least labor market experienced heterosexual mothers and lesbian mothers  
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2301*** -0.2301*** -0.2301*** -0.2301*** -0.2301*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Lesbian -0.2462*** -0.2462*** -0.2462*** -0.2462*** -0.2462*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.1984*** 0.1984*** 0.1984*** 0.1984*** 0.1984*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Adoption Year -0.0763 -0.0763 -0.0763 -0.0763 -0.0763 
 (0.368) (0.368) (0.368) (0.368) (0.368) 
Age at adoption -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0274*** 0.0274*** 0.0274*** 0.0274*** 0.0274*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,937 3,937 3,937 3,937 3,937 
R-squared 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 
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Table A4 – Difference-in-Difference coefficient for intra-household earnings gap entering parenthood between Heterosexual and Lesbian 
households 
The tables shows the Difference-in-Difference regression estimate of relative development in the intra-household salary gap in 
parenthood for different-sex and same-sex households. The dependent variable is the intra household difference in absolute salary 
(Panel A.) and log salary (Panel B.) between the partners. For the different-sex households it is the man’s salary subtracted by the 
woman’s. For the same-sex households it is the salary of the women with the highest pre-parenthood income subtracted by the 
women with the lowest pre-parenthood income. The main explanatory variable in the regressions is LE*d, which is the relative 
effect of parenthood for the lesbian households to the heterosexual households. Additional independent variables used in the 
regressions are an indicator variable of parenthood estimating the general effect of becoming a parent, and an indicator of 
household type estimating the general intra-household differences in salary between different-sex and same-sex households. 
Controls for the intra household differences one year prior to the first adoption in the parents’ educational attainment (measured 
as the collective years of education), age at first adoption (i.e., becoming parent) and salary as well as a categorical variable of area 
of residence are used. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. The absolute estimates are in DKK (1DKK is approximately 
0.157 USD). The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. Variating observation numbers in Panel B. are due to few zero salaries that are dropped due to the log-
transformation. 
 
Panel A. Intra-household difference in yearly absolute salary 
  Event+0 Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parenthood 52,167.9151*** 58,948.8488*** 39,727.5905*** 61,052.8528*** 79,474.1386*** 66,540.3914*** 
 (4,650.988) (5,888.625) (7,425.828) (8,938.134) (10,071.012) (11,910.679) 
Lesbian -3,568.2034 -1,687.6713 -2,355.9808 -6,705.1366 -5,124.3276 -9,739.6195 
 (9,334.393) (11,376.181) (13,075.805) (14,561.195) (14,849.060) (16,053.398) 
Parenthood*Lesbian -54,145.5576*** -67,928.3838*** -67,567.9183*** -93,065.9820*** -74,139.5946*** -80,639.1329*** 
 (13,025.514) (16,052.701) (18,478.470) (20,552.174) (20,956.220) (22,630.171) 
Adoption Year -4,429.0991 -16,871.9410 19,369.4530 27,925.1991** 10,630.9431 62,733.9736* 
 (55,511.094) (26,147.983) (12,319.331) (14,239.997) (19,430.009) (36,496.701) 
∆ Intra Household Salary (t-1) 0.9533*** 0.8911*** 0.8857*** 0.8730*** 0.8682*** 0.8829*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
∆ Intra Household Age at Adoption 381.2413 40.9500 -1,164.1010* -960.8410 -1,231.5109 -2,481.7749*** 
 (488.933) (600.876) (692.308) (770.250) (784.462) (846.428) 
∆ Intra Household Education 2,328.6995*** 3,404.8581*** 3,861.4713*** 5,789.5455*** 6,477.2845*** 6,508.1437*** 
 (852.386) (1,048.546) (1,206.249) (1,343.648) (1,368.256) (1,475.231) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 
R-squared 0.843 0.757 0.698 0.649 0.639 0.613 
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Panel B. Intra-household difference in yearly log salary 
  Event+0 Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parenthood 0.2115*** 0.2407*** 0.0974*** 0.1581*** 0.1818*** 0.1408*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.040) 
Lesbian 0.0017 0.0168 0.0209 0.0175 0.0203 0.0224 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.052) 
Parenthood*Lesbian -0.1821*** -0.2587*** -0.3345*** -0.4108*** -0.2856*** -0.3118*** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.063) (0.069) (0.066) (0.075) 
Adoption Year -0.0137 -0.0453 0.1356*** 0.1133** 0.0987 0.0801 
 (0.265) (0.107) (0.042) (0.048) (0.063) (0.129) 
∆ Intra Household Log(Salary) (t-1) 0.9513*** 0.8972*** 0.8366*** 0.7650*** 0.7493*** 0.7227*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
∆ Intra Household Age at Adoption 0.0027 0.0051** 0.0022 0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0045 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
∆ Intra Household Education 0.0069* 0.0130*** 0.0140*** 0.0237*** 0.0239*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,206 3,192 3,178 3,162 3,147 3,139 
R-squared 0.676 0.615 0.608 0.532 0.553 0.471 
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Figure and Table A5 – DiD coefficients for child penalty in earnings between Heterosexual Women to Lesbian Women – Controlling 
for days of parental leave taken around first childbirth 
The tables show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for heterosexual women to lesbian 
women. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in the regressions is 
Parenthood*Lesbian, which is the relative child penalty for heterosexual mothers to lesbian mothers due to parenthood. Additional 
and untabulated independent variables used in the regressions are; an indicator variable of motherhood. An indicator variable of 
household gender composition type. Days of parental leave taken around first adoption. Controls for educational attainment, age 
at first adoption, labor experience, a dummy indicating adoption within the year, a categorical variable of area of residence, and 
year dummies. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. Panel A. compares heterosexual women to all lesbian women with at 
least one day of parental leave taken around first adoption. Panel B. compares heterosexual women to all lesbian women that 
takes the most parental leave within the household. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. ***, **, * correspond to 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variating observation numbers are due to few zero salaries that are 
dropped due to the log-transformation. 
           Panel A.                     Panel B.  
                                  All women                Women with the most intra household leave 
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Regression output for Figre A5, Panel A. 
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2519*** -0.0829*** -0.1897*** -0.1809*** -0.1936*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) 
Lesbian -0.2007*** -0.1575*** -0.1634*** -0.1529*** -0.1527*** 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.2151*** 0.1450*** 0.1950*** 0.1952*** 0.1880*** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) 
Days of parental leave -0.0009*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adoption year -0.0396 -0.1323*** -0.0541 -0.0984 -0.0770 
 (0.094) (0.041) (0.048) (0.062) (0.111) 
Age at adoption -0.0031 0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0046* -0.0047 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0652*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 0.0767*** 0.0745*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0152*** 0.0156*** 0.0188*** 0.0207*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,795 4,729 4,664 4,579 4,503 
R-squared 0.092 0.097 0.096 0.110 0.104 
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Regression output for Figure A5, Panel B. 
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2545*** -0.0968*** -0.2061*** -0.1987*** -0.1984*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) 
Lesbian -0.1435*** -0.1220** -0.1294** -0.1267** -0.1250** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.1793*** 0.1348** 0.1770*** 0.1798*** 0.1621** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.064) (0.068) 
Days of parental leave -0.0005*** -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adoption year -0.1027 -0.1093** -0.0338 -0.1068 -0.0596 
 (0.112) (0.048) (0.052) (0.068) (0.127) 
Age at adoption -0.0068** -0.0040 -0.0032 -0.0061** -0.0067** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0699*** 0.0818*** 0.0790*** 0.0813*** 0.0791*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0213*** 0.0221*** 0.0224*** 0.0250*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,906 3,876 3,823 3,763 3,718 
R-squared 0.105 0.103 0.103 0.122 0.109 
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Figure and Table A6 – DiD coefficients for child penalty in earnings between Heterosexual Women to Lesbian Women – Controlling 
for the partners share of parental leave around first childbirth 
The tables show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for heterosexual women to lesbian 
women. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in the regressions is 
Parenthood*Lesbian, which is the relative child penalty for heterosexual mothers to lesbian mothers due to parenthood. Additional 
and untabulated independent variables used in the regressions are; an indicator variable of motherhood. An indicator variable of 
household gender composition type. The partners share of parental leave taken around first adoption. Controls for educational 
attainment, age at first adoption, labor experience, a dummy indicating adoption within the year, a categorical variable of area of 
residence, and year dummies. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. The figure and table compares heterosexual women to 
all lesbian women that takes the most parental leave within the household. The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. 
***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variating observation numbers are due to 
few zero salaries that are dropped due to the log-transformation. 
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Regression output for Figure A6 
  Event+1 Event+2 Event+3 Event+4 Event+5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parenthood -0.2378*** -0.0652** -0.1662*** -0.1577*** -0.1687*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) 
Lesbian -0.1644*** -0.1446*** -0.1486*** -0.1321*** -0.1277*** 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) 
Parenthood*Lesbian 0.2118*** 0.1376*** 0.1827*** 0.1844*** 0.1787*** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.057) 
Partner's share of leave 0.2903*** 0.2286*** 0.2431*** 0.1501*** 0.1513*** 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052) 
Adoption year -0.1114 -0.1357*** -0.0513 -0.1027* -0.0885 
 (0.095) (0.041) (0.048) (0.062) (0.111) 
Age at adoption -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0043 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Education 0.0691*** 0.0758*** 0.0757*** 0.0778*** 0.0763*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor Experience (t-1) 0.0159*** 0.0160*** 0.0190*** 0.0207*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Region Control -0.0646* -0.0418 -0.0612* -0.0736** -0.1125*** 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,070 4,019 3,957 3,886 3,829 
R-squared 0.103 0.116 0.107 0.121 0.106 
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Figure A7 – DiD coefficients for child penalty in earnings between Heterosexual Women to Lesbian Women – Using nearest neighbor 
matching or inverse probability weights (IPW) to align treatment and control group  
The tables show the Difference-in-Difference regression estimates of relative child penalty for heterosexual women to lesbian 
women. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yearly salary. The main explanatory variable in the regressions is 
Parenthood*Lesbian, which is the relative child penalty for heterosexual mothers to lesbian mothers due to parenthood. Additional 
and untabulated independent variables used in the regressions are; an indicator variable of motherhood. An indicator variable of 
household gender composition type. Days of parental leave taken around first adoption. Controls for educational attainment, age 
at first adoption, labor experience, a dummy indicating adoption within the year, a categorical variable of area of residence, and 
year dummies. Lastly, the regressions include year dummies. Panel A. compares lesbian women to heterosexual women weighted 
with IWP based on the age at first adoption. Panel B. compares lesbian women to heterosexual women weighted with IWP based 
on the age at first adoption and restricting both groups of  women to have taken the most parental leave within the household.  
The estimates are shown for Event+0 to Event+5. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Variating observation numbers are due to few zero salaries that are dropped due to the log-transformation. 
            Panel A. IPW: Age at first adoption       Panel B. IPW: Age at first adoption on most parental leave mothers 
 
Panel C. IPW: Age at first adoption, education and pre-adoption labor market experience 
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Abstract 
We analyze the effect of CEO education on environmental decision-making. Using a unique 
sample of Danish firms from 1996 to 2012, we find that CEO education significantly improves 
firms’ energy efficiency. We seek to derive causality using health shocks: the hospitalization of 
highly educated CEOs induces a drop in energy efficiency, whereas the hospitalization of less 
educated CEOs does not have any significant effect. Exploring the mechanisms at play, we show 
that our results are largely driven by advanced education in business degrees. Moreover, we show 
that CEO education is associated with greater environmental awareness: highly educated CEOs 
exhibit greater concerns for climate change, as measured by a survey of social preferences, and 
drive more environmentally efficient cars. Taken together, our findings suggest that education 
shapes managerial styles giving rise to greater sustainability in corporate actions. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the effect of CEO education on environmental decision-making. Several 
works in the literature have been devoted to quantifying the impact of human capital on 
economic outcomes such as labor market returns (e.g. Card 2001), financial decision-making (e.g. 
Cole et al. 2014; Black et al. 2018) and lifetime wealth (e.g. Oreopoulos 2007). Moreover, the 
literature has suggested that education is not only beneficial for individuals but may breed 
benefits to the entire society.77 This argument can be traced back to at least Friedman (1955: pg. 
2), who noted that ‘‘A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of 
literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance of some 
common set of values. Education can contribute to both. In consequence, the gain from 
education of a child accrues not only to the child or to his parents but also to other members of 
the society’’. More recently, Putnam (1995: pg. 672) argued that “education is by far the strongest 
correlate that I have discovered of civic engagement in all its forms.” Empirical studies provide 
support for this view by showing that education increases voter participation, support for free 
speech, public awareness and political involvement (Dee 2004; Milligan et al. 2004).78 Along this 
line, Meyer (2015) shows that educated individuals are more concerned about social welfare and 
environmental issues, while Volland (2017) documents that social trust is negatively correlated 
with energy demand at the household level.79  
We contribute to this literature by studying the impact of education on a CEO’s 
environmental stance. We find that better educated CEOs reduce their environmental footprint 
by spurring corporate energy efficiency and making greener private decisions. CEOs provide a 
context of utmost importance for our study. First, CEOs have ultimate influence on corporate 
                                                     
77 See also Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a discussion. 
78 Huang et al. (2009) provide evidence that education increases social trust and public participation. Brand (2010) 
shows that these effects are stronger for individuals who are otherwise less likely to obtain higher education. 
79 More generally, there is evidence suggesting that cultural views affect the way in which individuals handle 
collective action problems (Cherry et al. 2017). 
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policies, which may amplify the consequences of their personal environmental commitment (or 
lack thereof). Second, CEO decisions may significantly affect the environmental sustainability of 
other firms in the value chain (Dai et al. 2018) via e.g. stakeholder engagement, imitation and 
knowledge transfer. Despite such relevance, the effect of CEO traits on firms’ environmental 
policies remains, to our knowledge, largely unexplored. 
We collect data from the Danish Environmental Protection Agency data covering the 
energy consumption of 428 Danish manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2012. For each of 
these companies, we gather register data on CEO education and several other demographic 
characteristics. Our results indicate that firms led by highly educated CEOs use significantly less 
energy per output. In economic terms, an additional year of CEO education is associated with 
7% lower electricity and 17% lower gas (all scaled by employees), as well as a 20% higher 
efficiency in a composite index based on the use of energy inputs within a given industry.  
While this result holds controlling for several variables related to the industry, firm and 
CEO level, we acknowledge that the endogenous matching between companies and CEOs poses 
an empirical challenge to interpret our results causally. We try to overcome this challenge by 
exploiting CEO hospitalization events. As argued in Bennedsen et al. (2018), this approach helps 
to tease out the causal effect of CEOs on corporate policies given that hospitalization events 
exogenously change CEO exposure without altering the CEO-firm match. The hospitalization of 
highly educated CEOs may lower current energy use through at least two channels. First, 
environmental projects typically rest on cognitively demanding tasks that require changes in 
existing routines and novel recombination of existing approaches. When highly educated CEOs 
are hospitalized, there is a sudden lack of leadership inputs which impairs energy-related projects, 
in particular if other top managers have to cover up for the absent CEO on the part of the CEO 
job that is not related to energy projects. Second, hospitalization induces an increase in CEO’s 
personal risk. Hospitalized CEOs may be spending effort and time on personal well-being, and 
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may even start to consider leaving the helm of the company. This process takes focus away from 
such complex activities as energy-preserving projects. Moreover, hospitalization may reduce a 
CEO’s ability and incentives to monitor the activities of the company, and thus weakens 
employees’ incentive to work hard on energy-saving tasks. Customers and suppliers may also face 
weaker incentives to invest in complex relationship with firms led by hospitalized CEOs, thus 
reducing the resources available to energy-related projects. Our results indicate that, as compared 
to CEOs without college education, the hospitalization of highly educated CEOs has a significant 
and negative effect on firms’ electricity efficiency: for an additional day that highly educated 
CEOs spend in the hospital, the electricity efficiency of their firms declines by 7% to 9% 
depending on the specification. 
There are two interpretations for our findings so far. The first builds on the notion that 
education spurs managerial efficiency: accordingly, more educated managers may be better able 
to identify and pursue energy-saving approaches leading to a lower utilization of energy inputs. 
This evidence is related to Bloom et al. (2010), who find that good managerial practices improve 
energy efficiency. The second argument builds on the association between education and civic 
engagement (Dee 2004; Milligan et al. 2004), which suggests that highly educated CEOs may 
embrace a universalistic managerial style characterized by greater awareness of environmental 
priorities and better alignment between corporate and societal goals. Both of these arguments 
propose that more educated CEOs achieve superior environmental performance; however, the 
first argument implies that the effect arises from managerial skills (and is thus largely specific to 
some fields of study) whereas according to the second the effect stems from the level of 
cumulated education. Separating out these explanations empirically is difficult. We address this 
challenge by comparing CEOs’ educational attainment across different fields of study. Our 
results indicate that energy efficiency mainly arises by holding advanced degrees in business–
related disciplines. 
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We move to study the individual actions behind our results so far. Recent evidence 
suggests that CEOs tend to bring their own personal beliefs into corporate decision-making 
(Cronqvist et al. 2012). Accordingly, we posit that CEO education may be positively associated 
with personal awareness of climate change. Our results indicate that highly educated CEOs are 
significantly more concerned about climate change, as proxied by a survey-based measure of 
environmental concerns covering more than 5,000 CEOs. This result holds controlling for 
confounding factors such as gender, age and income, while also tackling endogeneity concerns by 
using parents’ education as instrumental variables while controlling for parents’ political and 
religious values (which may have had a direct effect on offspring’s preferences toward the 
environment). Next, we establish the material implications of education on CEOs’ personal 
choices by focusing on car purchase decisions, a topic currently under scrutiny (e.g. Yan and 
Eskeland 2018) given that cars are an important driver of pollution with significant implications 
for health conditions (Knittel et al. 2016). Our results suggest that CEO education has a positive 
and significant effect on the decision to purchase fuel-efficient cars, as measured by: (1) greater 
kilometer per liter of fuel, and (2) greater likelihood of owning an electric car. These findings too 
hold controlling for CEO income and other personal characteristics including age, gender and 
area of residence. 
Our paper offers novel insights to the underexplored relationship between the 
educational level of top executives and the environmental footprint of the organizations they 
lead. The seminal study by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provided early evidence on the presence 
of managerial styles.80 Recent works show that the impact of managerial styles on firm 
performance is stronger for highly educated CEOs (Bennedsen et al. 2018). Companies led by 
CEOs with better educational credentials achieve greater financial performance (Falato et al. 
                                                     
80 Building on this notion, many works have explored the origins of managerial styles by focusing on CEOs’ 
individual and family characteristics (e.g. Adams and Ferreira 2009; Cronqvist and Yu 2017; Yim 2013), professional 
background and experience (e.g. Custodio and Metzger 2013; Dittmar and Duchin 2016). 
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2015; King et al. 2016; Miller et al. 2015), while companies led by CEOs with science-related 
degrees engage in more R&D spending. By bridging the literature on managerial traits (e.g. 
Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008) with that on the determinants of 
firms’ environmental efficiency (e.g. Bloom et al. 2010; Popp 2002; Martin et al. 2012), our study 
provides important contributions to the debate on why some firms pollute more than others 
(Shapira and Zingales 2017). Corporate environmental actions are shaped by a complex set of 
firm-level and external determinants including a country’s legal framework (Liang and 
Renneboog 2017), industry competition (Fernandez-Kranz and Santaló 2010), energy price and 
policies (e.g. Popp 2002; Nesta et al. 2014), organization and management practices (Bloom et al. 
2010; Boyd and Curtis 2014; Martin et al. 2012) and corporate governance (Amore and 
Bennedsen 2016; Ferrell et al. 2016; Kock et al. 2012). This web of determinants induces a 
substantial heterogeneity in energy efficiency, which may even exceed the heterogeneity found in 
traditional productivity measures (Lyubich et al. 2018). Our contribution to this debate is to 
empirically show that the environmentally-conscious management style of educated CEOs has a 
positive effect on a firm’s energy efficiency. 
Our research has relevant implications along three directions. First, from the business 
perspective, energy consumption can represent a significant production cost, and our study 
suggests that CEO education is a managerial trait that provides relevant variations of such costs. 
Second, a growing research documents that socially-responsible actions may have significant 
implications for shareholder value (e.g. Deng et al. 2013; Kruger 2015; Flammer 2015; Servaes 
and Tamayo 2013), for instance because investment in corporate social responsibility facilitates 
the access to debt financing (Amiraslani et al. 2017) or because investors are sin averse due to 
social norms (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). We argue that education shapes managerial styles in a 
way that may be beneficial not just for shareholders, as the previous literature has suggested, but 
also for the environment. Third, understanding what drives firms to produce more efficiently can 
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help policy-makers design effective environmental policies which take into account not only 
traditional factors such as production inputs or industry specialization but also the demographic 
traits and human capital of top executives.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and shows the 
main summary statistics. Section 3 illustrates the relationship between CEO education and 
corporate energy efficiency and discusses our econometric strategies. Section 4 is concerned with 
the CEOs personal values and private choices. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
Our data come from various registers managed by Statistics Denmark and other sources, which 
provide us with comprehensive information at the firm and CEO level. In this section, we 
illustrate each data source and discuss the match between individual-level information and 
company data containing environmental and accounting items. 
 
2.1. Firm-level data 
We employ data from two separate sources, which are merged to form a longitudinal dataset of 
Danish firms from 1996 through 2012.81 The first source is represented by the annual reports 
submitted by companies to the Danish Environmental Protection Agency as part of the Green 
Accounting program, introduced in 1995 and aimed at increasing the public awareness of Danish 
firms’ environmental activities. The quality of these reports is ensured by central supervisory 
authorities of the Danish Ministry of Environment and Food. Every firm is assigned a 
supervisor, who goes through the green report and evaluates its completeness, consistency and 
reliability. Disclosing environmental data has been mandatory for firms in such sectors as 
manufacturing, infrastructure, transportation, power plants, mining and quarrying, and waste 
                                                     
81 Our dataset does not include the year 2008 due to a change in how the data were recorded by the Danish 
Environmental Agency. 
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disposal.82 Although the green reports have been filed in different formats and to different 
institutions, it is possible to observe each firm over time. We have therefore accessed all the 
environmental reports and extracted the environment-related variables from 1996 to 2012. 
 Our second source is Experian, an annual register containing detailed accounting 
and management information for all limited-liability and privately-held Danish firms. These 
companies are obliged to deliver a comprehensive set of financial items to the Danish Ministry of 
Business and Growth every year. According to the Danish corporate law, firms’ financial reports 
have to be approved by external accountants, a procedure which raises the credibility of the data. 
Unfortunately, firms are not obliged to report all accounting items, and this explains a greater 
number of missing values in some items such as revenues. The management section of this data 
source includes the identifier of each CEO, which Danish firms are required to report annually. 
 
2.2. Education and other CEO-level data 
The Danish educational system is primarily public and no tuition fees are demanded. We 
categorize the different educational levels in three groups. The first, Non-college degrees, consists of 
primary and lower-secondary school (9-10 years of schooling mandatory for all Danes), high 
school (upper secondary school, which is optional and takes 3 years), vocational education (an 
alternative to high school with a typical duration of 3 years) and short academy professional 
programs (with a duration of maximum 2 years). The second, Undergraduate degrees, consists of 3 to 
3.5 years long post high school professional bachelor and undergraduate programs (academic 
bachelor’s program). The third, Master or PhDs, consists of university graduate programs, where a 
                                                     
82 The specific sectors are: iron, steel, other metals, plastic coatings, cement, glass, glass fibers, mineral wool, pottery, 
ceramics, electro graphite, carbon, asbestos, chalk, calcium, tar, minerals, organic and inorganic chemicals, fertilizers, 
medicine, dyes, food additives, plant protection substances, biocides, polyurethane foam, paper, cellulose, textiles, 
alcohol, yeast, sugar, industry bakeries, potato flour, slaughterhouses, fish meal, meat meal, leather, diary, sea food, 
shell fish and proteins. A minor legislative change implemented in 2010 lowered by around 35% the number of firms 
obliged to report their Green Accounts. 
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master degree takes 2 years (on top of the 3 years for the undergraduate), and 3 additional years 
to get a PhD. Figure A1 provides an illustration of the Danish educational system. 
To study how CEO education affects green behavior, we access the Educational Register 
(UDDA), which contains data on the educational attainment of all graduates from any Danish 
educational institution. From this register, we gather the years of education, type of degree, year 
of graduation and institution for each CEO in our sample. We use other registers to collect other 
demographic variables such as CEOs’ age, gender, area of residence, marital status and income. 
 
2.3. Sample and summary statistics 
Common to the literature (e.g. Bloom et al. 2010; Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Jaffe and 
Palmer 1997), we focus on firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. The key advantage of 
this choice is that in manufacturing industries energy usage is a significant input of the 
production process. After cleaning and merging the data, we obtain 428 unique manufacturing 
firms for a total of 2,491 firm-year observations.83  
Our main variable of interest is the logarithm of a firm’s electricity consumption scaled by 
the number of employees. Electricity consumption is a reliable measure of a firm’s overall energy 
consumption and it is often easy to monitor. Employees are typically less volatile than profits and 
thus provide a better scaling factor than, say, operating profits. Nevertheless, we check that our 
results are robust to scaling electricity consumption by fixed assets or profit measures. Different 
firms use different energy sources, which can be close substitutes. To account for this issue, we 
employ alternative energy-related items in the numerator, such as gas and water consumption, or 
composite indexes that capture energy efficiency more broadly (see Section 3.3 for details). 
                                                     
83 Specifically, we start from a sample of 1,013 firms in the green accounting program. We drop 285 firms with 
missing information on the key energy variables, 209 firms that do not operate in manufacturing industries, 16 firms 
without information on the number of employees (our scaling factor for the measure of electricity efficiency), and 75 
firms with missing information on the individual characteristics of the CEO. As a result, we obtain 428 unique firms 
for a total of 2,491 observations. 
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Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows that the average firm has 168 
employees and DKK 342 million (i.e. approximately 53.6 million $) in total assets, whereas Panel 
B shows that the average firm uses 4.2 billion kWh annually. The two panels also show that 
energy consumption, capital and employees vary considerably, indicating a wide variation across 
firm sizes. This underpins the importance of scaling energy consumption variables by the firm’s 
number of employees. Panel C shows the distribution of firms across the manufacturing sub-
industries. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Panels A and B of this table provide firm characteristics for our sample firms for the period 1996-
2012. Fixed assets, total assets, gross profits and pretax earnings are expressed in 1,000,000 DKK = 
150.800 $ = 134.500 €. Capital Intensity is the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets (in DKK 1,000) over its 
number of employees. Employees are the number of employees in the firm. Energy variables are 
expressed in thousands. Panel C shows the distribution of observations across manufacturing sub-
industries classified according to the 3-digit NACE (the European statistical classification of 
economic activities). 
 
Panel A. Firm characteristics 
 Observations Mean Std. dev. 
Total assets 2,491 341,894 1,729,515 
Fixed assets 2,491 209,791 1,265,396 
Gross profit 2,444 92,075 317,985 
Pretax earnings 2,491 30,721 182,417 
Capital intensity 2,491 1,346 1,721 
Employees 2,491 168 351 
  
Panel B. Energy-related measures 
 Observations Mean Std. dev. 
Electricity, kWh 2,491 4,235.80 6,733.94 
Log(kWh/Employees) 2,491 10.02 1.22 
Log(kWh/Fixed assets) 2,491 4.00 1.41 
Log(kWh/Gross profit) 2,409 4.06 1.37 
Log(kWh/Pretax earnings) 1,900 5.78 1.83 
Gas, M3 1,527 1,817.58 10,200 
Log(Gas/Employees) 1,527 7.18 2.80 
Log(Gas/Fixed assets) 1,527 1.03 2.70 
Log(Gas/Gross profit) 1,476 1.23 2.84 
Log(Gas/Pretax earnings ) 1,159 3.00 3.00 
Water, M3 2,737 180.65 883.16 
Log(Water/Employees) 2,737 4.45 2.19 
Log(Water/Fixed assets) 2,737 -1.67 2.16 
Log(Water/Gross profit) 2,654 -1.54 2.19 
Log(Water/Pretax earnings) 2,155 0.14 2.41 
  
Panel C. Industry distribution 
 Observations Percent 
Food 16 0.64 
Leather and related 445 17.86 
Paper products 71 2.85 
Chemicals 147 5.90 
Other non-metal 787 31.59 
Computer and electronics 92 3.69 
Electrical equipment 933 37.45 
Total 2,491 100 
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In Table 2, we provide summary statistics for CEO characteristics. As shown, the CEOs in our 
sample are almost exclusively men, they are on average 53 years old and have undergone 15 years 
of education. 53% of the CEOs hold an undergraduate or higher degree. Of these, 49% hold 
“Technical advanced degrees”, consisting of engineering or natural sciences, 38% hold degrees in 
“Business advanced degrees”, consisting of degrees in business or economics, and 13% hold 
some “Other advanced degree” mostly consisting of degrees in humanities. 
Table 3 reports the average firm characteristics by different levels of CEO education. 
Panel A shows that firm size, measured in total assets, fixed assets and employees, is increasing in 
CEO education. Panel B presents the average firm characteristics by CEOs’ educational level, 
while Table A1 offers a detailed description of each variable used in the empirical analysis. 
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Table 3. Average firm characteristics by CEO educational level 
This table reports the average values of Table 1, Panels A and B, separately for different 
levels of CEO education. 
 
Panel A. Firm characteristics 
 Non-college 
degree 
Undergraduate Master 
or PhD degree 
Fixed assets 52,448.73 106,576.50 836,562.60 
Total assets 103,767.00 190,991.20 1,279,616.00 
Gross profit 38,352.56 74,145.09 270,324.30 
Pretax earnings 6,661.97 14,289.49 127,889.10 
Capital intensity 1,175.43 1,157.27 2,185.23 
Employees 93.40 165.93 370.89 
 
   
Panel B. Energy-related measures 
 Non-college 
degree 
Undergraduate Master 
or PhD degree 
Electricity, kWh 2,904.57 4,620.42 6,965.50 
Log(kWh/Employees) 10.16 9.89 9.90 
Log(kWh/Fixed assets) 4.24 3.98 3.39 
Log(kWh/Gross profit) 4.26 3.98 3.66 
Log(kWh/Pretax earnings) 6.16 5.69 5.02 
Gas, M3 1,166.07 805.26 1,302.53 
Log(Gas/Employees) 7.73 7.24 7.60 
Log(Gas/Fixed assets) 1.66 1.22 1.07 
Log(Gas/Gross profit) 1.78 1.37 1.42 
Log(Gas/Pretax earnings) 3.80 3.18 3.04 
Water, M3 38.64 98.63 236.41 
Log(Water/Employees) 4.58 4.10 4.78 
Log(Water/Fixed assets) -1.35 -1.78 -1.74 
Log(Water/Gross profit) -1.34 -1.80 -1.46 
Log(Water/Pretax earnings) 0.56 -0.16 -0.06 
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3. CEO education and corporate energy efficiency 
In this section, we estimate the association between the length of CEO education and electricity 
usage. Seeking to establish causality, we adopt an empirical identification based on hospitalization 
shocks. Then, we go beyond the focus on electricity and show the effect of CEO education on 
several dependent variables capturing energy efficiency more broadly. Finally, we explore the 
effect of specific fields of study. 
 
3.1. Baseline results 
We begin by estimating the following regression:  
 
where yit is the logarithm of electricity over employees for the firm i at time t. Education is the 
CEO’s educational level, measured in years.  is a vector containing individual characteristics 
such as age and gender, which may correlate with environmental attitudes and thus confound the 
education effect.  is a vector containing a firm’s financial variables such as capital intensity 
(computed as the ratio of total assets to employees) and asset growth (measured as the annual 
growth in total assets), which are commonly employed as controls in the environmental 
economics literature (e.g. Bloom et al. 2010).84 Industry is a set of industry dummies that capture 
the time-invariant sectoral heterogeneity within the manufacturing sector.85 Year is a set of year 
dummies included to absorb time effects common to all firms. We estimate this regression with 
pooled OLS and compute robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to account for both 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the structure of residuals.86 
                                                     
84 In untabulated checks, we further validate our findings using a broader set of controls including e.g. the ratio of 
intangibles to total assets, and profitability (computed as the ratio of operating profits to total assets). 
85 The main approach to account for industry effects is based on a classification including 23 different industries. As 
we will show, our results hold using finer industry classifications based on 53 or 111 different industries. 
86 Notice that since CEO education does not change over time we do not include firm fixed effects in our baseline 
analysis. Indeed, in our sample, there are 428 firms and very few of them changes CEO. Firms that change CEO (1) 
hire from outside the pool of 428 CEOs, which raises concerns of endogenous matching; (2) hire a CEO who is 
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In Column (1) of Panel A, Table 4, we regress electricity efficiency on the CEO’s 
educational level and only control for year and industry dummies. As shown, CEO education is 
negatively and significantly associated with electricity per employee. In economic terms, the 
coefficient indicates that an additional year of CEO education is associated with a 7% higher 
electricity efficiency. Column (2) shows that this effect remains significant when controlling for 
CEOs’ age and gender. In Columns (3)-(4), we further control for a firm’s capital intensity, asset 
growth, and the logarithm of total assets. Looking at the coefficient of these variables, we find 
that firm growth and firm size are both associated with lower electricity efficiency, either because 
fast-growing firms sacrifice environmental goals during their expansion process or because higher 
energy intensity supports the firms in growing. Moreover, we find that capital per worker is 
positively associated with electricity efficiency. Despite the inclusion of these controls, our main 
result on CEO educational level remains significant at the 1% level. 
In Panel B of Table 4, we estimate the regression using a set of education dummies 
instead of our baseline variable measuring years of schooling. We use three categories: non-
college education (baseline), undergraduate degree, and Master or PhD degree. As compared to 
CEOs with non-college degree, holding an undergraduate degree has a positive and significant (at 
the 10% level) effect on electricity efficiency. This effect becomes much stronger, both 
economically and statistically, for CEOs holding a Master of PhD degree: the coefficient indicates 
a 38% increase in electricity efficiency relative to firms with CEOs holding a non-college degree. 
These findings suggest that the effect of CEO education on a firm’s environmental stance is 
stronger for CEOs with the highest educational attainment, possibly owing to the fact that 
environmental activities typically rest on cognitively demanding tasks that require changes in 
existing routines and novel recombination of existing approaches (see Amore and Bennedsen 
2016 for related arguments). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
likely to have education similar to that of the outgoing CEO, which does not yield enough variation for our 
estimation. However, we address concerns of omitted factor bias at the CEO level in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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3.2. Evidence from CEO hospitalization events 
Our findings so far offer strong indication that CEO education is positively associated with firms’ 
electricity efficiency. Our baseline estimates included a host of confounding factors to rule out 
concerns of omitted factors. Nevertheless, interpreting our results causally remains problematic 
due to well-known concerns of endogenous matching between CEOs and firms (e.g. Custodio 
and Metzger 2014). As Fee et al. (2013) pointed out, endogeneity in the formation and 
termination of CEO-firm matches hinders the interpretation of existing studies that have used 
CEO turnover to understand the effect of managerial styles on corporate outcomes. 
To alleviate this concern, we use an identification strategy based on CEO hospitalization 
events. While we acknowledge that the rarity of hospitalization events restricts the analysis to a 
small sample, this approach has some advantages. First, they occur more frequently than most of 
the other CEO shocks (e.g. sudden death) used in the previous literature while being largely 
exogenous to firm outcomes. Bennedsen et al. (2018) provide evidence that reduces the concern 
of reverse causality, according to which past firm performance may affect the likelihood of 
hospitalization.87 By altering CEO exposure while keeping constant the match between a CEO 
and its company, hospitalizations enable us to add to our baseline model in Table 4 both firm 
and CEO fixed effects, which reduce omitted factor biases coming from unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Second, while CEO shocks such as sudden death have only a binary variation, 
hospitalization events have different duration that varies across CEOs; this heterogeneity can be 
exploited to estimate the impact of CEO presence at the firms. Third, even though most 
hospitalization spells are short, the absence from the office is typically much longer: Bennedsen 
et al. (2018) find that, on average, when an employee is hospitalized from 1 to 3 days the days of 
absence are 23, and when an employee is hospitalized from 4 to 5 days the days of absence are 
                                                     
87 To confirm this result in our sample, we estimate a logit regression where the hospitalization is the dependent 
variable and the main explanatory variable is the change in operating profits to assets between two years and one year 
prior to the hospitalization event. Results do not show any significant effect of declining performance on the 
likelihood of hospitalization, and thus mitigate the reverse causality concern that CEOs tend to be hospitalized as a 
result of worse business conditions. 
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39. For senior managers the respective figures are 13 and 27 days. Collectively, these findings 
indicate that even short spells of CEO hospitalization can lead to a significant decrease in the 
effective work hours. 
The hospitalization of highly educated CEOs may lower current energy use through at 
least two channels. The first relates hospitalization events to managerial capacity. Environmental 
projects typically rest on cognitively demanding tasks that require changes in existing routines and 
novel recombination of existing approaches. Thus, these projects require top-management inputs 
in formulation, implementation and monitoring. When highly-educated CEOs are hospitalized 
there is a sudden lack of leadership resources which impairs energy-related projects, in particular 
if other top managers have to cover up for the absent CEO on the part of the CEO job that is 
not related to energy projects. Furthermore, there may be delays in restoring environmental 
initiatives for at least two reasons: (1) the hospitalized CEO may need a personal recovery that 
extends beyond the actual hospitalization period; (2) when the CEO is back to work, his/her 
priorities will be on catching up with the day-to-day management while the environmental 
projects may be put aside for some time. 
The second channel relates to the fact that health shocks increase key personal risk in the 
firm, which in turn affects the behavior of the CEO and the stakeholders of the firm. The CEO 
may be spending effort and time on his/her current and future well-being and may start 
considering retiring or changing job. This process likely takes focus away from the most 
complicated activities, which include energy-preserving projects. It also may reduce a CEO’s 
ability and incentives to monitor the activities of the company, and thus weakens employees’ 
incentive to work hard on energy-saving initiatives. External stakeholders might perceive that the 
CEO may not be around forever or that he/she may not be able to exercise leadership. 
Customers and suppliers may have reduced incentives to invest in relationship-specific activities 
with the firm, which will temporarily reduce the resources available to energy-related projects. 
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Generally, we expect the effect of hospitalization to be different from that of a vacation 
because vacations are planned (and often in periods where most other employees take vacation) 
whereas the length and timing of hospitalization and recovery periods are less planned and often 
come without warning. Bennedsen et al. (2018) document that CEO hospitalization events 
induce a substantial drop in a firm’s operating efficiency: 10 days of hospitalization reduces firm 
operating profitability with 5.8 pct. from its mean.88  
Our data source for this analysis is the National Patient Register, which contains all public 
and private secondary health care interactions in Denmark.89 Using this data, we count the days 
that the CEOs were hospitalized in the year up to and in the current year. As Table 5 shows, out 
of the total 2,491 firm-year observations there are 250 firm-years (amounting to 10 % of the total 
number of firm-year observations) in which a CEO has been hospitalized for at least one day 
within the current and past years. The table also shows that CEO hospitalization events vary in 
both the intensive and the extensive margins, i.e., the occurrence and duration of hospitalizations. 
Moreover, as further validation of our approach, the table highlights that hospitalizations do not 
vary significantly across the CEOs’ educational levels.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
88 Comparing the size of this coefficient with ours is not straightforward due to the fact that a CEO may not 
optimize energy consumption in the same way as profits. Indeed, we expect that during periods of CEO 
hospitalization profitability becomes a major concern since the firm seeks to reduce any drop in profit that may harm 
its competitive ability. During these turbolent periods, environmental projects may be neglected or put aside, and this 
may explain the larger drop on energy efficiency. 
89 The vast majority of hospitalizations are managed by the public healthcare system. Approximately 95% of the 
hospital spending in Denmark is financed through public expenditures. 
90 While our data sources contain information on the primary medical condition, we are unable to exploit this 
information due to a small sample size. 
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Table 5. CEO hospitalization events 
  
Each column reports firm-year observations by CEOs’ highest degree and by 
the level of hospitalization days in the current year and the year before. 
Hospital data are constructed based on records from Statistics Denmark, 
which reports the number of days that an individual was hospitalized. 
 
  
Non-college 
degree 
Undergraduate 
degree 
Master  
or PhD 
None 1,026 814 401 
1 day 50 19 11 
2 days 20 16 6 
3 days 14 14 5 
4 days 9 5 <5 
5 days <5 6 <5 
6 days 9 <5 <5 
7 days <5 <5 <5 
≥8 days 39 15 <5 
Total 1,162 894 435 
 
We regress the main dependent variable of Table 4 on the interaction term between 
hospitalization length and CEO’s educational attainment keeping the firm- and CEO-level 
controls of our previous specification. As shown in Table 6, Column (1), the interaction between 
CEO hospitalization and holding an undergraduate degree is not significantly different from the 
baseline (i.e. CEOs with non-college education). By contrast, the interaction between CEO 
hospitalization and holding an advanced degree is positive and statistically significant.  
To validate our result, in Column (2) to (4) we show the findings obtained scaling 
electricity by fixed assets, gross profits and total assets, respectively. Moreover, in Table 7 we 
estimate the effect of hospitalization on three different subsamples depending on the level of 
CEO education. Again, we employ four alternative dependent variables to verify the robustness 
of our findings. Consistent with our previous findings, CEO hospitalization does not have any 
significant effect on electricity efficiency when the CEO has low to medium education. However, 
when the CEO holds an advanced degree, the coefficient of CEO hospitalization becomes 
significant. Economically, the coefficients indicate that for an additional day a highly educated 
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CEO spends in the hospital, the electricity efficiency of his/her firm drops by 7% to 9%. While 
this magnitude may seem large, it is worth keeping in mind that hospitalization events have 
broader consequences for a CEO’s effort provision: each day of hospitalization is surrounded by 
a period of significantly reduced workload implying that the count of hospital days corresponds 
to much longer absence spells. Furthermore, there may be urgent day-to-day management to 
catch up with once the CEO returns, which reduces the time available for energy-saving 
projects.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
91 The distribution of hospitalization days in Table 5 suggests that we are mostly capturing the effect of changes in 
the low end of the distribution. Thus, we cannot speak of very long hospitalization periods – even if we expect them 
to command large effects since long hospitalizations will likely trigger CEO replacement, retirement or death. 
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Table 6. CEO hospitalization and electricity efficiency: Interaction 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of electricity consumption over the number of employees (Column 1), fixed assets (Column 2), gross 
profits ( Column 3) or total assets (Column 4). Days at hospital [t-1, t] measures the hospitalization days of the CEO in the current year and the year 
before. Undergraduate degree is a dummy equal to one of the CEOs hold an undergraduate degree, and zero otherwise. Master or PhD is a dummy 
equal to one if the CEOs hold a Master or PhD degree, and zero otherwise. The baseline group is formed by CEOs holding non-college degrees. CEO 
age measures the years of CEO age. Log(Capital intensity) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets over its number of employees. 
Asset growth is the growth rate in the firm’s total assets Employees are the number of employees in the firm. Total assets is the logarithm of a firm’s 
total assets. Furthermore, our regressions include 3-digit industry and year dummies. Clustered (firm) standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variable: 
  
Ln(kWh/ 
Employees)  
Ln(kWh/ 
Fixed 
assets) 
Ln(kWh/ 
Gross 
profits) 
Ln(kWh/ 
Total 
assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Days at hospital [t-1, t] -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0092 -0.0067 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Days at hospital [t-1, t] × Undergraduate Degree 0.0077 0.0076 0.0129 0.0105 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Days at hospital [t-1, t] × Master or PhD 0.0887*** 0.0889*** 0.0856** 0.0922*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) 
CEO age -0.0039 -0.0027 0.0138 -0.0113 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Log(Capital intensity) 0.2382*** -0.7606*** 0.1208** -0.2708*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.054) (0.050) 
Asset growth 0.0254 0.0251 -0.0416 0.1459** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.059) 
Total assets 0.0035 0.0034 -0.0002  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,491 2,491 2,401 2,491 
Adjusted R2 0.913 0.935 0.898 0.925 
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Table 8. Placebo tests: Effect of future hospitalization on current electricity efficiency 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of electricity consumption over the number of employees. Days at hospital 1 
year ahead (Column 1) and 2 years ahead (Column 2) measure, respectively, the hospitalization days dated one year or two 
years after the time when the dependent variable is measured. Undergraduate degree is a dummy equal to one of the CEOs 
hold an undergraduate degree, and zero otherwise. Master or PhD is a dummy equal to one if the CEOs hold a Master or 
PhD degree, and zero otherwise. The baseline group is formed by CEOs holding non-college degrees. CEO age measures the 
years of CEO age. Log(Capital intensity) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets over its number of 
employees. Asset growth is the growth rate in the firm’s total assets Employees are the number of employees in the firm. 
Total assets is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Furthermore, our regressions include 3-digit industry and year dummies. 
Clustered (firm) standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Dependent variable: Log(kWh/Employees) 
 (1) (2) 
Days at hospital 1 year ahead 0.0033  
 (0.005)  
Days at hospital 1 year ahead × Undergraduate degree -0.0173  
 (0.017)  
Days at hospital 1 year ahead × Master or PhD 0.0409  
 (0.030)  
Days at hospital 2 years ahead  0.0017 
  (0.004) 
Days at hospital 2 years ahead × Undergraduate degree  -0.0147 
  (0.020) 
Days at hospital 2 years ahead × Master or PhD  0.0464 
  (0.043) 
CEO age 0.0067 0.0061 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Log(Capital intensity) 0.2357*** 0.2329*** 
 (0.051) (0.061) 
Asset growth 0.0150 0.0165 
 (0.023) (0.022) 
Total assets 0.0087 0.0026 
 (0.011) (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
CEO fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,056 1,708 
Adjusted R2 0.924 0.934 
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Trying to improve the causal interpretation of our finding, we conduct a placebo test 
where we estimate the effect of future CEO hospitalization on current electricity consumption. In 
Table 8 we replace the baseline hospitalization variable with a measure of hospitalization events, 
which take place either one year or two years after the date of the dependent variable. As shown, 
none of the interactions between future hospitalization and CEO education has a significant 
effect on current electricity efficiency.  
 
3.3. Robustness analysis 
In this section, we start by addressing the concern that CEO education is correlated with other 
factors associated with CEO skills, which may in turn be correlated with electricity efficiency. 
CEO compensation tends to be higher for CEOs that have more skills and experience. 
Additionally, there is a positive association between CEO pay and education (see e.g. Custodio et 
al. 2013 on the MBA premium for US CEOs), which makes executive pay a relevant omitted 
factor potentially biasing our analysis. To account for this challenge, we add a control measuring 
the logarithm of CEO total compensation. Results in Columns (1) of Table 9 show that CEO 
compensation is positively associated with firms’ electricity efficiency, perhaps consistent with the 
view that better-paid CEOs have a broader skill set. Nevertheless, we find that the coefficient of 
CEO education remains economically and statistically significant. 
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Table 9. Controlling for CEO pay and ownership 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of electricity consumption over number of employees. The main explanatory 
variable in Columns (1)-(4), years of education, measures a CEO’s years of schooling. Log(CEO Income) is the natural 
logarithm of the CEO yearly income. CEO ownership is a dummy equal to one if the CEO holds more than 5% of the firm’s 
equity shares. CEO age measures the years of CEO age.  Log(Capital intensity) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
fixed assets over its number of employees. Asset growth is the growth rate in the firm’s total assets Employees are the number 
of employees in the firm. Total assets is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Furthermore, our regressions include 3-digit 
industry and year dummies. Clustered (firm) standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variable: Log(kWh/Employees)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Years of education -0.0525*** -0.0609*** -0.0557*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log(CEO income) -0.1378**  -0.1391** 
 (0.062)  (0.061) 
CEO ownership  -0.3733* -0.3345* 
  (0.198) (0.179) 
Male CEO -0.0064 -0.0981 0.0003 
 (0.161) (0.166) (0.159) 
CEO age -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0023 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log(Capital intensity) 0.2776*** 0.3062*** -0.3345* 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.179) 
Asset growth -0.0534* -0.0568** -0.0464* 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Total assets -0.0113*** -0.0122*** -0.0112*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,483 2,556 2,483 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.183 0.188 
 
CEO ownership may affect the incentives to manage the company efficiently for the long 
run. In this case, greater CEO equity holdings will extend the time-horizon in managerial 
decision-making making the firm more focused on long-term sustainable goals rather than short-
term financial results. Due to data limitations, we are unable to estimate separately the effects of 
long-term equity-based and short term pay items in the CEO’s pay package. However, we can 
control for equity alignment by including a dummy equal to one if the CEO is also a significant 
shareholder of the firm (i.e. he/she owns at least 5% of the equity capital). Results reported in 
Column (2) of Table 9 confirm that CEO education is positively associated with energy efficiency 
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even after controlling for CEO ownership. Lastly, in Column (3) we show that the positive 
association between CEO education and electricity efficiency is robust to the joint inclusion of 
CEO pay and CEO equity ownership as controls.92 
So far, we have employed electricity as main energy input. To generalize our findings, we 
operationalize the dependent variable using other relevant energy sources such as water and gas 
consumption. These items are again normalized using employees. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 10, 
which provide the estimates obtained using these ratios as dependent variables, confirm that 
CEOs with longer education manage more energy-efficient firms.  
Next, we use alternative standardization methods. Columns (3)-(5) of Table 10 show the 
results obtained using as dependent variable: (1) the logarithm of electricity over profits; (2) the 
logarithm of electricity over fixed assets; (3) the logarithm of electricity over pre-tax earnings. As 
shown, the coefficient of CEO education is significant across all columns. We also follow an 
alternative computation of the dependent variable by converting kWh and natural gas to British 
Thermal Units (BTU) to obtain a common measure for both energy inputs. The BTU is defined 
as the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water by one degree of 
Fahrenheit. We apply the standard conversion rate of 1 kWh = 3,412.14 BTU and 1 m3 Natural 
Gas = 36,020.98 BTU. Finally, we aggregate the BTU stemming from the two different energy 
inputs at the firm level, divide it by the number of employees and take the logarithm of the 
resulting values. Results in Column (6) show that an additional year of CEO education lowers 
energy efficiency by 6%. 
Alternatively, following existing work (Jaggi and Freedman 1992; Telle 2006) we 
construct a ratio that evaluates each firm’s energy consumption relative to its peers within a given 
sub-industry. First, each type of energy consumption is normalized by the firm’s number of 
                                                     
92 A related question would be about the difference of CEO education for publicly traded and private companies. 
Unfortunately, we do not have publicly traded firms in our sample to make this comparison. 
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employees:  where i is the firm, j is the sub-industry, s is the energy source and 
t is the year. The lower eijst, the more energy efficient the firm is. To make this ratio comparable, 
we find the most energy efficient firm in each sub-industry: . 
This baseline value is the minimum value of the energy per employee ratio found within each 
sub-industry over the time and for, respectively, electricity, and gas. The sub-industry minimum is 
now divided by each firm’s energy efficiency ratio, to obtain a relative measure of energy 
efficiency: . Eijs ranges from zero to one. The closer to one, the more energy efficient 
the firm is relative to its peers. As argued, different firms may use different energy sources that 
can be close substitutes. To ensure that the firms are not just substituting away from one energy 
source to another, we find the ratios for each energy input and collect them in a common index: 
. Using this ratio, instead of the absolute values, has the advantage 
that it ranks the firm’s energy efficiency within the sub-industry unambiguously. The downside is 
that it makes it more complex to interpret the regression coefficients. In our computation, both 
energy sources (electricity and gas) have equal weights.93 Unfortunately, the observation number 
falls significantly, since only firms with information on both the energy variables can be used to 
compute the index. Results in Column (7) show that CEO education raises a firm’s energy 
efficiency relative to the industry benchmark.  
In the next step of our robustness analysis, we account for sectoral heterogeneity in a 
more fine-grained way. First, we replace the industry classification of our baseline specification 
(based on 23 industries and effectively partitioning our manufacturing firms in 7 sub-industries) 
with a classification based on 53 industries (partitioning our manufacturing firms in 17 sub-
industries). Second, we use an even more detailed classification based on 111 different industries 
(partitioning our manufacturing firms in 34 sub-industries). Results in Columns (8)-(9) show the 
                                                     
93 The results are robust to excluding water consumption from the index. 
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results obtained using these more detailed sets of industry dummies. As shown, our findings 
remain economically and statistically significant.  
Finally, in Column (10) we estimate our regression separately for the subsample of the 
most energy-intensive industries (i.e. the two industries with the highest average of the dependent 
variable computed across all firms). Our results indicate that the effect of CEO education on 
energy efficiency is economically stronger than the one estimated using the full sample. 
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3.4. CEOs’ field of study 
So far, we have shown that CEO education is associated with energy efficiency. Bloom et al 
(2010) show a positive association between managerial practices and firms’ energy efficiency. This 
perspective suggests that our findings can be driven by holding degrees in specific fields, such as 
business studies, which endow CEOs with skills and training in managing firms with fewer 
energy inputs. Relatedly, CEOs with technical background may have a deeper understanding of 
products and production units, and may therefore be able to increase a firm’s production 
efficiency. 
To delve into the effect of the fields of study, we divide CEOs’ educational achievements 
into four different categories. The first is “short education”, which contains all educational 
degrees lower than college, whereas we divide all “long education” degrees (i.e. undergraduate or 
higher) into three groups: (1) business (including economics and management); (2) technical 
(including engineering and natural sciences degrees); and (3) other fields (including humanities, 
legal studies and so on). As mentioned in Section 2.3, the majority of CEOs with long education 
did their studies in business (38%) or technical-oriented fields (49%), while about 13% of them 
hold a degree in other disciplines.  
We estimate the model in Table 4 replacing the continuous measure of a CEO’s years of 
education with this categorical variable for the fields of study taking four values (short education 
is used as baseline group). Table 11 indicates that relative to CEOs with short education, only 
CEOs with long education in business-related degrees experience a greater electricity efficiency 
(from 45% to 51% depending on the specification, and significant at the 1% level) while the 
coefficients for CEOs holding long education in technical fields or other fields are not statistically 
different from zero. These results provide some support for the managerial practice view, which 
suggests that CEOs with advanced education in management-related disciplines should leave a 
larger imprint on firms’ energy efficiency. 
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Table 11. Fields of study 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of electricity consumption over number of employees. Technical advanced 
degree is a dummy for undergraduate or higher education in engineering or natural sciences. Business advanced degree is a 
dummy for undergraduate or higher education in management or economics. Other advanced degree is all undergraduate 
or higher educations in fields outside either technical or business.  The baseline educational category is formed by all non-
college educational attainments. Male CEO is a dummy equal to one for male CEOs and zero for female CEOs. CEO age 
measures the years of CEO age.  Log(Capital intensity) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets over its 
number of employees. Asset growth is the growth rate in the firm’s total assets Employees are the number of employees in 
the firm. Total assets is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Furthermore, our regressions include 3-digit industry and year 
dummies. Clustered (firm) standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variable: Log(kWh/Employees) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Business advanced degree -0.4578*** -0.4694*** -0.5163*** -0.5020*** 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) 
Technical advanced degree -0.1433 -0.1470 -0.1890 -0.0988 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.140) (0.135) 
Other advanced degree -0.1272 -0.1322 -0.2413 -0.2309 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.190) (0.184) 
Male CEO  0.1436 -0.0568 -0.0905 
  (0.204) (0.173) (0.167) 
CEO age  -0.0033 -0.0054 -0.0042 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Capital intensity)   0.2772*** 0.3336*** 
   (0.057) (0.058) 
Asset growth   -0.0611** -0.0521* 
   (0.030) (0.029) 
Total assets    -0.0133*** 
    (0.002) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,491 2,491 2,491 2,491 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.109 0.158 0.189 
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4. CEO education, environmental attitude and personal choices 
Our analysis so far shows a positive association between CEO education and firms’ energy 
efficiency. As we have argued, this result can be attributable to the fact that more educated 
managers embrace managerial styles that blend corporate efficiency and respect for the 
environment. In this section, we test whether CEO education is associated with a greater 
awareness of climate changes and, in turn, with a greener attitude in personal decisions. 
 
4.1. CEO education and the perception of climate change 
We start by studying the relationship between CEO education and individual perception of 
climate change threats. Measuring preferences toward the environment is challenging. Leveraging 
on the growing popularity of survey methods in economics (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), 
recent studies have adopted questionnaires to elicit pro-environment preferences (e.g. Videras et 
al. 2012). To address our research question, in collaboration with Statistic Denmark in 2015 we 
sent a questionnaire to approximately 55,000 Danish CEOs. We received answers from 13,590 
CEOs, yielding a response rate of a little over 25%. The survey questions were about values 
regarding political preferences and cultural values. Importantly, the survey also contained a 
question asking “Following the current trend, are we going to experience a climate catastrophe in 
the near future?” Possible responses are: 1=Agree a lot; 2=Agree; 3=Neither nor; 4=Disagree, 
5=Disagree a lot. We use the response to this question as a measure of CEOs’ environmental 
awareness (greater values correspond to weaker environmental concerns). The 11,901 CEOs that 
answered this question are, on average, close to climate neutral (with an average response of 2.9). 
While the survey data is available for a larger sample, in the next empirical analyses we employ 
the subsample of approximately 5,000 CEOs with available information on the CEO and the 
education of their parents (which we will later use as an instrument for CEO education). We 
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apply this restriction also when we use OLS, in order to estimate OLS and 2SLS on the same 
sample. 
We start by estimating a regression in which the dependent variable is the measure of 
climate change concerns ranging from 1 to 5. Given the ordered nature of such variable, we 
employ ordered logit regressions. The key explanatory variable measures a CEO’s years of 
education. Results, reported in the first column of Panel A, Table 12, show that CEO education 
has a negative effect on the likelihood of stating weaker climate change concerns; in other words, 
longer education makes CEOs more concerned about climate change. To reduce omitted factor 
problems, we control for the CEO age, gender, and the logarithm of income. Results, reported in 
the second column of Panel A, are largely consistent with our previous estimates. 
To establish causality, we use a two-stage least square regression. To this end, we follow 
the educational literature and employ the education of a CEO’s father and mother as 
instrumental variables (see Hoogerheide et al. 2012 for a review). The validity condition maintains 
that these instruments are significantly associated with CEO education. We validate this 
condition in the first-stage regression reported in the left part of Panel B, Table 12: the education 
of both a CEO’s mother and father has a positive and 1% significant effect on CEO education. 
The exclusion restriction maintains that parents’ education does not have a direct effect on 
CEO’s climate change concerns other than via the direct effect of CEO education. The primary 
factor that may invalidate this condition is CEO income: CEOs coming from more educated 
(and arguably wealthier) parents may also be less financially constrained (due e.g. to 
intergenerational transfer or resources) and this may influence a CEO’s environmental 
preferences. To mitigate this concern, our specification controls for CEO income.94 Another 
relevant source of variation comes from the family environment in which the CEO grew up: 
                                                     
94 In untabulated checks, we also verify that our results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy equal to one if any of 
the parents have or have had a managerial position in the same firm of the son or daughter (the focal CEO of our 
analysis). This check is useful to mitigate the concern that parents’ education can be correlated with offspring’s 
education (needed for our analysis) but also have a direct effect on offspring’s green attitude due to learning or 
imitation of parents’ green managerial style. 
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growing up with better educated parents may influence the CEOs’ environmental preferences not 
necessarily via their education but directly via parents’ environmental preferences. To alleviate 
this concern, we should ideally control for parents’ environmental preferences. While we do not 
have direct questions about parents’ green attitude, we can use our survey data to control for a 
host of cultural factors related to the family environment in which the CEOs grew up.95 In 
particular, we control for two variables measuring how religious the CEOs’ upbringing was, and 
the political orientation in the CEOs’ childhood household. These two variables can be used as 
proxies for climate change views, since religious and political views have been shown to correlate 
with climate change concerns (e.g. Biel and Nilsson 2014; Stanley et al. 2017; Hoffarth and 
Hodson 2016). Hence, controlling for these variables partly alleviates concerns about the 
endogenous transmission of parental education to CEO environmental preferences. 
The lower panel of Panel B presents the second stage regression, in which the key 
explanatory variable is the instrumented value of CEO education together with the controls of 
our baseline specification. As shown, the results are consistent with our previous insights: CEO 
education has a positive and 1% significant effect on climate change concerns.96  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
95 It is important to notice that the average age of our CEOs is 53 years, so the majority of them were children in the 
60 and early 70s. Before the oil crisis in 1974, there was, in general, little environmental awareness in Denmark. This 
supports in itself the claim that CEOs’ green awareness is not directly correlated with parents’ green awareness after 
we control for parents’ education. 
96 The table also shows that age and being a male significantly decrease climate concerns, which is in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Eisler et al. 2003). 
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Table 12. Relationship between CEO education and environmental concerns 
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results from an ordered logit model in which the dependent variable is the CEO’s 
response to the survey question “Following the current trend, are we then going to experience a climate catastrophe 
in the near future?” Possible responses are: 1=Agree a lot; 2=Agree; 3=Neither nor; 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree a lot. 
Greater values correspond to weaker environmental concerns. The main explanatory variable is a CEO’s years of 
education, CEO age, a dummy for male CEOs, and the logarithm of CEO income. Religious upbringing is measured 
using answers to the survey question “My childhood home was religious and religion was a big part of my 
adolescence” possible answers: 1= Disagree a lot, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither nor, 4=Agree, 5=Agree a lot. Family’s 
political view is measured using answers to the survey question “How would you characterize the political view in 
your childhood home on a scale from one to ten, where one is left wing and 10 is right wing. Panel B presents results 
from a 2-stage least square model. In the first stage regression, reported in the left panel of the table, the dependent 
variable is CEO education and the key explanatory variables are the controls included in Panel A, together with the 
two instrumental variables: the education of a CEO’s mother and father. The right panel of Panel B presents the 
second stage regression, in which the key explanatory variable is the instrumented value of CEO education from the 
first stage together with the controls of our baseline specification. Robust standard errors are shown in the 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel A. Ordered logit     
   
  
Dependent variable: Climate concern     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years of education -0.0217* -0.0217* -0.0220* -0.0294** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
CEO age  0.0101*** 0.0100*** 0.0083** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male CEO  0.1179* 0.1135 0.1321* 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Log(CEO income)  0.0009 0.0018 -0.0013 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Religious upbringing   0.0257  
   (0.024)  
Family's political view    0.1051*** 
      (0.012) 
Observations 5,473 5,473 5,463 5,439 
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Panel B. 2SLS analysis      
   
 
First stage. Dependent variable: Years of education      
 (1) (2) (3) 
CEO age 0.0219*** 0.0207*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male CEO -0.1555*  -0.1582* -0.1417 
 (0.0867) (0.0867) (0.0872) 
Log(CEO income) 0.2318*** 0.2312*** 0.2305*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Father's years of education 0.1040*** 0.1049*** 0.1029*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Mother's years of education 0.1114*** 0.1109*** 0.1103*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Religious upbringing  0.1035***  
  (0.027)  
Family's political view  0.0424*** 
     (0.013) 
Observations 5,463 5,463 5,439 
R2 0.089 0.092 0.092 
F-statistics 108.16 92.36 91.74 
 
 
Second stage. Dependent variable: Climate concern 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Years of education -0.1324***  -0.1306***  -0.1502*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
CEO age 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 0.0053** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male CEO 0.0615 0.0586 0.0641 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Log(CEO income) 0.0268 0.0265 0.0302* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Religious upbringing  0.0217  
 
 (0.014)  
Family's political view  0.0671*** 
     (0.007) 
Observations 5,463 5,463 5,439 
 
 
 
4.2. CEO education and environmental choices: Evidence from cars 
 
 
 149 
The previous section shows that CEO education is positively associated with awareness of 
climate change issues. But does education make CEOs greener when it comes to allocation of 
personal resources and decision-making over real outcomes? We address this question using data 
on CEOs’ cars. The Motor Vehicle Register (DMRB) contains extensive information on every 
motor vehicle registered in a Danish household or company. The register is updated whenever a 
vehicle undergoes a transaction (e.g. new purchase, change of ownership, scrapping etc.). Given 
our focus on personal lifestyle, we only focus on passenger cars (excluding commercial vehicles). 
The cars are all associated with the owner’s individual identification number. If the car is owned 
by a company but used by the CEO, then the company identification number is registered as the 
owner, but the CEO identification number is registered as the user. We are therefore able to 
construct a complete map of the cars owned and used by Danish CEOs. Our data contain 
information on cars’ fuel type, fuel efficiency (kilometers per liter of fuel), weight and 
classification (e.g. 2 or 4-wheel drive). We focus on the universe of Danish CEOs in 2013, and on 
the subsample of CEOs included in our survey. Summary statistics for both samples are reported 
in Table 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Summary statistics on CEO cars 
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This table shows the summary statistics for the CEOs employed in our analysis in Table 13. Panel 
A refers to the population of Danish CEOs, while Panel B refers to the CEOs covered in our 
survey about CEO values. Urban dummy is equal to one if the CEO residence is in one of the 
five largest municipalities in Denmark and zero otherwise. Log(Km/Liter gas) is the logarithm of 
a CEO car’s energy efficiency measured as the ratio of kilometers per liter of gasoline. Electric 
car is a dummy equal to one for electric cars and zero otherwise. A complete description of each 
variable is provided in Table A1. 
 
Panel A. Population of Danish CEOs 
 Observations Mean Std. dev. 
Urban dummy 74,858 0.20 0.40 
Electric car 74,858 0.0010 0.03 
Diesel car 74,858 0.46 0.50 
Log(Km/Liter gas) 74,858 2.80 0.29 
Panel B. CEOs in the value survey 
  
 Observations Mean Std. dev. 
Urban dummy 4,504 0.17 0.38 
Electric car 4,504 0.0011 0.03 
Diesel car 4,504 0.48 0.50 
Log(Km/Liter gas) 4,504 2.78 0.29 
 
 
In our regression analysis, the first dependent variable is the logarithm of kilometers per 
liter of fuel (greater values correspond to more environment-friendly cars). One potential 
violation of this argument is represented by diesel engines, which are normally considered worse 
for the environment but at the same time makes a car run longer per liter. To avoid this 
confounding effect, we control for a dummy equal to one for diesel cars, and zero otherwise.97 
We also control for the weight of the cars and therefore estimate the environmental margin of car 
choices within a given class of car size. Additionally, we control for the CEO-level characteristics 
employed in the previous section (namely gender and age, but also CEO income that may affect 
car choice via budget constraints). To account for the confounding effect of a CEO’s area of 
residence (in urban vs. rural areas) we also control for a dummy equal to one if the CEO lives in 
one of the five largest Danish municipalities, and zero otherwise. 
We employ both OLS and 2SLS using parents’ education as instrumental variables. 
Results in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 14, Panel A, indicate that CEO education has a significant 
                                                     
97 Even though diesel cars drive longer per liter of fuel, they pollute more than gasoline cars (Anenberg et al. 2017).  
 
 
 151 
and positive effect on the green efficiency of his/her car. We validate this finding using an 
alternative dependent variable, i.e. a dummy equal to one for electric cars and zero otherwise. 
Driving an electric car is often perceived as a strong environmental commitment. Column (3) 
shows that more educated CEOs are significantly more likely to own electric cars. The remaining 
part of the table validates this result using different subsamples. In Columns (4)-(5), we use the 
subsample of non-married CEOs to evaluate whether their car choice depends on their family 
situation. Higher education is positively associated with car efficiency in the OLS specification. 
The coefficient remains positive and large in the 2SLS specification, though the coefficient is less 
precise.  
In Panel B of Table 14, we employ the CEOs covered in the survey discussed in Section 
4.1. Again, the results are consistent with our main finding: highly educated CEOs choose more 
environmental-friendly cars. Using this latter sample makes us able to control for how religious 
the CEOs’ upbringing was, and the political orientation in the CEOs’ childhood household 
(similar to what we did in Section 4.1). As the table shows, our results are robust to the inclusion 
of these additional variables as well as to the use of a 2SLS regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. CEO education and car choices 
 
This table presents results of OLS and the second-stage of 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions, we use as 
instruments for CEO education the education of a CEO’s father and mother measured in years. Depending on 
the specification, the dependent variable is Log(Km/Liter gas), i.e. the logarithm of the ratio of kilometers per 
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liter of gas, or Electric car, i.e. a dummy equal to one for electric cars and zero otherwise. In Columns (1)-(3) of 
Panel A, we use the population of Danish CEOs. In Columns (4)-(5) we use the subsample of single (unmarried) 
CEOs. Years of education measures a CEO’s years of schooling. Male CEO is a dummy equal to one for male 
CEOs and zero for female CEOs. CEO age measures the years of CEO age. Urban dummy is equal to one if the 
CEO lives in one of the five largest municipalities and zero otherwise. Log(CEO income) is the logarithm of 
CEO income. Log(Car weight) is the logarithm of a CEO’s car. Diesel car is equal to one for diesel cars and zero 
otherwise. In Panel B we use the CEOs covered in our value survey of 2009. These regressions include as further 
controls also religious upbringing measured using answers to the survey question “My childhood home was 
religious and religion was a big part of my adolescence” possible answers: 1= Disagree a lot, 2=Disagree, 
3=Neither nor, 4=Agree, 5=Agree a lot, and family’s political view measured using answers to the survey question 
“How would you characterize the political view in your childhood home on a scale from one to ten, where one is 
left wing and 10 is right wing.  Robust standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
Panel A.  
All CEOs 
 
 Single CEOs 
 
Dependent variable: Log(Km/ Log(Km/ Electric  Log(Km/ Log(Km/ 
 Liter gas) Liter gas) Car  Liter gas) Liter gas) 
 OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (4) (5) 
Years of education 0.0043*** 0.0080*** 0.0005**  0.0044*** 0.0052 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 (0.001) (0.006) 
Log(CEO income) 0.0086*** 0.0075*** 0.0000  0.0037 0.0035 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Male CEO -0.0074*** -0.0066*** 0.0003  -0.0513*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
CEO age -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0000  -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban dummy -0.0088*** -0.0111*** -0.0003  0.0006 0.0000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Log(Car weight) -0.9565*** -0.9576*** 0.0037***  -1.0809*** -1.0804*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Diesel car 0.4023*** 0.4026***  
 0.4446*** 0.4445*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Adjusted R2 0.550 0.549  
 
0.650 0.650 
Observations 74,858 74,858 74,858  4,180 4,180 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.  
CEOs covered in the survey 
 
Dependent variable: Log(Km/ Log(Km/ Log(Km/ Log(Km/ Log(Km/ Log(Km/ 
 Liter gas) Liter gas) Liter gas) Liter gas) Liter gas) Liter gas) 
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 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years of education 0.0035** 0.0036** 0.0034** 0.0104** 0.0104** 0.0103** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Log(CEO income) 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0106*** 0.0086** 0.0086** 0.0087** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male CEO -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0066 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0058 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO age -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban dummy -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0025 -0.0072 -0.0074 -0.0072 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log(Car weight) -0.9777*** -0.9774*** -0.9768*** -0.9787*** -0.9783*** -0.9778*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Diesel car 0.3984*** 0.3982*** 0.3982*** 0.3989*** 0.3987*** 0.3985*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Religious upbringing  0.0002   -0.0005  
  (0.0003)   (0.0003)  
Family's political view   0.0006   0.0003 
   (0.001)   (0.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.532 0.532 0.530 0.530 0.529 
Observations 4,504 4,497 4,777 4,504 4,497 4,777 
 
5. Conclusion 
Understanding the drivers of environmental decisions is central to designing effective policies 
that mitigate the impact of firm actions on natural resources. We contribute to the growing 
literature on the implications of top executives’ human capital by studying how CEO education 
shapes environmental attitudes in corporate decision-making.  
Estimating a wide array of regressions on a panel dataset of Danish firms from 1996 to 
2012, we deliver the following findings. First, we find a positive association between CEO 
education and firms’ energy efficiency: better educated CEOs use significantly less energy inputs 
(electricity and gas) per employee. Second, we seek to establish the causal direction of our 
findings by using CEO hospitalization events, which generate temporary and arguably exogenous 
separations between CEOs and firms without changing the matching between the two. Third, we 
estimate the effects of long education in different fields showing a positive association between 
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electricity efficiency and CEO advanced education in business-related fields. Fourth, using a 
comprehensive survey on individual values and preferences, we show that highly educated CEOs 
exhibit stronger personal concerns for climate change. They are also significantly more likely to 
own environment-friendly vehicles, such as fuel-efficient cars and electric cars.  
Taken together, our results suggest that CEO education brings about a management style 
that can reconcile financial performance with environmental preservation. 
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Figure A1. The Danish educational system 
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Table A1. List of variables  
Name Description 
Financial variables 
Total assets The value of the firm's total assets 
Gross profits Yearly gross profit 
Capital intensity The ratio of capital (total assets) to labor (employees) 
Asset growth The percentage yearly change in total assets 
Employees The total number of the firm’s employees 
Fixed assets Tangible assets such as property, plant, equipment etc. 
Pretax earnings Earnings after operating expenses and before tax 
  
CEO characteristics 
CEO age The age of the CEO 
CEO male Dummy = 1 if the CEO is a male 
Years of education The duration of the CEO's highest educational degree in years 
Non college degree 
Consists of lower and upper secondary, vocational, and short academy 
professional programs 
Undergraduate degree 
Consists of 3-3.54 years long post high school professional bachelor and 
undergraduate programs 
Master or PhD degree Consists of university graduate programs 
Short education 
Dummy = 1 if the CEO's highest education is shorter than a college 
degree 
Long technical education 
Dummy = 1 if the CEO's has a master or PhD degree in engineering or 
natural sciences 
Long business educations 
Dummy = 1 if the CEO's has a master or PhD degree in business or 
economics 
Long other education 
Dummy = 1 if the CEO's has a master or PhD degree in any other field 
than in a business or technical field 
Log(CEO income) 
The CEO's yearly cash payments, excluding benefits, stock option or 
other non-cash payments 
CEO ownership Dummy = 1 if the CEO own more than 5 per cent of the firm 
Urban dummy 
Dummy = 1 if the CEO lives in one of the five most populated 
municipalities in Denmark 
Fathers' years of education Years of education obtained by the father of the CEO 
Mothers' years of education Years of education obtained by the mother of the CEO 
Days at hospitalization [t, t-1] 
Days during which the CEOs has been hospitalized in the year up to and 
in the current year 
  
Firm’s energy efficiency  
Electricity Yearly electricity consumption measured in 1,000 kWh 
Log(kWh/Employees) The logarithm of the firm's electricity consumption over its employees 
Log(kWh/Gross profits) The logarithm of the firm's electricity consumption over its gross profits 
Log(kWh/Pre-tax earnings) 
The logarithm of the firm's electricity consumption over its pre-tax 
earnings 
Log(kWh/Fixed assets) The logarithm of the firm's electricity consumption over its fixed assets 
Water, M3 Yearly water consumption measured in 1,000 cubic meters 
Log(Water/Gross profits) The logarithm of the firm's water consumption over its gross profits 
Gas M3 Yearly gas consumption measured in 1,000 cubic meters 
Log(Gas/Gross profits) The logarithm of the firm's gas consumption over its gross profits 
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BTU British Thermal Unit 
  
Environmental variables at the CEO level 
Climate concern 
Survey question: Following the current trend, are we then going to 
experience a climate catastrophe in the near future? 
Categories: 1. Agree a lot, 2. Agree, 3. Neither nor, 4. Disagree, 5. 
Disagree a lot 
Religious upbringing 
Survey question: CEOs’ perception of how religious his/her upbringing 
was on a scale from 1 to 5 (1: not religious - 5: very religious) 
Family’s political view 
Survey question: CEOs' perception of his family's political view in 
his/her upbringing on a scale from 1 to 10 (1: Left wing - 10. Right 
wing) 
Log(Km/Liter gas) 
The logarithm of the most fuel-efficient car at the CEO's household, 
measured by distance (in kilometers) the car runs per liter gas (number 
provided by producer) 
Log(car weight) The logarithm of the weight of the heaviest car in the CEO's household 
Diesel car Dummy=1 if the CEO's household owns a diesel car 
Electric car Dummy=1 if the CEO's household owns an electric car 
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Conclusion 
This Ph.D. thesis analyzes the determinants and implication of age at first childbearing for 
women, the gender inequality in child penalty, and CEOs’ environmental decision-making. 
Overall, the three chapters of this thesis use highly detailed register and survey data on different 
labor market outcomes. Each chapter contributes to our understanding of economic questions 
highly relevant in the public debate. The first chapter addresses the issue of when to have 
children. Women in modern society are pressured by constant demands from the society. For 
financial reasons, they are told that they are supposed to finish their studies and be well 
established in the labor market before having children. For biological considerations, they are 
told not to wait until they are too old, since fertility drops significantly with age. These “kind” 
suggestions provide a narrow window for when the women are supposed to feel confident in 
having children. My study finds that women should not necessarily wait with childbearing for 
financial reasons, since the observed income premium of postponing childbearing is most likely 
based on reverse causality. The second chapter addresses the issue of gender equality in the labor 
market. I identify one of the reasons behind the inequality in earnings and argue that most of the 
earnings differential has its roots within the households. How we organize the household around 
childbirth is still gender dependent and the current organization has a strong impact on mothers’ 
earnings. The third chapter finds that education increases climate change awareness and better 
educated CEOs are better at saving energy for manufacturing firms. A big part of the world’s 
energy consumption comes from manufacturing firms. Identifying what can lower energy 
consumption can be important in the ongoing struggle against overexploiting our planet’s 
resources.  
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